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Since 1945, nuclear w eapons have im pacted w orld politics and the w orld has
sought to control their spread. This has resulted in the nonproliferation regim e and its
centerpiece: the Treaty on the N onproliferation o f N uclear W eapons (NPT).
U nderstanding nonproliferation com pliance is im portant to determ ining w hether the NPT
is contributing to stopping the spread o f nuclear weapons. If the N PT is having no
influence on state behavior, then the international com m unity can decide if its efforts
should be redirected from treaties to other nonproliferation efforts.
There are several com peting theories on w hy states do or do not com ply with
treaties. One o f the most com m on thoughts is that states act in their own best interest at
the moment. However, dom estic politics and the influence o f internal factors have
gained recognition and popularity. Dr. Beth Simm ons is one o f the leading scholars in
this area.
Simmons has done extensive qualitative and quantitative research resulting in the
proposition that in the case o f human rights treaties m obilization o f dom estic groups,
agenda setting, and litigation influence treaty com pliance. Simmons argues that the
neorealist focus on state interests w ithin treaty com pliance is not satisfactory.
While the Sim m ons’ theory developed from human rights treaties, it m ay be
applicable to nonproliferation. Both issue areas deal with security: individual for human

rights and national for nonproliferation. Furthermore, the hum an rights treaties used by
Simmons and the NPT share sim ilar timelines in w orld history, are w idely ratified, and
utilize oversight bodies. And yet they all lack direct enforcem ent capabilities. Like the
human rights issues, nuclear w eapons issues som etim es cause an em otional reaction.
Finally, while it goes against accepted international norms to violate hum an rights and
proliferate, infractions still occur in both issue areas. Perhaps, the m ost com m on reason
for the violations is for the security o f the ruling regime.
Does the dom estic politics theory on com pliance with hum an rights treaties assist
in explaining N PT com pliance? Given the success o f the theory in the area o f human
rights and the similarities o f hum an rights treaties to the NPT, it will be meaningful to
evaluate the domestic politics theory o f treaty com pliance and use the theory in the area
o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f treaty com pliance m ore generally
and to test whether the issue area matters.
This dissertation seeks to assess w hether Sim m ons’s domestic politics theory o f
com pliance (i.e. m obilization o f dom estic groups, agenda setting, and litigation) is a
useful prism for viewing the high politics issues area o f national security, specifically on
nuclear weapons, by exploring six Nonproliferation Treaty m em ber states situations o f
com pliance, noncom pliance, and potential com pliance concern. Ultimately, it shows that
the theory is not very useful in explaining com pliance (or noncom pliance) because the
mechanism s are not present when analyzing the NPT. M obilization is som ewhat present
in two cases but not directly tied to the NPT and nonproliferation. This m eans that the
theory should be m odified to account for its shortcom ings with treaties concerning high
politics issues.

Copyright, 2013, by Kimberly Van Dyke Gilligan, All Rights Reserved.

There is no evil in the atom; only in men's souls. -A d lai Stevenson, 1952

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

M any times during graduate school, I realized that trying to earn a Ph.D. is like
trying to climb Mt. Kilimanjaro. I started both endeavors with much enthusiasm and a
little trepidation. I had som e experience that I felt made me qualified and I w ould just
wing the rest. Now, I recognize that learning to be a scholar is not quite like learning to
use the bathroom outdoors... but for me they are both traumatic experiences. Perhaps, I
should have said that my enthusiasm was accom panied by optimism and naivety. I never
understood in either situation w hy people should be intim idated or w orse yet, not m ake it
to the sum m it after so much effort. It never occurred to me I could not finish either
challenge. I could practically hear the Sherpas telling me, “pole, pole” w hile going
through graduate school (pole is Swahili for slowly). Except this time, instead o f the
m eaning “slowly, slow ly” as advice to take m y time to ensure success, I was hearing it as
a cruel chant that I was dragging this on too slowly and was taking too long.
I owe m y parents so much. W hen I said I was going to climb K ilim anjaro my
parents laughed at my lack o f m ountain clim bing and bought me hiking boots. Likewise,
when I told them about the language requirem ent for a Ph.D. they laughed at my lack o f
language skills and bought me German language software. Their buying m y hiking boots
helped get m e up the mountain and their buying German software helped get me through
the Ph.D. language requirement. Like with m any o f my ambitious plans, they are
supportive and keep the “you’re crazy” com m ents to a minimum. One plan was to write
a book. Now, I m eant a hum orous com ing o f age n o v el... but this dissertation will do.

I also never could have clim bed the m ountain without a guide. Dr. Kurt Taylor
Gaubatz has been my guide every step o f the way. From my first classes at Old
Dominion University through the dissertation process, Dr. G aubatz has been encouraging
and guided me in the right direction.
Thanks to com m ittee m em bers Dr. Karp and Dr. Schulm an for their advice and
questions which helped to shape this dissertation. I also owe a debt to M elodee Baines
w hose friendship and sense o f hum or helped me keep my sanity through graduate school.
Finally, I w ant to acknow ledge m y husband for supporting m e and his patience when I
vented about my research. I have ditched him for many a coffee shop over the past three
years and he has never com plained.

T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S

Page
LIST OF T A B L E S ................................................................................................................................ x
IN TR O D U C TIO N .................................................................................................................................1
N UCLEA R W E A P O N S ........................................................................................................ 6
COM PARING NON PROLIFERATION AND HUM AN R IG H T S ........................ 10
THE N ON PRO LIFERA TIO N REGIM E AND THE N P T ........................................ 17
FIN D IN G S .............................................................................................................................. 25
D ISSERTATION STR U C TU R E.......................................................................................27
COM PLIANCE AND TH E CASE STUDY M E T H O D O L O G Y ...........................................31
IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................................ 31
COM PLIANCE A ND N O N C O M P L IA N C E ................................................................ 33
DOM ESTIC POLITICS AND TREATY C O M P L IA N C E ........................................ 39
W HY A CA SE STUDY M E T H O D O L O G Y ................................................................ 48
CASE ID E N T IF IC A T IO N ................................................................................................. 50
C O N CLU SIO N S....................................................................................................................54
STATES OF NO PRO LIFERA TION C O N C E R N .................................................................... 56
IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................................ 56
G E R M A N Y ............................................................................................................................59
K A Z A K H ST A N ....................................................................................................................71
CO N C LU SIO N S...........................................................
80
STATES THAT HAVE A LREA D Y FAILED TO C O M PL Y ................................................ 83
IN T R O D U C T IO N ................................................................................................................ 83
SY R IA ...................................................................................................................................... 87
L IB Y A ................................................................................................................................... 101
C O N CLU SIO N S..................................................................................................................114
STATES THAT ARE OF POTENTIAL PRO LIFERA TION C O N C E R N ....................... 117
IN T R O D U C T IO N ............................................................................................................ 117
EG Y PT................................................................................................................................... 121
SAUDI A R A B IA ................................................................................................................ 135
C O N C LU SIO N S..................................................................................................................147

ix

Page
C O N C L U S IO N S ...............................................................................................................................151
IN T R O D U C T IO N .............................................................................................................. 151
W HAT CAN BE INFERRED ABOUT THE T H E O R Y ?...................................... 153
W HAT DO THE RESULTS TELL US A BOU T N O N PRO LIFERA TIO N ? .... 158
IS M OBILIZA TION THE K E Y ?.................................................................................. 159
RESEARCH C O N C LU SIO N S...................................................................................... 161
BIBLIO G RA PH Y ..............................................................................................................................167
V IT A .....................................................................................................................................................182

X

LIST OF TABLES

Table

Page

1..... Results o f Chapter 3 Case S tu d ie s.......................................................................................... 82
2.

Results o f C hapter 4 Case S tu d ie s...................................................................................... 116

3.

Results o f C hapter 5 Case S tu d ie s........................................................................................ 150

4.

Results o f All Case Studies........................................................................................ 157

1

C H A PTER I
INTRODUCTION

Since 1945, nuclear weapons have played a vital role in international politics.
They continue to do so being perceived as overt threats, security enhancers, and prestige
enhancers. Given how dangerous nuclear w eapons are the issue o f nonproliferation and
the international effort to stop the spread o f nuclear weapons is critically important.
A key step in stopping the spread o f nuclear w eapons is for states to first com mit
themselves voluntarily not to acquire the w eapons and not to assist other states in their
pursuit o f the weapons. States make this com m itm ent by ratifying the Treaty on the
N onproliferation o f N uclear W eapons (NPT).

Given that m ost everyone can agree a

world with m ore nuclear weapons states is a scary prospect (with K enneth W altz being
the famous dissenter),1 it is im portant to understand com pliance with the NPT. Put
another way, understanding w hether the N PT influences nonproliferation com pliance is
important to know ing w hether the N PT is contributing to stopping the spread o f nuclear
weapons. I f the NPT is having no influence on state behavior, then the international
com m unity should redirect its efforts to other nonproliferation endeavors. The question
asked in this dissertation is: can treaties influence com pliance? And, if so, how do they
do so? M ore specifically, does the NPT influence nonproliferation com pliance at the
national level?
A review o f the literature on treaty com pliance reveals a prim arily neorealist
perspective. The com m only accepted b elief is that state compliance can be explained by

1 Kenneth N. W altz, "The Spread o f N uclear W eapons: More M ay Better," Adelphi
Papers, no. 171 (1981).
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balance o f pow er and states acting in their own best interests.2 However, Dr. Beth
Simm ons has recently argued that treaties them selves influence state com pliance by
influencing politics at the dom estic level.3
Simmons has done extensive qualitative and quantitative research resulting in the
proposition that mobilization o f dom estic groups, agenda setting, and litigation influence
com pliance o f a state in the case o f hum an rights treaties. Simmons refers to this trifecta
as the dom estic politics theory o f com pliance. As the Director o f the W eatherhead
Center for International Affairs and Clarence D illon Professor o f International Affairs at
Harvard University, Simmons is a very w ell-respected and influential scholar.4
Sim m ons’ seminal work is her 2009 book, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights:
International Law in D om estic P olitics, which presents her argum ent for the dom estic
politics theory o f treaty com pliance.5 Sim m ons argues in her award-winning book that
the neorealist focus on state interests for treaty com pliance is not satisfactory.6 She does
not claim her findings are sufficient to explain com pliance behavior but that they do play
a pivotal role in com pliance. H er research focused on case studies w ithin the low politics
area o f hum an rights. Given how influential her theory has been, it is im portant to

2 Kenneth N. W altz, Theory o f International Politics (Boston: M cGraw-Hill, 1979).
3 Beth A. Simmons, M obilizing f o r H um an Rights: International Law in D omestic
Politics (New York: Cam bridge U niversity Press, 2009).
4 Harvard University, "People: Beth Simm ons,"
http://w w w .gov.harvard.edu/people/faculty/beth-sim m ons (accessed N ovem ber 30,
2 0 1 2 ).

5 Sim m ons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D omestic Politics.
6 A ccording to Simm ons' university biography page (H arvard University, "People: Beth
Simmons."), M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D om estic Politics won
the “2010 American Society for International L aw ’s Certificate o f M erit for a Preeminent
Contribution to Creative Scholarship, the American Political Science A ssociation’s
W oodrow W ilson Award for best book published in government, politics or international
relations, and the International social Science C ouncil’s Stein Rokkan A w ard for a very
substantial and original contribution to social science research"
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understand what other fields o f study it m ay be applied successfully and w hat limitations
it may have. This dissertation seeks to understand whether Sim m ons’ dom estic politics
theory o f com pliance (i.e. m obilization o f domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation)
is applicable to the high politics issues o f national security, specifically on the
proliferation o f nuclear weapons. It does so by exploring the situation o f six NPT states’
with differing experiences o f com pliance and noncompliance.
W hile the Sim m ons’ theory developed from human rights treaties, it m ay be
applicable to nonproliferation. Both issue areas deal with security: individual for human
rights and national for nonproliferation. Furtherm ore, the hum an rights treaties used by
Simmons and the N PT share sim ilar tim elines in w orld history, are w idely ratified, and
utilize oversight bodies. And yet they all lack direct enforcem ent capabilities. Like the
human rights issues, nuclear w eapons issues som etim es cause an em otional reaction.
Finally, w hile it goes against accepted international norms to violate hum an rights and
proliferate, infractions still occur in both issue areas. Perhaps, the m ost com m on reason
for the violations is for the security o f the ruling regime.
The dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance has been applied successfully to
human rights treaties, w hich are by their very definition for the individual's security.
Therefore, the individuals that com prise the dom estic population are the largest
stakeholders. This m ay or may not hold true for national security issues, such as
acquiring nuclear weapons. Groups that m obilize at the domestic level to dem and their
rights under international law m ay not dem and com pliance with international laws that
involve national security issues. Given the success o f the theory in the area o f human
rights and the sim ilarities o f human rights treaties to the NPT, it will be meaningful to

evaluate the domestic politics theory o f treaty com pliance and use the theory in the area
o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f treaty com pliance more generally
and to test w hether the issue area matters. By understanding com pliance with the NPT
policym akers may be able to work more efficiently and effectively on nonproliferation
agreements.
The dom estic politics theory o f com pliance is com prised o f three elements: the
m obilization o f domestic groups, agenda setting, and litigation. The first elem ent is the
m obilization o f dom estic groups. These groups can be m otivated to organize and
inspired to influence their governm ent based on a treaty. Sim m ons’ argues that a treaty
m ay increase the odds o f success and thereby increase m otivation o f a group to mobilize
for change. There have been m om ents in history o f strong anti-nuclear w eapons
m ovements. M obilization has occurred against the weapons and the treaty gives further
credibility and hope to those mobilizing.
The second point that Simm ons advances is that negotiating and ratifying a treaty
can influence or set dom estic agendas. Treaties can bring issues to the forefront o f the
elite agenda setters’ attention and the nation’s population in general. A treaty gives text
to a concept and som ething for people to speak directly about in specific terms. The elite
agenda setters m ay have a variety o f international and domestic reasons to ratify and
possibly com ply with a treaty. The domestic population now has a legal foothold on
which to dem and action from its government. In the nonproliferation arena this means
that the decision to build nuclear w eapons m ust be held in order for states to determ ine
whether they will ratify the NPT. This brings up the third part o f Sim m ons’ domestic
policy theory o f treaty com pliance, litigation.
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The final part o f Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory o f com pliance is litigation.
With treaty ratification, citizens now have a legal m echanism, which depending on the
legitimacy o f the judiciary system, can be used to dem and (and possibly even ensure)
com pliance and not sim ply state lip service to a treaty and its mandate. In the world o f
nuclear proliferation this means a state that has ratified the treaty m ay now fear that its
domestic population can hold the national governm ent accountable. Right and w rong are
now explicitly w ritten out in a treaty and the dom estic population can observe and judge
com pliance o f its ow n governm ent and bring legal action as necessary.
Simm ons argues that w ithin hum an rights treaties there is a disparity o f
com pliance perhaps based on the specific issue. Those issues that have related actions
that are “centrally adm inistered and easy to observe” are m ore likely have state
com pliance then those issues that involve actions that are “decentralized and often
furtive.” 7 Simm ons offers the exam ple o f state adm inistered death penalty at the national
level, as opposed to torture, which m ay be adm inistered widely at the local level. In
com parison, a pursuit o f nuclear w eapons will be a centralized tightly controlled state
effort and therefore in theory it should be straightforward for a governm ent to control
com pliance (or noncom pliance).
Simm ons theory and findings are based on studying com pliance with human
rights treaties. W hat about when the issue is nuclear weapons and nonproliferation?
First, we should understand nuclear weapons and then com pare the two issue areas.

7 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H uman Rights: International Law in D omestic Politics, 358.
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N uclear W eapons

Since the 1945 nuclear weapon test in a New M exico desert, nuclear w eapons
have taken on m any meanings. It has been argued that these w eapons o f mass destruction
represent the end o f a world war, prestige, scientific prowess, Cold W ar stability, and
national security (in the form o f deterrence). For those against nuclear weapons, these
bom bs also represent potential genocide, possible accidents, a future in a state o f nuclear
winter, as well as targets o f terrorists and sabotage.
N uclear weapons are unique because o f their im portant role in international
politics. The fungibility o f nuclear w eapons m ay be debatable but the pow er and prestige
that comes with the weapons is not. It is no coincidence that the five perm anent m em bers
o f the U nited N ations Security Council are the five nuclear weapons states recognized by
the NPT. A ccording to the Article IX o f the NPT, only states that have “m anufactured
and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January,
1967” are recognized as nuclear w eapons states under Article IX o f the treaty. M any
states have sought nuclear weapons at some point, perhaps to be a part o f this elite club.
Those states that evolve their programs to the full developm ent o f w eapons have seen
how this changes the international playing field. N orth Korea, for exam ple, has only a
handful o f w eapons but it demands greater attention from the international com m unity
than if it had no weapons at all. Yet, m ost states have given up their “right” to pursue
nuclear weapons.
N uclear w eapons are infamous as a threat to nations and individuals. N uclear
weapons contain a trem endous potential energy and resulting destructive power. Even a
prim itive nuclear weapon, such as the one dropped on Hiroshima, contains in a single
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w eapon the equivalent destruction pow er o f 15 kilotons o f TN T.8 Any given m odem
nuclear weapon may be equal to m illions o f tons o f TNT. The largest nuclear weapon in
history is the U SSR ’s Tsar Bomba (also known as the King o f Bombs). This weapon was
designed to be 100 megatons o f TNT but to reduce the fallout during the test it was only
detonated to h alf its potential, which was equal to a yield o f 50 m egatons o f TN T.9 This
resulted in a shock wave that could be felt 700 kilometers aw ay and com plete destruction
w ithin the 55-kilom eter radius. A bom b this size may not be m ilitarily useful but it
illustrates the destructive power that can be raged against humankind. H ow can we
control the spread o f this technology and avoid destruction?
There are three possible m ethods for controlling the spread o f nuclear weapons.
There is deterrence, w hich is to say a threat based approach. There are security
assurances, both positive and negative, which are to assuage threats. Finally, there are
political approaches, such as treaties.
Deterrence is the credible threat o f retaliation for undesirable/noncom pliant
behavior and is com pletely dependent upon punishm ent.10 The extreme exam ple in
security is M utually A ssured Destruction, also know n as M AD, and M AD is exactly what
it is. M AD is the concept that if the states involved in a conflict both have enough
nuclear w eapons to survive an attack and retaliate by annihilating the enem y than neither
side will launch an attack, which at that point is tantam ount to national suicide. M AD is
often used to describe the Cold W ar relationship between the US and the Soviet Union

8 John M alik, "The Yields o f the H iroshim a and Nagasaki N uclear Explosions," (Los
Alamos, N.M .: Los Alam os National Laboratory, 1985), 1.
9 The N uclear W eapon Archive, "The Soviet W eapons Program - the Tsar Bomba,"
http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/Russia/TsarBom ba.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
10 Graham Evans and Richard N ew nham , The Penguin Dictionary o f International
Relations (London: Penguin, 1998), 126.

stockpiles.11 W eapons states and nonaligned states agreed that “ som ething had to be
done to cap the flow o f nuclear weapon technology or the actual transfer o f such weapons
before matters ran out o f control.” 12
On a related issue, security assurances may be another m ethod o f stem ming
proliferation o f nuclear w eapons.13 There are positive and negative security assurances.
Positive security assurances (usually referred to as security guarantees) are com mitments
to come to the aid o f a state threatened by the use o f force. If the use o f nuclear weapons
is an option in defending said state, it is considered to be under a nuclear umbrella. A
negative security assurance is the com m itm ent not to use nuclear w eapons against a state.
The idea is that by offering security a state will be less likely to pursue nuclear weapons
to bolster its own security. Positive and negative security assurances take the form o f b i
lateral agreements, multi-lateral agreem ents, and treaties (such as nuclear weapon free
zones). There are over a dozen o f these types o f agreements but no single allencom passing agreem ent (or treaty).14
W hy create a nonproliferation treaty rather than use deterrence or security
guarantees to stop the spread o f nuclear weapons? Threatening a country for developing
nuclear weapons reinforces for the victim state the value o f the weapons (and that the
state which possesses nuclear w eapons makes the rule). A treaty will offer benefits for
com pliant behavior rather than only punishm ent offered by deterrence.

11 Ibid., 312.
12
Thom as C. Reed and Danny B. Stillman, The Nuclear Express (M inneapolis: Zenith
Press, 2009), 143.
13 James J. W ritz and Peter R. Lavoy, eds., Over the H orizon Proliferation Threats (Palo
Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012), 240.
14 Ibid., 241.
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Robert Cooper said it best, “it may be that m odem science, w hich gave us the
weapons, will also give us the means o f controlling them. But history suggests that the
solution to the problem s o f technology is better politics rather than better technology.” 15
In fact, there is a long history o f trying to use politics to control nuclear weapons.
President Eisenhower was one o f the first to suggest policy to control proliferation,
believing that decisive policy decisions could make a difference he asked that the
decisions “be the decisions which will lead this w orld out o f fear and into peace.” 16
Perhaps, the m ost effective and celebrated o f these policies is the NPT.
Policy in the form o f a treaty m ay be the only w ay o f slow ing and possibly
stopping the spread o f nuclear w eapons. D eterrence has not proven sufficient for
stopping the spread o f nuclear weapons. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-m oon expanded
on this concept when he said, “Unfortunately, the doctrine o f nuclear deterrence has
proven to be contagious. This has made non-proliferation m ore difficult, w hich in turn
raises new risks that nuclear w eapons will be used.” 17
If it is assum ed that treaties are critical to controlling the spread o f nuclear
weapons, then com pliance is the essential issue. No treaty is perfect and there will
always be a state that fails to com ply or attempts to cheat. N onproliferation treaties and
agreements give the international com m unity a structure to create and codify

15 Robert Cooper, The Breaking o f Nations: O rder a n d Chaos in the Twenty First
Century (London: Atlantic M onthly Press, 2004), 5.
16 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Atoms for Peace" (paper presented at the 470th Plenary
M eeting o f the United Nations General A ssem bly, New York, NY, 1953).
17 Ban Ki-moon, "The United Nations and Security in a N uclear-W eapon-Free World"
(paper presented at the N uclear Disarmament: A Com pass Point for Progress and
Accountability, New York, 2008).
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international norms, a way to control the chaos and identify the cheaters.

Kennedy

perhaps put it best in 1963 in his com m encem ent speech to American University:

No treaty, how ever much it may be to the advantage o f all, however tightly it may
be worded, can provide absolute security against the risks o f deception and
evasion. But it can - - if it is sufficiently effective in its enforcem ent and if it is
sufficiently in the interests o f its signers - - offer far more security and far fewer
risks than an unabated, uncontrolled, unpredictable arms race.18

Com paring N onproliferation and H um an Rights

On the surface nonproliferation law and hum an rights law seem very different, but
on several levels, they are comparable. In both cases, states com mit them selves to a
course o f action that infringes upon their national sovereignty. The two also address
security. Human rights deals with individual security and nonproliferation has a focus on
state and individual security. Human rights essentially seek to ensure that “everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security o f person.” 19 Nonproliferation seeks “to make every
effort to avert the danger o f such a w ar and to take m easures to safeguard the security o f
peoples.”" These definitions aid in understanding the cosm opolitan view that most
people can agree on: it is a good thing to be pro-hum an rights and pro-nonproliferation
(anti-spread o f nuclear weapons).

18 John F. Kennedy, "Com m encem ent Address at American University, June 10, 1963"
(paper presented at the American University Spring Com m encem ent, W ashington, DC,
1963).
19 United Nations General Assembly, "Universal Declaration o f Human Rights," in
Resolution 217 A (III) (10 Decem ber 1948), Article III.
20 "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons," in UN Registration N um ber I10485 (05 M arch 1970), Preamble.

Furthering the idea that human rights and nonproliferation are both about security,
they both have sim ilar goals but differing entities to protect. The pursuit o f hum an rights
is often viewed as in the protection o f the individual and the pursuit o f nuclear w eapons is
often viewed as in the protection o f the nation. Hum an rights are not seen as playing a
key role in national security. In some cases it is said that hum an rights even hinder
national security by disallow ing certain practices that some believe are in the interest o f
national security. N uclear weapons, on the other hand, are seen as increasing defenses
and some believe the weapons are very much in the interest o f national security. The
same could be for regim e security.
Both hum an rights violations and nuclear w eapons proliferation m ay be
incentivized by regim e security (or to m aintain the governm ent state quo). A governm ent
m ay violate hum an rights to rem ain in pow er, such as to hold back a m inority or
opposition group. For centuries this practice was considered acceptable. A governm ent
may seek to build or acquire nuclear w eapons as a deterrent against other states
interfering or attem pting to overthrow the controlling regime. The concept o f bolstering
national defenses to prevent regim e change and m aintain status quo o f governm ent is also
a centuries old practice. Iran is attem pting to do this right now by pursuing nuclear
weapons for national and regime security.21
It is now against established international norm s to violate human rights and to
proliferate, but both still happen. States often have interests that lead them to turn a blind
eye to these practices. For example, a state m ay not condem n a state com m itting blatant
human rights violations for the sake o f stronger econom ic ties. Along the same lines, a

2'C lifton W. Sherrill, "Why Iran W ants the Bomb and W hat It Means for US Policy," The
Nonproliferation Review 19, no. 1 (M arch 2012).

state may not respond harshly to a state seeking to proliferate because o f a reliance on a
mutual trade agreement.
The timing o f the two issue areas’ developm ent in international law is also
similar. The main human rights treaty, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, was
brought about after the atrocities o f W orld W ar II and the Holocaust. In fact, Simm ons
argues that hum an rights as a m atter o f treaty law had a “nearly com plete absence prior to
the end o f W orld W ar II.”22 Upendra Baxi and Kate Ham burger Kolleg disagree, and in
their review o f Simmons book point out this is a W estern centric view not a w orld view
o f the history o f human rights.23 Likewise, prior to W orld W ar II and the bom bing o f
Japan, the w orld has no idea that the nuclear era was ju st around the com er.
Additionally, both hum an rights and nonproliferation had increased attention again in the
1970s. It was then that large strides w ere once again m ade in human rights.24 For
example, this period o f time included A m nesty International’s cam paign against torture,
leading to the UN General A ssem bly D eclaration A gainst Torture and eventually the
Convention Against Torture and O ther Cruel, Inhum an or D egrading Treatm ent or
Punishm ent (CAT). There was also m ore m ovem ent on advancing w o m en ’s issues,
including the UN Decade for W omen. For nonproliferation, there was perhaps the
biggest developm ent since the creation o f the International Atomic Energy Agency: the
ratification o f the NPT.
The treaties that Simm ons used for in her research are also sim ilar to the N PT in
that they are each alm ost universal in their state memberships. The N PT currently has
29

“ Simmons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D om estic P olitics, 36.
23 Upendra Baxi and Kate H am burger Kolleg, "M obilizing for Human Rights:
International Law in Domestic Politics," Law a n d Politics Book Review 22, no. 1 (2012).
24 Simm ons, M obilizing fo r H uman Rights: International Law in D om estic P olitics, 50.
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189 m em ber states (not including N orth K orea).25 The Convention on the Rights o f the
Child (and its Optional Protocol Relating to Children in A rm ed Conflicts) is a case study
in Sim m ons’ research that also has nearly universal m em bership.26 The Convention on
the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrim ination against W om en is another such
exam ple.27
Sim m ons’ case study treaties all rely on an oversight com m ittee.28 The NPT
utilizes the International Atomic Energy A gency (IAEA) as its oversight body.
A ccording to Article III o f the N PT, each state is required to enter an agreem ent with the
IAEA, “for the exclusive purpose o f verification o f the fulfillm ent o f its obligations
assum ed under this Treaty.”
Simmons believes that the US and U SSR used hum an rights treaties “selectively
i n

to try and gain the moral high ground.”

Likewise, com m itm ents to some

nonproliferation treaties can be used to gain moral high ground in an attem pt to show a
greater com m itm ent to nonproliferation.
As Simmons found with hum an rights treaties, the N PT does not have
“unconditional effects.”31 Ratification does not mean there are no noncom pliance cases.
Even treaties that have near universal m em berships will have cheaters. N evertheless, in
some cases, the treaties m ay make a difference in state behavior.

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, "NPT M embership," N uclear Threat Initiative,
http://w w w .nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/apm npt.pdf (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
26 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D omestic P olitics, 315.
27 Ibid., 233.
28 Ibid., 262.
29 "Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons," Article III.
30
Simmons, M obilizing fo r H uman Rights: International Law in D om estic P olitics, 353.
31 Ibid., 273.
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A less obvious sim ilarity lies in what could be term ed a “national security clause.”
Some hum an rights violations, such as torture, are practiced in the nam e o f national
security. A ccording to Simmons this is done “out o f self-constructed ‘necessity,’
justifying their practices with references to security and the public or national interest.” 32
There is an obvious link here with states defending the pursuit o f nuclear w eapons for
security reasons and national interests. North Korea claim ed it was “defending suprem e
national interests” when it withdrew from the NPT for the first time in 1993.33
A shared perceived w eakness o f human rights and the nonproliferation regim e is
the increasing role o f non-state actors in the international system. As U pendra Baxi and
Kate Ham burger K olleg point out in their review o f S im m ons’ book, there is discussion
o f armed opposition groups but non-state actors do not play a prom inent role.34 N on
state actors do not make com m itm ents nor are they held responsible under these treaties.
States pledge not to com m it atrocities and not to pursue nuclear weapons. Yet, non-state
actors are capable o f com m itting atrocities and pursuing nuclear weapons.
A nother type o f non-state actor is transnational activists. Transnational activists,
and transnational advocacy networks, are com posed o f "relevant actors working
internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a com mon
discourse, and dense exchanges o f inform ation and services."35 The hum an rights issue
area has many transnational actors (taking the form o f nongovernm ental organizations)

32 Ibid., 305.
33
M onterey Institute o f International Studies, "IAEA-North Korea: N uclear Safeguards
and Inspections 1993," http://cns.m iis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/nuc/iaea93.htm
(accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
34 Baxi and Kolleg, "M obilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic
Politics."
35 M argaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists B eyond Borders (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1998), 2.
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forming transnational advocacy networks, such as Am nesty International and Human
Rights W ithout Frontiers.36 Nonproliferation also has transnational actors, such as the
N uclear Threat Initiative, the Jam es M artin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the
W orld Institute for N uclear Security, and the C arnegie Endowment for International
Peace.37
Related to transnational actors are cam paigns and m ass m ovements. Cam paigns
"usually have a concentrated period o f intense activity" with a specific goal, while mass
m ovem ents are broader and "often require a num ber o f cam paigns to achieve large
goals."38 Cam paigns and m ovem ents exist in human rights, for example the US civil
rights m ovem ent and the m ore specific M ontgom ery Bus Boycott cam paign. There have
been mass m ovem ents against nuclear w eapons testing and nuclear power. For exam ple,
there is the anti-nuclear pow er m ovem ent in G erm any and the cam paign that took the
form o f m ass occupation o f proposed W yhl nuclear pow er plant site in G erm any.39 (This
is not quite nuclear nonproliferation but the connection will be discussed in greater detail
later.)

36 United for Human Rights, "Human Rights Organizations,"
http://w w w .hum anrights.com /voices-for-hum an-rights/hum an-rights-organizations/nongovem m ental.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
7 Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Project on N uclear Issues: Reference
Desk," Center for Strategic and International Studies, http://csis.org/program /referencedesk (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
38 Global N onviolent Action Database, "Campaigns, Not M ovements," Swarthm ore
College, http://nvdatabase.sw arthm ore.edu/content/cam paigns-not-m ovem ents (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
39 Global N onviolent A ction Database, "Mass Occupation o f Proposed W yhl N uclear
Power Plant Site in Germany, 1974-1977," Swarthm ore College,
http://nvdatabase.sw arthm ore.edu/content/m ass-occupation-proposed-w yhl-nuclearpow er-plant-site-germ any-1974-1977 (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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Finally, hum an rights treaties and the NPT share a lack o f direct enforcem ent.
Not ju st physical enforcem ent but also in the sense o f diplomatic enforcem ent. As
Simmons points out in regard to human rights laws, "peers cannot act as reliable
enforcers o f the regim e."40 O ther states may ignore noncom pliance events because o f
political or econom ic concerns or perhaps because o f the costs associated w ith raising the
issue and enforcem ent. In the case o f human rights, a state may feel since it is outside
their territory and does not directly affect national security, noncom pliance does not
require a forceful response (or a response at all). For nonproliferation, states can take
unilateral actions, such as cutting diplom atic ties or sanctions. Otherwise, the IAEA
reports the noncom pliance to the UN Security Council, who can than vote on the level o f
enforcem ent/response (or to have a response at all). The fact o f "reliable enforcers" is
m ore difficult because o f the UN Security Council's structure, which includes veto pow er
for the perm anent m em bers.41
Given the sim ilarities between the two different issue areas, it will be m eaningful
to evaluate the Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory o f hum an rights treaty com pliance and
its applicability in the area o f nonproliferation to gain a greater understanding o f w hy
states com ply with international agreem ents and if the issue area matters. As described in
M obilizing f o r H um an Rights, Simmons found in international human rights law that the
states that ratify with no intention o f com plying, may in the end com ply due to the
m obilization o f stakeholders.42 In particular, ratification o f a treaty can generate political
pressures on a state to comply. Sim m ons’ research found stable dem ocracies and stable

40 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H uman Rights: International Law in D om estic Politics, 126.
41 United Nations Security Council, "Members," http://w w w .un.org/sc/m em bers.asp
(accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
42 Simm ons, M obilizing fo r Human Rights: International Law in D omestic Politics.
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autocracies are less likely to com m it and com ply with international hum an rights treaties.
This dissertation seeks to com pare an assessm ent o f nonproliferation com pliance with
human rights compliance.

The N onproliferation Regime and the NPT

N ow that nonproliferation and hum an rights have been com pared, it is tim e to
delve deeper into the nonproliferation regim e and the NPT, which is the focus for
exploring the dom estic politics theory's usefulness in high politics issues. A regim e is
defined as “a fram ework o f rules, expectations and prescriptions betw een actors in
international relations.”43 One o f the key com ponents o f regim es is international laws
and agreements. The international nonproliferation regim e is com prised o f several
treaties and organizations but the Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons
(NPT or INFCIRC/140) is the “linchpin” o f the regim e.44
Nonproliferation is an issue area that has seen significant developm ent in
international law. This has come in the form o f m ulti-national treaties and bi-lateral
agreements. As Simmons used the pinnacle hum an rights treaties for her research, this
study will use the treaty centerpiece o f the nonproliferation regime: the NPT. The NPT
and hum an rights treaties have a num ber o f com m onalities.
Both human rights treaties and the NPT state the necessity o f security that
precipitated the creation o f the treaties. The pream ble o f the NPT sets the treaty's central

43 Evans and Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary’ o f International Relations, 471.
44 W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in Paul W illiams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction
(London: Routledge, 2008), 364.
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purpose: “Considering die devastation that would be visited upon all m ankind by a
nuclear w ar and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger o f such a
w ar and to make m easures to safeguard the security o f peoples.”45
W hile security is the obvious underlying concern for creating the treaty, it is
im portant to understand that several factors contributed to nonproliferation taking the
form o f an international treaty. The alternative (or even com plem entary) m ethodologies
to a treaty are secrecy and denial.
First, keeping the technology as a m ilitary secret was obliviously not enough to
stop proliferation. The Soviet nuclear program m ade its im portant early gains through
espionage o f the US program, w hile the UK program was assisted directly by the U S.46
There was serious concern that other states may have their ow n capabilities w ith time,
even w ithout direct (or indirect) assistance from the US. This becom es truer with tim e as
the interconnectedness o f the w orld increases and technological advances make it easier
to transfer nuclear knowledge.
Second, denial did not appear a viable option as new uranium deposits were being
discovered around the w orld.47 K eeping the material to an exclusive group for trade
w ould not last. Finally, the increase in available uranium m eant an anticipated expansion
in nuclear reactors.

48

The concern ultim ately being that nuclear reactors can be used for

production o f electricity and for the production o f plutonium .49

45 "Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons," Preamble.
46 John Simpson, Jenny N ielsen, and M arion Swinerd, N P T Briefing B ook, 2010 ed.
(Southam pton, UK: M ountbatten Centre for International Studies, 2010), Part 1-4.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 W orld N uclear Association, "The N uclear Fuel Cycle," http://ww w .w orldnuclear.org/info/inf03.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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These factors o f secrecy and denial collectively m eant that there was not a useful
m ethodology for stopping proliferation and that it had becom e a “necessity to do this
through voluntary and co-operative international arrangem ents.”50 These international
arrangements include several treaties, with the center piece o f the legal fram ework o f
nonproliferation being the NPT.
By also being a law -m aking treaty, the NPT is a normative treaty. This means
that a large num ber o f states belong to the treaty and the treaty expands on the accepted
"perception o f international law upon any given topic or establish new rules which are to
guide them for the future in the international conduct.” 51 The NPT is an exceptional
treaty with alm ost universal m em bership and it elaborates upon the shared perception that
the spread o f nuclear w eapons is bad.
Finally, the N PT m ay be considered a self-enforcing treaty. A ccording to
Simmons, a self-enforcing agreem ent is one in w hich “two or more parties adhere to the
agreement as long as each gains m ore from continuing the agreement than from
abrogating it.”32 It is in each individual state’s interest to not have other states posses
nuclear weapons as that is few er w eapons that could potentially be used against said
state. This relies on the concept o f reciprocity. Simm ons found this unsatisfactory in
hum an rights treaties because a state w ould not low er its hum an rights standards in
response to another state’s hum an rights crim es.53 It m ay be possible to view reciprocity
in the form o f suspension o f aid to a violating state, which may only serve to hurt the

50 Simpson, Nielsen, and Swinerd, N P T Briefing Book, Part 1-4.
51 M alcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th ed. (Cam bridge, U.K. ; New York:
Cam bridge University Press, 2003), 90.
52 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D omestic Politics, 116.
53 Ibid., 123.
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offending state’s citizens. With the N PT this reciprocity is a denial o f peaceful uses
cooperation and a denial o f trade o f nuclear technologies. If reputation is a serious
concern, and a state does not w ant to be seen as unreliable, the likelihood o f com pliance
increases m aking the treaty almost self-enforcing.54

The Content o f the N P T
So, what are states agreeing to when they ratify the NPT? W hile the focus o f this
research is on nonproliferation com pliance, the N PT is greater than this focus. The NPT
has two well-know n objectives: prevent the spread o f nuclear weapons and international
disarm ament. There is a third, and often ignored objective, to spread the technology and
knowledge o f peaceful uses o f nuclear energy. Collectively, these objectives are often
referred to as the three pillars. The three pillars are: nonproliferation, peaceful uses o f
nuclear energy, and disarm am ent.55 There are eleven articles outlining the responsibilities
and com m itm ents o f the states that choose to be a party to the NPT. These articles can be
divided into the three pillars, w ith the some left over articles for adm inistrative purposes.

N onproliferation Pillar
N onproliferation is for some, like the US government, the m ost im portant pillar.56
The first article o f the N PT requires nuclear w eapons states not to transfer nuclear
weapons, control over nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon technology or give any

54 Ibid., 117.
55 Government o f Canada, "The N uclear N onproliferation Treaty,"
http://w w w .intem ational.gc.ca/arm s-arm es/nuclear-nucleaire/npt-tnp.aspx (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
56 Harold Muller, "A Treaty in Troubled W aters: Reflections on the Failed N PT Review
Conference," The International Spectator, no. 3 (2005): 41.
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assistance related to developing nuclear w eapons to a non-nuclear w eapons state. This is
the twin to Article II. The second article is the responsibility o f the non-nuclear w eapons
states. It requires these states to not to receive nuclear weapons or anything related to
nuclear weapons. N on-nuclear weapons states are also committed not to pursue nuclear
weapons with or w ithout another state’s assistance. Collectively, this is the backbone o f
the nonproliferation regime.
Article III requires non-nuclear w eapons states to place their facilities under
safeguards. This article mandates states conclude a safeguards agreement w ith the IAEA
w ithin 18 months o f a state’s entry-in-force w ith the NPT. The purpose o f this article is
to verify that states are in com pliance with articles I and II o f the NPT. The agreem ent
utilized is known as a Com prehensive Safeguards A greem ent and the model used for
writing each state’s agreem ent is know n as IAEA Informational C ircular 153
(IN FCIRC/153).57
How are the nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty affected by Article
III? They are not required under the N PT to have IAEA safeguards at their facilities.
Rather these states have what is known as Voluntary Offer A greem ents.58 The US,
Russia, UK, France, and China have Voluntary O ffer Agreements with the IAEA, which
is an agreem ent m odeled after INFCIRC/153. It is how ever stronger on safeguards for
specific facilities but less com prehensive as not all facilities are included. This
agreement gives a state the opportunity to offer to the IAEA some (or even all) o f its
m aterials and/or facilities for safeguards. This is to belie the som etim es-perceived

37 International A tom ic Energy Agency, "IAEA Safeguards Glossary," in International
N uclear Verification Series (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002), 7.
58 Ibid., 8.
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com mercial disadvantage o f having safeguards. It is up to the IAEA to choose w hether to
apply safeguards on the materials and/or facilities offered.
Articles IV and V include the activities and materials that will be safeguarded.
The purpose o f “safeguards is the tim ely detection o f diversion o f significant quantities o f
nuclear m aterial from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture o f nuclear weapons
or o f other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence o f such
diversion by the risk o f early detection.”59
Article VII allows parties to the treaty to enter into regional treaties concerning
nuclear weapons. This article is referring to nuclear w eapon free zone (N W FZ) treaties
in particular. M any states have chosen to jo in these treaties. There are currently five
regional treaties establishing such zones.60 These treaties are the Treaty o f Tlatelolco
(Latin A m erica and the C aribbean N W FZ), the Treaty o f Rarotonga (South Pacific
N W FZ), the Treaty o f B angkok (Southeast A sia NW FZ), the Treaty o f Pelindaba
(A frican N W FZ), and the Central Asia N uclear W eapon Free Zone Treaty. There are
currently calls in the international com m unity for a M iddle East N uclear W eapon Free
Zone.61 There are also related treaties covered by this article that prohibit the deployment
o f nuclear w eapons in more controversial areas. These are “ the Antarctic Treaty, the

59 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Structure and Content o f A greem ents between
the Agency and States Required in Connection with the Treaty on the N on-Proliferation
o f N uclear W eapons," in Inform ational Circular 153 (Corrected) (1972).
60 Arms Control Association, "Nuclear-W eapon-Free Zones (NW FZ) at a Glance,"
http://w w w .arm scontrol.org/factsheets/nw fz (accessed Novem ber 30, 2012).
61 United N ations, "UN Study on Effective and Verifiable M easures W hich W ould
Facilitate the Establishm ent o f N uclear-W eapon-Free Zone in the M iddle East," ed.
D epartm ent for D isarm am ent Affairs (New York, NY: United Nations, 1991).
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O uter Space Treaty, the M oon A greem ent, and the Seabed Treaty [that] denuclearize and
dem ilitarize specific areas o f the globe, as well as outer space.”62

Peaceful Uses o f N uclear Energy Pillar
Article IV states that “nothing in the treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the
inalienable right o f all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use o f
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrim ination and in conform ity with
Articles I and II o f this Treaty.” Iran has cited this article continuously in defense o f its
enrichm ent research and production (although some influential m em bers o f the
international com m unity believe this m ay be a ploy to conceal a w eapons program).
A rticle V explains that non-nuclear weapons states shall receive any benefits possible
from peaceful nuclear explosions by weapons states.

D isarm am ent Pillar
Article VI m ay be one o f the m ost im portant articles in the w hole treaty. It directs
that nuclear w eapons states “pursue negotiations in good faith” to end the arms race (that
was happening at the time), for nuclear disarm am ent and to create “a treaty on general
and com plete disarm am ent.” The arms race has ended and now (debatable) progress is
being made towards nuclear disarm am ent. N on-nuclear weapons states and the NonAligned M ovement often cite this article in urging the super powers to do m ore for

62 N uclear Threat Initiative, "NW FZ Tutorial,"
http://w w w .nti.org/h_learnm ore/nw fztutorial/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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peace.63 D isarm am ent was largely ignored during the Cold W ar, a time when the Soviet
Union and the US were rapidly building their arsenals.

A dm inistrative Articles
Article VIII has two main objectives. The first objective is to explain how states
can propose and pass am endm ents to the treaty. For an am endm ent to pass, it would
require a m ajority vote that includes all o f the Board o f Governors representatives (which
also means all five o f the nuclear weapon states). The treaty has never been amended.
The second objective is to create a conference that is to be held every five years. The
conference is for “reviewing the operation o f the treaty.” These conferences are always
politically charged. Because it can be difficult to accom plish much at an international
conference, the states have preparatory m eetings in the years between review conferences
in order to keep m om entum going and discuss ideas.
Article IX explains that the treaty is open to all states for ratification and how the
treaty com es into force. The important detail contained in this article is that a nuclear
weapons state is one that has “m anufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or another
explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967.”
A rticle X contains two important points. First, a state can withdraw from the
treaty if the state decides it is in its national interest and gives the other treaty m em bers
and the UN Security Council three m onths’ notice. This has happened only once. N orth

63 Jaswant Singh, "Against N uclear Apartheid," Foreign Affairs 77, no. 5 (1998): 50.

K orea subm itted its notice on 12 M arch 1993.64 Second, after the treaty is in force for
tw enty-five years a conference will be held to decide if the treaty shall continue
indefinitely or for another fixed period. In 1995, the parties to the treaty voted to extend
the treaty indefinitely.65 This decision was taken with the backdrop o f the new ly
discovered clandestine activities o f North Korea and Iraq.66 This lengthened the shadow
o f the future for those states involved and perhaps thinking o f cheating (i.e. taking
noncom pliant actions).67
Finally, Article XI is inform ative and contains no obligations for the states. This
article explains that authentic translated copies o f the NPT will be “in the archives o f the
D epositary G overnm ents” and transferred to the governm ents o f the parties o f the treaty.

Findings

A pplying the domestic politics theory o f treaty com pliance to hum an rights
treaties helps explain why states keep their treaty obligations. Simmons does not argue
that dom estic politics theory independently explains treaty com pliance but that the theory
does help scholars and policy makers to gain a better understanding o f the puzzle that is
treaty com pliance. But does the theory aid in understanding com pliance in high politics
issue areas?

64 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA & DPRK,"
http://w w w .iaea.org/new scenter/focus/iaeadprk/fact_sheet_m ay2003.shtm l (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
65United N ations, "Extension o f the Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear
W eapons," in Conference o f the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear
Weapons (New York, NY: United Nations, 1995).
66 Reed and Stillman, The Nuclear E xpress, 145.
67 Robert M. Axelrod, The Evolution o f Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
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Considering the state o f the world in June 2012, six states are used as sample o f
the international com m unity in relation to the NPT. These states are divided into three
groups: those o f no com pliance concern, those that have already failed to com ply, and
those that are o f potential proliferation concern. Germany and Kazakhstan are strong
proponents o f the nonproliferation regim e and are the states o f no proliferation concern.
Syria and Libya are the noncom pliant states as they have both failed to com ply with their
N PT obligations. Egypt and Saudi A rabia are challenging and are both considered
potential future proliferation concerns. W hen analyzing these states o f varying
com pliance through the perspective o f dom estic politics theory, there are m ixed results.
The following pages will show that the domestic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance does not very well explain state com pliance with the NPT. The Germ an and
K azakhstan case studies have som e m obilization but no litigation or agenda setting. Even
then the m obilization in G erm any is against nuclear pow er m ore generally and the
m obilization in Kazakhstan is against nuclear weapons testing. All three m echanism s o f
the dom estic politics theory (i.e. m obilization, agenda setting, and litigation) are lacking
in the noncom pliance cases o f Syria and Libya. This is as expected. Similarly, the
Egyptian and Saudi Arabia cases o f potential proliferation concern have no evidence o f
m obilization, agenda setting, or litigation related to nonproliferation.
The domestic politics theory o f treaty com pliance is not an all-encom passing
theory that explains compliance, nor did Simmons ever claim it to be. The theory is a
tool we can use to view and understand treaty compliance. In the high politics issue area
o f nation security, and nonproliferation specifically, the domestic politics theory does not
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seem to be extrem ely useful but it should not be fully discounted. Perhaps, this means
that the theory should be m odified to account for high politics issues.

Dissertation Structure

Chapter 2 explores alternate theories on state com pliance with international
obligations. Com pliance theories and ideas are reviewed to com plete a w ell-rounded
review on variables relevant to understanding the com pliance o f a state to a particular
treaty. The focus is on introducing Sim m ons’ dom estic policy theory o f com pliance:
dom estic mobilization, agenda setting, and litigation. The chapter also includes an
explanation o f the m ethodology and the reasoning behind the case study choices.
The six states assessed can be broken into three categories. There are states that
are very obviously not going to proliferate and strong proponents o f the nonproliferation
regim e and there are those states that have already failed to comply. The third category is
those states that have not failed to com ply but m ay do so in the future. They are future
potential challenges for the nonproliferation com munity. Som e of the states are currently
undergoing dram atic political changes and so for the sake o f this dissertation, analyses
will assume a cut-off date in history o f June 2012.
For each state, there is an introduction to the specific situation o f the state,
followed by an overview, which includes the state’s history w ith nonproliferation and
why they m ight want to proliferate, any im portant issues or concerns that have been
raised in the past, as well as their history with the NPT itself and the international
nonproliferation regim e more broadly.
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The status o f nuclear pow er in the state is also reviewed to draw a more com plete
picture o f each state. Next, each state is analyzed applying Sim m ons’ dom estic politics
theory o f treaty compliance. This includes reviewing the theory’s m echanism s o f
domestic population m obilization, agenda setting, and litigation for each state’s particular
situation in a scholarly search for evidence. Conclusions are then draw n for each state on
w hether com pliance/noncom pliance can be better understood using dom estic politics
theory.
Each chapter o f case studies also finishes w ith a section on broader conclusions
for the category o f states discussed (as opposed to conclusions on the specific states
covered in the case study itself). The conclusion section also includes a table com paring
the states in the case study and the application o f dom estic politics theory mechanisms.
The case study chapters are (3) States o f N o Proliferation Concern, (4) States That H ave
Already F a iled to Comply, and (5) States That are o f P otential Proliferation Concern.
C hapter 3 includes the first two states, w hich are not o f potential proliferation
concern. These are G erm any and Kazakhstan. They w ere both proliferation concerns for
the international com m unity in the past but have solid records in the nonproliferation
regime today. Kazakhstan exem plifies the spirit o f nonproliferation in having given up
the weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union and joining the NPT. G erm any illustrates
that it is possible to increase dedication to the nonproliferation regime. Both, G ermany
and Kazakhstan will show the im portance o f dom estic populations on national decisions.
C hapter 4 includes the next two states and its focus is on states that have already
failed to comply. N on-com pliance is a political decision am ong states and therefore
debatable. The decision for choosing the noncom pliant states for this dissertation is
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based on previous judgm ents by the IAEA Board o f Governors. These states are Syria
and Libya. Both states were found in noncom pliance this decade and neither still has a
nuclear w eapons program (at least to the international com m unity’s know ledge as o f June
2 0 1 2 ).

The case study chapters are rounded out with chapter 5, with two states that are
capable o f acquiring nuclear weapons and are o f potential proliferation concern. Egypt
and Saudi Arabia were chosen to represent states that are a proliferation concern. Despite
the seem ingly difficult task o f selecting potential proliferators, these two states are logical
choices and supported by contem porary researchers. For example, Egypt and Saudi
Arabia are from The N uclear Tipping Point, which is an edited volume focused on states
that could go nuclear and the policies that affect them .68 Their potential to proliferate is
explored further in this chapter. Each o f these states has a unique history with
proliferation and concerns that could tip them in the direction o f acquiring nuclear
weapons. They are o f serious concern because they have the capacity to acquire nuclear
weapons should they chose to do so.
Chapter 6 offers an analysis o f how useful the dom estic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance is in the high politics issues area o f nonproliferation.

A table is offered

com paring the different cases and the application o f dom estic politics theory’s
mechanisms. W hile the theory is not especially useful the concept o f what this means for
the theory and for nonproliferation is thoroughly explored. It was never expected that the
theory would be sufficient in explaining com pliance and Simmons never claim s that it is.

68 Kurt M. Cam pbell, Robert J. Einhom , and M itchell Reiss, eds., The N uclear Tipping
Point: Why States Reconsider Their N uclear Choices (W ashington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution Press, 2004).
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However, it may prove to be a useful lens through which the international
nonproliferation com m unity can further understand treaty compliance.
Finally, this chapter sum m arizes the research and draws conclusions, ending the
dissertation. The argum ent is reviewed, the pieces o f the dissertation summarized. Ideas
for future research are offered and final conclusions are drawn to end the dissertation.
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CH A PTER II
COM PLIANCE A ND TH E CASE STUDY M ETH ODOLOGY

Introduction

The N PT and IAEA nuclear safeguards are a barrier to nuclear w eapons and
rem oving them would allow for the developm ent o f nuclear weapons w ithout oversight.
State com pliance with the N PT m eans a safer world with fewer nuclear weapons.
W ithout com pliance there w ould be no w ay o f m onitoring the nuclear m aterials and
activities in the world.
C om m itm ent and com pliance are key aspects o f international law, and treaties in
particular. A better understanding o f when and w hy states com ply with their
com m itm ents can lead to a strengthening o f the international legal system and
im provem ents in the developm ent o f treaties. But are the drivers for com pliance the
same no m atter the issue? Does it m atter if the issue is o f low politics or high politics?
Furtherm ore, can understanding com pliance in low politics issue areas, such as hum an
rights, help us understand com pliance in high politics issue areas, such as the spread o f
nuclear weapons?
In her domestic politics theory, Simm ons extensively explores “the role o f the
executive, the judiciary, and citizens” on the com pliance behavior o f a state.69 In this
study, her dom estic politics theory o f com pliance will be expanded to consider
com pliance with the NPT, as opposed to com pliance with key human rights treaties.

69 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D om estic P olitics, 126.
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This chapter starts with a focus on developing an understanding o f what
com pliance and noncom pliance look like for the NPT. The particular definitions o f
com pliance and noncom pliance in the context o f the NPT will be given.
The next focus is on explaining in detail the m echanism s o f the dom estic politics
theory o f treaty com pliance in the low politics issue area o f human rights. These
variables are the m obilization o f dom estic groups, agenda setting, and litigation. This
section includes how these three variables can be defined and how they m ay be
influential in the high politics o f nuclear weapons proliferation.
The third focus o f this chapter is on explaining the m ethodology for applying the
dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance to the NPT. This section includes an
argum ent for using the case study m ethod by discussing the strengths and w eaknesses o f
this approach.
The fourth focus is on the case study identification. Here is w here the explanation
o f countries to be utilized in the case studies is given. Using the variables influencing
compliance, that are identified at the beginning o f this chapter, each state will be assessed
on com pliance with the N PT (and ultim ately nonproliferation by proxy). There will be a
total o f six states assessed.
These six states are divided into three categories according to their record o f NPT
compliance. This includes two states that are not o f proliferation concern, two states that
have already failed to com ply and two states that are o f potential proliferation concern.
The states not o f proliferation concern are G erm any and Kazakhstan. The two states that
have already failed to com ply were chosen according to the IAEA Board o f G overnors’
findings. These are Syria and Libya. Finally, the two states that are potential
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proliferation concerns are Egypt and Saudi Arabia. There will be an em phasis on the
relationship with Sim m ons’ findings for all six case studies to further understand treaty
compliance.
Finally, conclusions are offered to understand the connection o f com pliance and
its related variables with the upcom ing case study chapters.

Com pliance and N oncom pliance

Compliance
A w orking definition o f com pliance comes from M erriam -W ebster: “a. the act or
process o f com plying to a desire, dem and, proposal, or regim en or to coercion b.
conformity in fulfilling official requirem ents.” 70 Every treaty includes official
requirem ents to which the parties to the treaty are com m itting themselves. A ssessing a
state’s com pliance is intended to be a m easurem ent o f the level o f com pliance. In other
words, states meet these obligations com pletely, partially or not at all. W ithout
compliance, a treaty is not w orth the paper it is written upon.
In theory, com pliance should be simple to assess. Either a state is m eeting its
obligations or it is n o t.. .or so one would think. As with so many things in life, there is a
grey area. A state that has not been found in noncom pliance may not necessarily be in
compliance. It is precisely this gray area that causes international controversy and creates
political issues. This concept, and the role o f politics in com pliance, will be discussed in

70 M erriam -W ebster, "Compliance," M erriam -W ebster Online Dictionary,
http://w w w .m erriam -w ebster.com /dictionary/com pliance (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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detail. The m echanism s o f domestic politics theory presented as independent variables in
this chapter are ways that treaties may influence com pliance.
Com pliance with the N PT is challenging to assess in the same w ay that it is
difficult to assess within human rights issues. A state in noncom pliance will likely not
readily reveal itself. A violator may attempt to hide details o f its transgressions. Not
every violation is as blatant as those that make it into the news. Furthermore, anom alies
can exist w hich raise questions about the com pliance o f a state. In some cases, these
anomalies can be resolved quickly, such as by the IAEA conducting an inventory
verification or a state providing more inform ation. In other cases, these anom alies
becom e part o f the path to a noncom pliance finding, such as with Syria.
For this dissertation a state is in com pliance as long as it is not in noncom pliance
according to the IAEA Board o f Governors. This dichotom y is a bit sim plistic but a clear
guideline is needed to make this differentiation and using the decisions o f the
international com m unity avoids author biasing. There are, o f course, politics involved in
the Board o f Governors' decisions so bias is not com pletely eliminated. The states that
are o f a potential proliferation concern are currently in com pliance and m ay rem ain so
forever. However, they m ay be sources o f proliferation concern in the future and are
already being discussed by contem porary scholars. The results o f this research m ay aid
in understanding w hether dom estic politics plays a role in treaty com pliance and
therefore increase or decrease international concern in the future.
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Noncom pliance
N oncom pliance is occasionally easy to determine: a failure to com ply with
obligations is a failure to comply. But, as stated above, an apparent lack o f com pliance is
not necessarily noncompliance. For the purposes o f this dissertation, noncom pliance is
technically defined as those states that have been found in noncom pliance by the IAEA.
It is not an uncom plicated process for the IAEA Board o f Governors to determ ine and
report a noncom pliance finding. The IAEA process is explained below but the im portant
part now is to understand that using their findings to determ ine noncom pliance is
reasonable for this dissertation. There is little controversy around the six states chosen
for this dissertation and their level o f com pliance.
Anyone can determine noncom pliance for them selves; states are frequently
crucified in the m edia by flippant com m entators. However, the IAEA has access to and
requires facts (facts often disputed by the country being investigated) and then the agency
requires a drawn out period o f debate and votes on various related resolutions. Until
fairly recently, the IAEA Board o f Governors had always followed the Spirit o f Vienna
for big decisions, such as noncom pliance findings.
The “Spirit o f V ienna” refers to the cooperative w orking environm ent at the
IAEA that focuses on the technical issues rather than be distracted w ith politics,
especially in the first two decades o f the agency’s history.71 A former US am bassador to
the IAEA has pointed out that the Spirit o f Vienna has been underm ined by recent
noncom pliance finding votes in which divisive politics have played a larger role than

7 1 ' *
David Fischer, H istory o f the International A tom ic Energy Agency: The First Forty
Years (Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency, 1997), 21.

36

science.7' W hile the IAEA noncom pliance findings may increasingly reflect politics, it
seems a more reasonable measure o f com pliance for this dissertation than using personal
opinion or a single state’s point o f view.
A formal finding o f noncom pliance is a political decision am ong states and
therefore is sometimes debatable. It is im portant to note that the IAEA can find states in
violation o f Safeguards Agreem ents (IN FCIRC/153) but not in noncom pliance o f the
NPT. The IA EA ’s purpose is to assess only A rticle III o f the NPT via safeguards not the
entire treaty. W hile noncom pliance w ith the IAEA, and therefore A rticle III o f the NPT,
is likely to mean noncom pliance with the NPT, this is not an automatic guarantee.
Form er D irector Pierre G oldschm idt o f the D epartm ent o f Safeguards at the IAEA, has
cautioned that "the fact that there is no official definition o f what constitutes
noncom pliance should not be used as an excuse by the secretariat for not reporting
prom ptly, fully, and factually any significant or intentional failure or breach o f safeguards
undertaking."73
If the IAEA secretariat detects a violation or noncom pliance, the D epartm ent o f
Safeguards has two choices. The state can be reported to the IAEA Board o f Governors
or the incident can be included in the annual Safeguards Im plem entation Report. The
Board o f Governors is com posed o f 35 m em ber States.74 A ccording to A rticle X I 1.C o f
the IAEA Statute, “the Board shall report the non-com pliance to all m em bers and to the

72 Gregory L. Schulte, "Strengthening the IAEA: How the N uclear W atchdog Can Regain
Its Bark," in Strategic Forum (W ashington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
March 2010).
73
Pierre Goldschmidt, "Safeguards N oncom pliance: A Challenge for the IAEA and the
UN Security Council," Arm s C ontrol Today 40, no. 1 (January/February 2010).
74 International Atomic Energy Agency, "IAEA Board o f Governors,"
http://iaea.org/A bout/Policy/B oard/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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Security Council and General A ssem bly o f the United N ations.” There is no definition o f
noncom pliance to guide the B oard’s decision; however, Peter Jenkins suggests that the
previous decisions can be considered as a kind o f case-law .75
Jenkins also found that, “w hether the Security Council needs to be inform ed o f a
case has been the prim e consideration” in deciding w hether a state is in noncom pliance.
The underlying fact is that Article III.B.4 o f the IAEA Statute says the Security Council
should be informed w hen m atters concern “international peace and security.”76 The
Board o f Governors considers the consequence and severity o f the violations in the
context o f international peace and security when determ ining noncom pliance.
The Board o f G overnors has found six o f the eight states brought before it to be in
noncom pliance. The tw o noncom pliant states used for the case studies in this dissertation
are Libya in 2004 and Syria in 2011. The four not being used are Rom ania in 1992, Iraq
1991, Iran in 2005, and N orth Korea, w hich was found in noncom pliance in 1993, in
1994, and again in 2003. Egypt and South K orea were discussed by the Board o f
Governors but not found in noncom pliance.
Beginning in 1997, states have had the option o f entering an A dditional Protocol
with the IAEA. This gives the IAEA m ore inform ation and access to im plem ent
safeguards more efficiently and effectively, in order to confirm states are in com pliance
with their obligations. Perhaps unsurprising, neither o f the noncom pliance case studies
chosen (Syria and Libya) had an Additional Protocol in place when found in
noncompliance.

75 Peter Jenkins, "Staying Credible: How Precedents Can Help the IAEA Get
Noncompliance Calls Right," A rm s Control Today 40, no. 7 (Septem ber 2010).
76 "Statute o f the International Atom ic Energy Agency," ed. International Atomic Energy
A gency (1989).
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In addition to the Board o f G overnors’ decisions on compliance, the United States
com pletes its own evaluations. The US State D epartm ent’s Adherence to a n d
Compliance with Arm s Control, Non-proliferation, a n d D isarm am ent Agreem ents a nd
Commitments report “provides an assessm ent o f US adherence to obligations undertaken
in arms control, nonproliferation, and disarm am ent agreem ents, as well as an assessm ent
o f the adherence o f other nations to obligations undertaken in arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarm am ent agreem ents and related com m itm ents.” 77
Like the Board o f G overnors, the US State D epartm ent also identified Libya, Iraq,
Iran, and Syria as noncom pliant parties to the NPT. A ccording to the 2010 report, Libya
7 0

and Iraq were not com pliant in the past but are currently.

The report addresses current

(as o f 2010) US concerns about com pliance issues w ith five states specifically: Iran,
China, Burma, N orth Korea, and Syria. In addition, the US finds 18 states are not in
com pliance w ith A rticle III o f the N PT as they have failed to bring a Safeguards
Agreement into effect w ithin 18 months o f becom ing a party to the N PT (as required by
Article III).
Under Article III, states are required to begin negotiating a Safeguards Agreem ent
with the IAEA w ithin 180 days o f entering the NPT into force, and bring the resulting
Safeguards A greem ent into force w ithin 18 m onths o f beginning the negotiations.79

77 US Departm ent o f State, "Adherence to and Com pliance with Arms Control, NonProliferation, and D isarm am ent Agreem ents and Com m itm ents," ed. Com pliance Bureau
o f Verification, and Im plem entation (2010), 1.
78 Ibid., 53.
79 "Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons," Article III.
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There are currently 14 states not in com pliance w ith this aspect o f the N PT .80 These
states have not been form ally found in noncom pliance and reported to the UN Security
Council m ost likely because they are not seen as a threat to international security (which
the IAEA Statute uses as a guideline in determ ining which states to report).81 There is
currently a push w ithin the US governm ent to encourage these states to include their
agreem ents with the IAEA. The IAEA has limited resources and given the lack o f
nuclear capabilities in these states (which all have bigger concerns than expending their
resources on concluding these agreem ents) there has not been a strong effort to com plete
the agreements.
In addition to the definition o f noncom pliance above, there is the possibility that
states can be in noncom pliance under Article III and Article VI. U nder Article VI,
nuclear w eapon states that are party to the N PT agree to “pursue negotiations in good
faith” to disarm .

R9

There has been progress in arms control and disarm am ent but some

states have long argued that the nuclear w eapons states are in noncom pliance by their
failure to negotiate "in good faith" towards the total elim ination o f nuclear w eapons.83

Dom estic Politics and Treaty Compliance

Scott Sagan has suggested an alternative “ domestic politics m odel, which
envisions nuclear w eapons as political tools used to advance parochial dom estic and
80

International Atom ic Energy Agency, "Status List,"
http://w w w .iaea.org/O urW ork/SV /Safeguards/docum ents/sir_table.pdf (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
81 "Statute o f the International Atomic Energy Agency."
82 "Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear W eapons," Article VI.
83 Joseph S. Nye, "NPT: The Logic o f Inequality," Foreign Policy 59 (Sum m er 1985).
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bureaucratic interests.”84 Sagan believes that dom estic reasons can drive a state to
acquire nuclear weapons, because the w eapons represent a means to an end (which m ay
vary actor to actor). Simmons has dem onstrated that dom estic reasons can also explain
and possibly compel treaty com pliance with hum an rights treaties. Her three m echanism s
(m obilization, litigation and agenda setting) represent a m eans to an end (treaty
com pliance). Sagan’s dom estic model for proliferation therefore suggests another reason
to use Sim m ons’ dom estic politics theory to understand nonproliferation com pliance.
The dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance "privilege[s] dom estic political
actors as agents in their ow n political fate."85 In other words, Simmons found that
treaties can influence com pliance by em pow ering domestic actors. She does not rule out
the im pact o f external actors but has found the internal actors can be sufficient for
gaining com pliance in the area o f hum an rights law. Simons argues that "international
law helps local actors set priorities, define m eaning, make rights dem ands, and bargain
from a position o f greater strength than w ould have been the case in the absence o f their
oz

governm ent's treaty com m itm ent."

This translates into three mechanisms that will be

used as variables for this dissertation: m obilization, agenda setting, and litigation. In
human rights, this means that citizens can use their government's international
com m itm ents to dem and change through litigation and m obilize to dem and change by
draw ing dom estic and international attention to violations. But what does this mean in
the w orld o f high politics and national security?

84 Scott Sagan, "W hy Do States Build N uclear W eapons?: Three M odels in Search o f a
Bomb," International Security 21, no. 3 (W inter, 1996-1997): 55.
8:1 Simmons, M obilizing fo r Human Rights: International Law in D om estic Politics, 126.
86 Ibid., 126.
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Simmons found a strong connection between governm ent types and com pliance
with human rights treaties. This m ay translate well to the high politics o f security w ith a
small twist. Simmons found that true dem ocracies already respected hum an rights and
that signing a hum an rights treaty required little action for a democracy. They were
sincere in their ratification. Furtherm ore, the dom estic groups may not m obilize, as there
is little need to on this issue in a democracy.
On the other hand, an autocracy that disregards hum an rights m ay ratify w ith no
intention o f changing its behaviors. They are insincere in their ratification. The groups
that m ay have m obilized in a m ore dem ocratic nation usually have no credible means o f
requesting change in an autocracy (w hether this is by litigation or m obilization).
Simm ons offers this result when describing governm ent type in relation to com pliance.87
M ost importantly, Simm ons found that her theory "works" best for transitional
dem ocracies w here the m echanism s have the m ost im pact.88
W hat does this m ean for the nonproliferation regim e? Will it be possible to
separate the sincere ratifications from the insincere? And will the m echanism s o f the
dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance be more apparent (i.e. will it make the
clearest explanation) in the transitional dem ocracies, as Simmons found in the human
rights regime?

87 Ibid., 354.
88 Ibid., 155.
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M obilization o f D om estic Groups
Simm ons concedes that “not all kinds o f issues elicit identical kinds or degrees o f
domestic m obilization.”89 Simmons uses the exam ple o f torture to illustrate this concept.
A state can instill fear in its citizens to prevent dom estic m obilization.90 For exam ple, a
governm ent can claim that it is protecting the nation by using torture against a certain
group because that is the only way to prevent terrorist attacks. It is not a far stretch o f the
im agination to think a state may claim that possessing nuclear weapons is the only w ay to
prevent attack from other nations. Citizens will m obilize because o f discontent but
discontent as Simm ons defines it is "structural, arising from the existing political, social,
and econom ic relationships within a given society."91 Those that have rallied against
nuclear w eapons have identified their discontent with their governments building w hat
they view as dangerous unreliable technology that causes genocide.
Citizens m ay m obilize not so much because they disagree with their governm ent’s
decision and desire for com pliance, but because it has becom e personal. H um an rights
treaties are deeply personal because they affect the individual. State acquisition o f
nuclear w eapons does not encroach at the individual level in the same w ay violations o f
human rights does. However, sanctions against a state as a result o f noncom pliance can
impact citizens. At which point, the decision not previously affecting the individual now
matters more. This impact can be even greater if the international com m unity uses
violence, such as pre-em ptive strikes or war.

89 Ibid., 199.
90 Ibid., 358.
91 Ibid., 137.
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A m ajor factor in domestic groups being able to mobilize is ever lowering
transaction costs. Transactions costs are the non-m onetary costs o f doing business.92 In
this case, it includes telecom m unications, internet access, and more. Sim m ons points out
that the lowering transaction costs “helped to em pow er the governed relative to
governments over the century.’’93 The rise in social media has played a critical role in
supporting groups organizing around the w orld on im portant issues.
In fact, governm ents attem pting to suppress dom estic groups that have begun to
m obilize have shutdown telecom m unications providers to stop the ease o f
com m unications that leads to better organization.94 During the 2011 Arab Spring, social
m edia was used extensively to com m unicate am ong demonstrators. It should be noted
that m odem technology and social m edia are not solely responsible for dom estic groups'
ability to m obilize.95 In 1919, dom estic groups were able to m obilize effectively in
Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya, w ithout Tw itter or Facebook.96
Populations will be most likely to m obilize when they place value on an issue and
they deem success likely.97 Treaties can increase the likelihood o f successfully
m obilization.

98

This is especially true in transitional partially dem ocratic governm ents,

such as Egypt and Kazakhstan in this dissertation's case study.99 Simm ons sees treaties
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as resource for populations considering mobilizing. A treaty clearly defines an issue and
gives legal grounds to dem and change, which com bined increase the likelihood o f
success.

100

If domestic m obilization played a role, evidence should be found in the form o f
movem ents, such as petitions, protests, and organized events by citizens draw ing
attention and publicity to their cause in the hopes o f stopping their nation from pursuing
nuclear weapons.

Agenda Setting
The second m echanism o f the dom estic politics theory is national agenda setting.
For the issue area o f nonproliferation, this w ould mean nonproliferation related policies
w ould be discussed and enacted in the national agenda. To say that a nation joins and
com plies with a treaty based only on its existing policy preference is perhaps “too
hasty.” 101 No international treaty can com pletely reflect a state’s preference (as no state
has the pow er to negotiate and influence a treaty w ithout com prom ises). Therefore, the
issue o f the treaty comes onto the dom estic agenda and given the process o f ratification
may by default influence com pliance. Furtherm ore, a treaty gives a nonnegotiable text
for discussion.
Simmons does not claim that a treaty changes preferences but that it m ay change
the priorities.102 An issue that could be ignored previously now draws plenty o f attention,
including legislative attention. It is also possible that it is not that a state was not

100 Ibid., 138.
101 Ibid., 127.
102 Ibid., 127.
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interested in an issue previously so much as it was a low priority and not discussed. W ith
a treaty there is a clear definition and expectation from the international com m unity
which a state should respond to positively or negatively. Silence before a treaty is
developed m ay have m eant am biguity on the issue but silence with the treaty in existence
is interpreted as disagreem ent with the corresponding policy.103
Domestic actors can also use treaties to reinforce a previously set agenda. For
example, a state unable to pursue nuclear weapons does not have to adm it that it is not
capable but rather ju st point to its com m itm ent as the reason for not pursuing nuclear
weapons. Furtherm ore, a national governm ent can use a treaty in line w ith its agenda o f
condem ning other nations, as we see in the M iddle Eastern nations condem ning Israel for
not joining the NPT.
The caveat Simm ons offers for agenda setting is that there are no guarantees.104
Agenda setting is m ore likely to w ork in states that are “sincere” in their ratification and
want to comply. Furtherm ore, influencing the agenda and bringing attention to an issue
is not a guarantee o f successful im plem entation o f the treaty.
If agenda setting plays a role than evidence should be found by looking for
nonproliferation becom ing an issue where it was not previously and the developm ent o f
national law related to nonproliferation.

Litigation
The ratification o f an international treaty requires a corresponding dom estic law.
Depending on the governm ent type it is autom atically created or lawm akers m ust

103 Ibid., 128.
104 Ibid., 129.
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specifically im plem ent new law s,105 The IAEA lawyers willingly review national
legislation to ensure states are creating the best possible regulations for this task.
Citizens can use these domestic and international laws to demand com pliance. This can
be seen in the issue area o f human rights. Individuals and minority groups can use
litigation to dem and their rights be protected. This may also be true for nonproliferation
but whether litigation is utilized will be the more interesting question. But the ratification
o f a treaty (and corresponding law) does not guarantee it will be used for litigation
purposes.106
It m ay be that domestic groups do not use the judicial system to dem and their
state not pursue nuclear weapons because they have larger m ore im m ediate concerns.
For example, a dom estic population with high unem ploym ent, economic difficulties and
risk o f starvation m ay not be concerned w ith the state breaking its nonproliferation
commitment. However, if the illegal pursuit o f nuclear weapons has resulted in the
domestic population being punished by international sanctions, perhaps that population
will m obilize and w ill use the court system to dem and change. This could also happen if
a state with economic difficulties spends m oney on nuclear weapons to the detrim ent o f
social services and w eakening the national econom y. Some analysts suppose that it is a
fear o f econom ic collapse that has kept China from pursuing larger nuclear warhead
stockpiles.107 There is a belief in China that the Soviet Union collapsed because o f its
arms race with the US. In this case, a group could be rallied to demand change through
litigation against the government in the court system.

105 Ibid., 130-31.
106 Ibid., 130.
107 Jeffrey Lewis, The M inimum M eans o f Reprisal: China's Search fo r Security in the
Nuclear A ge (Cam bridge: The M IT Press, 2007).
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Related to litigation are dom estic institutions. Domestic institutions, such as
national judicial systems, create stability and ease com pliance with hum an rights treaties.
The courts could assist in com pliance w ith the NPT. Simmons found that having a strong
independent judicial system contributes to treaty compliance. Ideally, a separate
institution that is not elected by the people, nor directly responsible to the political
government, could more effectively, and objectively, develop and enforce policies and
regulations.

108

A credible judicial system allows for com pliance issues to be challenged

dom estically and are an avenue for change. An example o f this is the dom estic courts
being used to change practices o f governm ent torture in Chili and Israel, based on their
international treaty obligations.109
Litigation has the ability "to put in place a new or transformed discourse o f rights
which goes to the heart o f the w ay in w hich the substantive issues are conceived,
expressed, argued about, and struggled o ver."110 This can be applied not ju st to rights but
other issues, such as possibly to nonproliferation. Individual litigation cases may not
cause change but "litigation is also a political strategy, with power to inspire rule revision
and further m obilize political m ovem ents."111 Furthermore, a failed case is not
necessarily a failure in itself as even this has the potential to bring publicity and public
m obilization.
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Robert Elgie and Iain M cM enamin, "Credible Com m itm ent, Political Uncertainty or
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110 Alan Hunt, "Rights and Social M ovements: Counter-Hegemonic Strategies," Journal
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If litigation played a role evidence will be found in the court system. There will
be court cases brought against the state by individuals and/or domestic groups organized
for the goal o f nonproliferation and keeping their state from pursuing nuclear weapons.

W hy a Case Study M ethodology

Simmons uses a com bination o f qualitative and quantitative analyses in her study
o f com pliance with hum an rights treaties. A qualitative m ethodology how ever is m ore
appropriate for this dissertation. To be m ore specific, a case study m ethodology is the
ideal choice in this situation. A case study m ethodology is useful because the research
goal is to explore the im plem entation o f Sim m ons’ theory w ithin the high politics issue
area o f nonproliferation to see w hat can be learned about treaty compliance.
One o f the strengths o f a case study is the capability to assess generalizations or
variables in a specific situation.112 As Bennett and G eorge point out in their seminal
book, case studies allow for several causal m echanism s to be explored w ithin a single
case.113 Case studies allow “w ithin-case analysis and cross-case com parisons o f a small
num ber o f cases.” 114 In this study, cases will be analyzed individually testing S im m ons’
three com ponents o f dom estic politics theory o f compliance: agenda setting, litigation,
and domestic mobilization. Then the results are com pared across the case studies to
identify any patterns or anom alies in the conclusions chapter.

112 A lexander L. George and A ndrew Bennett, Case Studies a n d Theory D evelopm ent in
the Social Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cam bridge, Mass.: MIT
Press, 2005), 19.
113 Ibid., 21.
114 Ibid., 18.

There are potential disadvantages to using a case study m ethodology that should
be acknowledged. First, there are potential biases in choosing the case s t u d i e s . C a r e
must be taken that a variety o f cases are chosen and not ju st the ones that will be support
the desired results. There has also been an effort to use a variety o f geographical regions,
cultures, econom ies, etc. Some states have failed to comply, some are considered strong
proponents o f nonproliferation, and some are harder to interpret. These categories are
addressed by choosing six states for case studies (two for each category). This will be
explained in the next section, Case Study Identification. O ne final note on selection bias:
there is a bias in that all o f the states are m em bers o f the NPT. This bias is acceptable as
the hypothesis is centered on com pliance with this specific treaty.
A nother disadvantage o f the case study m ethodology is that it does not necessarily
identify how much a variable influenced/im pacted/m attered, only w hether it m attered.116
Etel Solingen faces a sim ilar problem in N uclear L ogics, in which she states it is
im portant not to overestim ate or underestim ate the im pact o f any single variable when
using the case study method.

I I7

This is not a true disadvantage in this research because

knowing w hether S im m ons’ findings m attered in com pliance with the N PT is sufficient.
If it is possible to discern how much they mattered, or how much the dom estic politics
theory o f com pliance m attered as whole, that would be more interesting but it will not be
considered a failure if this cannot be discerned. On a related noted, the purpose o f this
research is to identify w hether the variables are necessary. It is not expected that there
will be a clear answ er on w hether the variables are sufficient. Bennett and G eorge point

115 Ibid., 23.
116 Ibid., 25.
117
Etel Solingen, N uclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia a n d the M iddle East
(Princeton: Princeton U niversity Press, 2007), 250.
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this out as seeking to find w hether a variable “ favors1' a specific outcom e.118 In some
particularly com plex case studies, one may only know w hether a variable is a
“contributing cause” but one m ay not be able to discern if it is necessary for the
outcome.

i 19

Case Identification

Before describing the categories that the six states fall into, one needs to
understand they are all sufficiently technologically advanced to be nuclear capable. As
M atthew Kroenig has pointed out bluntly, “w hether or not a state w ants nuclear weapons
is irrelevant if it is unable to acquire them .” 120
Several analysts and scholars have m ade an effort to determ ine which states have
the capacity to build nuclear weapons. Exam ple w orks include, Stephen M. M eyer’s
seminal work, The D ynam ics o f N uclear P roliferation,12’ as well as the scholarship o f
Sonali Singh and Christopher R. W ay,122 and D ong-Joon Jo and Erik G artzke.123 This
dissertation will use states that have obvious technological and financial assets, although
as several countries have shown us (for example, N orth Korea) superiority is not
necessary in either category to obtain nuclear w eapons. The antiquated idea that only
118

George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory D evelopm ent in the Social Sciences, 27.
119 Ibid., 27.
120 M atthew Kroenig, "Importing the Bomb," Journal o f Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2
(2009): 163.
121 Stephen M. M eyer, The D ynam ics o f Nuclear P roliferation (Chicago: U niversity o f
Chicago Press, 1984).
122 Sonali Singh and Christopher R. Way, "The Correlates o f N uclear Proliferation,"
Journal o f Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (2004).
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first world states can acquire nuclear w eapons has been repeatedly proven w rong since
C hina’s first detonation in 1964.124 Furtherm ore, developing nations m ay have
capabilities in m anufacturing and m achine tools that can be “exploited” by third parties in
a nuclear w eapons program .125
A nother im portant thread between the states, but perhaps m ost im portant to the
noncom pliant states is the Additional Protocol. The noncom pliant states are chosen
because their noncom pliant findings w ere post 1997. Since 1997 states have had the
option o f ratifying the A dditional Protocol. This “addition” to current obligations gives
the IAEA m ore inform ation and access in order to be able to not ju st verify declared
m aterials and activities, but to confirm the absence o f undeclared m aterials and activities.
The A dditional Protocol is anticipated to becom e a new international norm but it is too
early to tell. In the future it may prove true and the absence o f an A dditional Protocol in
force m ay be indicative o f future noncom pliance.
In total, there are six states being evaluated. The two states that are not a concern
and the two states that failed to com ply should be straight forward when applying the
domestic politics theory because the outcom es (com pliance) are clear for these case
studies. The two states that are o f potential concern o f becom ing nuclear w eapons states
in the future may well be the more difficult and interesting cases. This analysis will
apply the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance to understand the cases with a

124 David Albright, Peddling Peril: How the Secret Nuclear Trade Arm s Am erica's
Enem ies (New York: Free Press, 2010), 5.
125 Ibid., 246.
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known end state in com parison with Sim m ons' results in hum an rights and will generate
inform ation on the potential unknow n outcom es o f the other two cases.126
More information on why these particular states were chosen will be given in
each case study chapter's introduction. Here the basic reasons are outlined in defense o f
using Germany, Kazakhstan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for this dissertation.
The two states that are not o f proliferation concern are G erm any and Kazakhstan.
They were both considered potential proliferators at one point in history. G erm any
clearly has the technological and financial capacity to acquire nuclear w eapons but
chooses not to do so. Germany was a concern after W orld W ar II and again after the
Cold War. K azakhstan was also a concern after the Cold W ar, when it inherited nuclear
weapons (as a result o f the breakup o f the Soviet Union) and it was unknow n if they
w ould keep them. This was an im m ediate and pressing proliferation concern. However,
K azakhstan w illingly returned the w eapons to Russia and joined the NPT. Both G erm any
and K azakhstan are considered strong supporters o f nonproliferation today.
The tw o states on “the other side o f the coin” are states that have already failed to
comply: Syria and Libya. As m entioned in the noncom pliance discussion above, the
com m on way o f defining noncom pliance for states is by when they fail to m eet their
safeguards obligations, as outlined in Article III o f the NPT. Syria and Libya were
chosen because they are recent cases o f noncom pliance that may be considered closed:
as o f June 2012, the international com m unity believes their program s have been stopped.
This is as opposed to the ongoing saga o f Iran and North Korea who m ay have active

126 There are two other kinds o f case studies that get away from the focus o f this research.
A fourth type o f case study would include states that have violated the N PT in the past
and are now com plying with the treaty. A fifth case study category w ould be on states
who gave up weapons programs in order to join the NPT as com pliant states.
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program s at the moment.

How their program s progressed and ultim ately ended are very

different stories and will make for an interesting chapter.
Finally, chapter 5 rounds out the case studies with two states that are capable o f
acquiring nuclear w eapons and are future potential proliferation concerns: Egypt and
Saudi Arabia. These states were selected from The N uclear Tipping Point, which is an
edited volum e focused on states that could go nuclear and the policies that affect th em .127
Respected nonproliferation expert D avid Albright, o f Institute for Science and
International Security, also lists Egypt and Saudi Arabia in his “to w orry about”
discussion o f proliferators.128 There are other scholars who refer to Egypt and Saudi
A rabia in this manner, and who they are and w hat their concerns are w ill be discussed in
m ore detail in chapter 5.
Egypt and Saudi A rabia each has a unique history w ith nuclear proliferation and
each has concerns that could tip them in the direction o f acquiring nuclear weapons.
Furtherm ore, both states have the capacity to acquire nuclear w eapons i f the decision is
m ade to do so. Egypt, which under the autocracy o f M ubarak had a policy o f com pliance
to the N PT despite its security incentives to proliferate, may becom e a transitional
dem ocracy as result o f the uprising and the Arab Spring. Egypt may be the most
interesting test o f this theory for explaining treaty compliance.

127 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The N uclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices.
128 Albright, Peddling Peril: H ow the Secret N uclear Trade Arm s Am erica's Enem ies,
244.
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Conclusions

The previous chapters have laid the groundw ork for the dissertation’s case
studies. This chapter reviewed the relevant m easures o f com pliance, the m echanism s that
com prise Simmons' dom estic politics theory o f com pliance, introduced the case study
m ethodology, and identified the states to be used in the case studies.
Definitions o f com pliance and noncom pliance were offered but the ultim ate
decision for this dissertation is based on the IAEA. The states are defined as
noncom pliant with the N PT based on historical findings by the IAEA Board o f
Governors. States are in com pliance if they have not been found in noncom pliance.
The domestic politics theory o f com pliance includes the m obilization o f domestic
groups, agenda setting, and litigation. These three variables were further defined in this
chapter. They will be used in the follow ing case study chapters to see if the dom estic
politics theory o f treaty com pliance can help us understand com pliance in the high
politics issue area o f national security. Through the prism o f dom estic politics theory we
should see in the case study states: nonproliferation added to the national agenda w here it
was previously absent, litigation in the courts attem pting to stop the acquisition o f nuclear
weapons, and dom estic groups m obilizing in the name o f nonproliferation. The theory is
not expected to fully explain com pliance; nor should the lack o f the theory’s mechanism
in noncom pliance cases fully explain noncom pliance. A ccording to Simm ons the
dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance ju st helps explain compliance.
The next three chapters are the case studies them selves. Chapter 3 discusses the
currently com pliant states: G erm any and Kazakhstan. Both o f these states were once
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proliferation concerns but are not consider solid supporters o f the nonproliferation
regime. Chapter 4 analyzes the recent noncom pliant states, Syria and Libya. Since 2003,
both o f these states have been found in noncom pliance by the IAEA Board o f Governors.
However, the w orld thinks their program s have been stopped and it is possible to study
these cases. C hapter 5 concludes the case study chapters with a discussion on the
potential proliferation states o f Egypt and Saudi A rabia. Both o f these states may support
the nonproliferation regim e, but the world also has reason to be concerned there m ay be a
change o f policy in the future.
The politics are evolving and there m ay be great changes in store for some o f
these states. But for the sake o f this dissertation, analyses will only use history and
events up until June 2012. O therw ise, the next chapters w ould continually need revising
for years to com e as history unfolds.
The next several chapters will explore if "com m itm ents have made an im portant
contribution" to stopping the spread o f nuclear w eapons, as Simmons has found to be true
in the issue area o f hum an rig h ts .129 In the very least, the analyses seek to gain a better
understanding o f why states keep their com m itm ent not to develop or acquire nuclear
weapons; nor help others to do so.

129 Simmons, M obilizing fo r H um an Rights: International Law in D om estic Politics, 199.
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C H A PTER III
STATES OF NO PRO LIFERA TION CONCERN

Introduction

The states in this chapter are the strong NPT supporters. It is expected that these
states will continue to m eet their com m itm ents and will not proliferate. They m ay even
dem onstrate their com m itm ent by going beyond the obligations o f the NPT.

V iew ing

these two cases through the lens o f the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance
should give the expected results: if the theory is relevant to understanding com pliance in
nonproliferation then the theory’s m echanism s should be present in these two com pliance
cases. There should be the presence o f m obilizing dom estic groups, the agenda setting
should be logical and related to the treaty, and there should be the use o f litigation.
These two case studies develop a baseline for the theory before m oving on to the
harder noncom pliance cases and potential proliferation concern cases. It is im portant
before delving in to the case studies to recall that Simmons does not claim dom estic
politics theory o f treaty com pliance to be sufficient in explaining com pliance. She
suggests only that the theory can help explain the puzzle that is treaty com pliance and
other factors m ay be involved as well.
So, what are the two cases and w hy were they chosen? The states for this chapter
are G erm any and Kazakhstan. After the Cold War, G erm any reunified and Kazakhstan
became an independent nation. G erm any and Kazakhstan each have a unique history
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with nuclear weapons. Germany once pursued nuclear weapons and Kazakhstan actually
had nuclear weapons; but both have m ade the choice not to possess nuclear weapons.
G erm any became the birthplace o f the Atomic Age in 1938 with the discovery o f
a fission reaction in uranium .130 Fission is the key concept behind a nuclear weapon and
is necessary to create an explosion.131 G erm any had an active nuclear w eapons program
during W orld W ar II and after the w ar the international com munity sought an assurance
that the program would not be restarted.132 The original nuclear w eapons program under
H itler was not successful, and luckily, w e never had to learn how he w ould have used
these destructive weapons.
D ecades later, with the end o f the Cold W ar, there were fears that G erm any might
once again be tem pted to develop nuclear w eapons for security reasons in unstable
political times.

133

These fears, happily, were unfounded and G erm any has stayed the

non-nuclear course. K azakhstan had a slightly different story after the Cold War.
K azakhstan did not seek nuclear w eapons but found them in its possession with
the fall o f the Soviet U nion.134 K azakhstan suddenly had the w orld’s fourth largest
arsenal o f nuclear weapons and substantial inventories o f highly enriched uranium and
plutonium . The Soviet U nion’s nuclear weapons test site, Sem ipalatinsk, was also
contained within the Kazakhstani borders. Ironically, however, this test site played a role

130 Global Security, "German Special W eapons,"
http://w w w .globalsecurity.org/w m d/w orld/germ any/nuke.htm (accessed N ovem ber 30,
2 0 1 2 ).
131 Federation o f A m erican Scientists, "Nuclear W eapon Design,"
http://w w w .fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/design.htm (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
132 Sim pson, N ielsen, and Swinerd, N P T Briefing Book.
133 John J. M earsheimer, "Why W e W ill Soon M iss the Cold War," Atlantic M onthly
O nline 266, no. 2 (1990).
134 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Nuclear," http://ww w .nti.org/countryprofiles/kazakhstan/nuclear/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).

58

in Kazakhstan citizens' revulsion for nuclear weapons despite the nation being posed to
be a nuclear power. A fter two releases o f radioactivity at the site, citizens living close by
m obilized to end testing in their new nation.135 The largest event was a protest in August
1989 that drew more than 50,000 dem onstrators to Sem ipalatinsk.1-’6 The suffering
caused by the effects o f fallout and radiation contam ination from nuclear w eapons testing
resulted in Kazakhstan giving up its inherited arsenal and becom ing a leading player in
the anti-nuclear weapons testing m ovem ent.137
This chapter, on states o f no proliferation concern, starts with the case o f
G erm any and is followed by the case o f Kazakhstan. For each state, there is an
introduction to the specific situation o f the com pliant state. A n overview is given next,
which consists o f the state’s history w ith the N PT and the international nonproliferation
regim e m ore broadly, as well as the status o f nuclear pow er in the state.
N ext, each state is analyzed using Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance. This includes review ing the m echanism s o f agenda setting, litigation, and
m obilization o f the dom estic population for each state’s particular situation in a scholarly
search for evidence. Conclusions are offered for each state as to w hether these variables
can explain their individual com pliance cases.

135 L. J. Carter, "Soviet N uclear Testing: The Republics Say No," Science 250, no. 4983
(16 N ovem ber 1990): 903.
136 Global N onviolent Action Database, "Kazakhs Stop N uclear Testing (NevadaSem ipalatinsk A ntinuclear Cam paign), 1989-1991," Swarthm ore College,
http://nvdatabase.sw arthm ore.edu/content/kazakhs-stop-nuclear-testing-nevadasem ipalatinsk-antinuclear-cam paign-1989-1991 (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
137 Arms Control Association, "International Day Against N uclear Tests: Translating
W ords into Action," http://w w w .arm scontrol.org/events/Intem ational-D ay-A gainstN uclear-Tests-Translating-W ords-Into-A ction (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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Finally, there are conclusions drawn for the chapter as a whole. The focus o f the
chapter’s conclusion is w hether, based on these two case studies, state com pliance with
the NPT can be effectively understood via domestic politics theory.

G ermany

Today, G erm any is a nonproliferation global leader. However, it is interesting to
note that “the im petus behind the atom bomb project in Britain and the United States
cam e from a fear o f the consequences o f a unilateral German success in the m ilitary
I -5 0

exploitation o f atomic energy.”

W hile G erm any never did produce nuclear weapons,

in 1945 the nuclear genie was out o f the bottle in the United States. G erm any
unknow ingly drove the A llied nuclear w eapons program but today consciously drives the
international nonproliferation effort.
G erm any w as one o f the reasons the international com m unity sought to develop a
nonproliferation treaty. “ Since at least 1960, the basic concern has been to stop or deflect
G erm any from going the w ay o f France,” to make the acquisition o f w eapons by
G erm any as difficult as possible.139 Today there is little doubt that G erm any is in
com pliance with its N PT obligations. W hile G erm any proliferation may have been a
concern at the time that the concept o f a nonproliferation treaty was initially developed,
G erm any is now one o f the treaty's strongest supporters.
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Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o f N uclear Strategy, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke,
Hampshire England; New York: Palgrave M acmillan, 2003), 14.
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G erm any one o f the “m ainstays” in the international nonproliferation com m unity.140
G erm any is clearly technologically capable o f producing a nuclear w eapon with minimal
time but thus far, it has purposefully chosen not to do so .141
This was not always obvious. While G erm any did commit to the N PT it did not
have the strongest set o f dom estic laws for meeting its obligations under the treaty. After
the first G u lf W ar much inform ation was revealed about the Iraqi nuclear weapons
program. This included, much to the em barrassm ent o f the Germ an governm ent, the
revelation that Germ an com panies had aided the program. In fact, the w orld w ould later
learn o f “extensive illegal deliveries by Germ an com panies to Iraq, as well as to Libya
and other states o f concern.” 142 In particular, Germ an citizens and com panies have been
accused o f aiding the developm ent o f gas centrifuges for enrichm ent in other nations.
Enrichm ent is a key step for a uranium based nuclear w eapons program .143
It was the Germ an "reputation for technical excellence, com bined w ith its slack
export controls [that] help to explain w hy it produced a substantial proportion o f Iraq’s
nuclear im ports."144 That is to say Germ an com panies contributed to the Iraq program by
taking advantage o f the lack o f governm ent oversight. German export controls have

140 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 18.
141 Robert F. M ozley, The Politics a n d Technology o f N uclear Proliferation (Seattle:
University o f W ashington Press, 1998), 165.
142 M ichael Rietz, "G erm any’s Export Control Law in the N ew M illennium ," Institute for
Science and International Security, http://isis-online.org/conferences/detail/germ anysexport-control-law -in-the-new -m illennium /20 (accessed Novem ber 30, 2012).
143 N uclear Files, "W eapons Basics," Nuclear Age Peace Foundation,
http://w w w .nuclearfiles.org/m enu/key-issues/nuclear-w eapons/basics/w eaponsbasics.htm #term s (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
144 International Institute for Strategic Studies, N uclear Black Markets (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007), 49.
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greatly im proved in recent history.145 Unfortunately, the international standard
punishm ents and penalties are not severe for W M D proliferation acts but things are
beginning to change, such as with UN Security Resolution 1540 (which requires states to
create regulations against W M D proliferation).146
These violations did contribute to the nuclear w eapons programs around the world
but “it should be stated clearly that those violations were the exception; the m ajority o f
Germ an com panies have conducted business w ithout cause for objection.” 147 M oreover,
w hile G erm any did have some problem s with individuals abusing the lack o f export
controls, there was never an issue that G erm any itself was proliferating (i.e. governm ent
sanctioned proliferation). G erm any has now im plem ented domestic export control laws
that m eet the international standards.148 One o f the w ays G erm any does this is by being a
m em ber o f the Zangger C om m ittee.149 The Zangger C om m ittee developed (and continues
to update) a Trigger List, which is a list “o f nuclear-related strategic goods to assist N PT
parties in identifying equipm ent and materials subject to export controls.” 150

This

Com m ittee and its list have contributed to international com pliance with paragraph 2 o f
the N P T ’s Article III.

145 M ichael Rietz, "G erm any’s Export Control Law in the N ew M illennium ," Institute for
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62

The N uclear Suppliers G roup (NSG) is another export control organization
through which Germany meets its nonproliferation obligations.131 The N uclear Suppliers
Group focuses on developing guidelines for nuclear-related transfers and maintaining
what is known as the Dual-Use List. This list covers nuclear-related “equipm ent,
material and technology” exports that “ could make a significant contribution to an
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity.”

It is anticipated that

G erm any will continue “to observe the NSG guidelines m ore closely” since discovering
several o f its citizens and com panies associated with Iraq’s 1980s nuclear weapons
program .153 By doing so, G erm any will be w orking to stay in com pliance w ith A rticle II
o f the NPT, which requires states to refrain from helping other states acquire nuclear
weapons. This article had been intended to stop state-to-state cooperation but evolving
tim es now require states to address individual actors within their borders acting w ithout
state consent.
This case study begins w ith an overview on Germany, including the state’s
history with nonproliferation and use o f nuclear power. The case study then
system atically goes through the dom estic politics theory m echanism s o f agenda setting,
litigation, and mobilization. Finally, conclusions are drawn about G erm any’s com pliance
to the NPT and what may be learned by using dom estic politics theory.

151 N uclear Suppliers Group, "Participants,"
http://w w w .nuclearsuppliersgroup.org/Leng/03-m em ber.htm (accessed N ovem ber 30,
2 0 1 2 ).
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Overview

History with Nonproliferation
Germany could have decided to pursue nuclear w eapons for prestige and political
power. At the time o f negotiations for the NPT, G erm any and other states had serious
concerns “that nations w ithout nuclear w eapons production will not be able to play the
role even o f ‘secondary great pow er.’” 154 G erm any may have also w anted to balance the
pow er in the region or even com pete as a regional hegem onic pow er w ith France and the
UK who had already acquired nuclear w eapons.155
G erm any’s main concern at the time was feeling threatened by the Soviet Union.
A nother reason G erm any could have desired nuclear w eapons is for national security. If
concerns persisted about the reliability o f the US as an ally or the capabilities o f NATO,
Germ any could have decided to pursue nuclear w eapons to provide for its own
defense.156
This same reason applied decades later, when, with the end o f the Cold W ar,
G ermany could have pursued nuclear weapons because as M earsheim er put it, “Germany
w ould no doubt feel insecure w ithout nuclear w eapons.” 157 However, G erm any has
continued to choose the path o f nonproliferation and has m aintained com pliance with its
NPT commitments.

154 Kelleher, "The Issue o f German N uclear Armament," 103.
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156 Cam pbell, Einhom, and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 209-12.
157 M earsheim er, "W hy We W ill Soon M iss the Cold War."
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Germ any com mitted not to build nuclear w eapons for the first time in 1954, when
it signed the Paris Protocols to the Treaty o f B russels.158 It m ade the com m itm ent again
in 1975 when it ratified the NPT (this will be discussed in more detail in the next
section).159 And, finally, G erm any once again agreed not to proliferate in 1990, as part
o f the Tw o-Plus-Four Treaty that ended the m ulti-national control in G erm any.160 The
N PT was perhaps the most im portant nonproliferation com m itm ent G erm any made
because o f the treaty’s unique characteristics.
Germ any is a party to the N PT because the Federal Republic o f G erm any and the
Germ an Democratic Republic both signed in 1969 and ratified in 1975.161 On O ctober 3,
1990, the United Nations was notified that the Federal Republic o f G erm any and the
German D em ocratic Republic w ould be know n as “G erm any” and w ould keep their
previous nonproliferation com mitment. Simm ons found that states m ay ratify to avoid
being singled out as the only state in their region not a party to a treaty. G erm any is
clearly not in this camp o f states ratifying late sim ply to avoid standing out in the region.
W ith a 1969 signature and 1975 deposit, G erm any is on par with m ost o f its neighbors.
Upon m aking the original com m itm ent to the N PT, G ermany also m ade a
declaration. The declaration included a reference to the importance o f N A TO to

158 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The N uclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 175.
159 C enter for Nonproliferation Studies, "NPT M embership."
160 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The N uclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 175.
161 United Nations, "NPT (Germany),"
http://disarm am ent.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/e03053a22d4bf8478525688f00693182/5c88b
675bd2d0bb68525688f006d2653?O penD ocum ent (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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G erm any’s national security, as well as a statem ent that the nation m aintained its right to
develop nuclear weapons if "it considers its suprem e interests in jeo p ard y ."162
As all parties to the N PT m ust do under Article III, Germany negotiated a
Safeguards A greement with the IAEA. G erm any’s Safeguards A greem ent with the IAEA
came into force in February 1977 and they ratified the Additional Protocol in April
2004.163 As a European Union m em ber, G erm any also needed to bring a safeguards type
agreem ent into effect with Euratom. Euratom is the European Atomic Energy
Comm unity, which is the nuclear w atchdog agency w ithin the European C om m ission.164
Germany's other nonproliferation com m itm ents include the C om prehensive Test
Ban Treaty, which it ratified in 1998.165 G erm any is an A nnex II state; this means their
ratification is necessary for the treaty to enter into force. This may be a rem nant o f past
proliferation concerns about G erm any. G erm any does not belong to any nuclear weapon
free zones.166

Current N uclear Status
In 2008, G erm any generated about 25% o f its electricity from nuclear pow er.167
G erm any had 17 operating nuclear reactors, com prised o f six boiling w ater and 11

162 Ibid.
163 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status List."
164 European Atomic Energy Com m unity, "European A tom ic Energy Com m unity
(Euratom)," European Com m ission, http://w w w .euratom .org/ (accessed N ovem ber 30,
2 0 1 2 ).

,fo CTBTO Preparatory Com m ission, "Status o f Signature and Ratification,"
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pressured w ater reactors. All o f the reactors were built by Siem ens-KW U and are fairly
large (totaling 20,339 MW e). The last time a new com mercial reactor came online was
1989. On a related note, after reunification, the Soviet design reactors in East G erm any
were all shutdown. Since the March 2011 disaster at Fukushima in Japan, G erm any has
decided to shutdown all o f their nuclear pow er plants by 2022; eleven o f w hich are being
com pletely dem olished and being returned to green fields.168
G ermany has no uranium mines but it does have an enrichm ent plant: URENCO
D eutschland.169 The plant, located in Gronau near the border with the N etherlands, has
been operational since 1985. A REV A also has a fuel fabrication plant in G erm any.170
There are no plans to close these plants.

D om estic Politics Theory

Domestic M obilization
Simmons describes domestic m obilization as social and political movements
organized by citizens. W est G erm any saw its first m obilization against nuclear weapons
I

in 1958.

n|

It was the short lived “Cam paign against Atom ic Death” which was

organized by the Social D em ocratic Party. A nother m ovem ent began in 1960 as the
Easter M arches o f Atomic W eapons Opponents; it was later renam ed the “Easter

168 Ibid.
169 URENCO, "URENCO Deutschland," http://w w w .urenco.com /content/45/urencodeutschland.aspx (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
170 World N uclear Association, "Nuclear Power in Germany."
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Marches o f Atomic W eapons Opponents-Cam paign for D isarm am ent.” Inspired by a
sim ilar m ovem ent in the UK, the “Easter M arches o f Atomic W eapons O pponentsCampaign for D isarm am ent” organized m arches across Germany in the 1950s and 1960s.
However, in the German and UK m ovem ents "there was no agreement, even am ongst the
protesters in either country, about w hat m eaning this resistance was supposed to h ave."172
It seems the G erm an m ovem ent was framed as an environm ental issue and did not
reference the NPT. This may be because G erm any was already keeping its com m itm ents
and the dom estic population was calling on the rest o f the world, and the U K specifically,
to disarm.
The anti-nuclear pow er m ovem ent goes back decades in Germany. One o f the
best known successful m ovem ents was the anti-nuclear pow er m ovem ent to stop
construction o f a nuclear pow er plant in W yhl.173 The m ovem ent included meetings,
protests, mass occupations, and litigation. In certain regions o f Germany, there has been
m obilization against nuclear pow er recently, w hich im pacted the national agenda to
shutter all German nuclear pow er plants after Fukushim a.174
The N PT actually supports peaceful nuclear uses so this exam ple shows it is
possible for the Germ an citizens to mobilize successfully, but this is certainly not an
exam ple o f m obilizing directly for nonproliferation or the N P T .173 M ore importantly,
though, the m obilization against nuclear pow er could be extrapolated and viewed in the

“ H olger N ehring, "The British and W est German Protests against N uclear W eapons
and the Cultures o f the Cold War, 1957-64," Contemporary British H istory 19, no. 2
(2005): 223.
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context o f nuclear weapons. A dom estic population so opposed to nuclear pow er would
clearly be opposed to nuclear weapons. However, there is sim ply no reason for citizens
to mobilize against non-existent noncom pliance.

Agenda Setting
Sim m ons found that in hum an rights treaties, agenda setting had m ore im pact in
dem ocracies than in autocracies.176 In order for the national agenda setting process to be
influenced by a treaty, the legislature needs to be fairly independent and "have greater
control over the national legislative agenda."177 In G erm any, the legislature is com prised
o f the Bundestag and the Bundesrat; and the system is genuinely dem ocratic.178 Before
unification, the Federal Republic o f G erm any was a dem ocracy and the G erm an
D em ocratic Republic was an au to cracy .179 A ccording to the Polity IV Project, G erm any
currently scores a ten. This m eans that it is a “consolidated dem ocracy.” 180

W hile

Sim m ons’ w ork finds that dom estic politics theory as a whole has less im pact in stable
dem ocracies because their treaty com pliance m ay be pre-determ ined by a variety o f
factors, it is still a worthw hile exploration.181
As stated above, the G overnm ent o f the Federal Republic o f G erm any made a
declaration with its signature to the NPT. This declaration included statem ents which
serve to reconcile its security interests (which were high on the national agenda) with the

176 Simm ons, M obilizing fo r Human Rights: International Law in D om estic P olitics, 149.
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treaty’s explicit demand that non-w eapons states not pursue or acquire nuclear weapons.
A m ong the key statements are:
the security o f the Federal Republic o f G ermany shall continue to be
ensured by NATO; the Federal Republic o f G erm any for its part shall
remain unrestrictedly com m itted to the collective security arrangem ents o f

NATO;” 182
“ ...in a situation in which it considers its supreme interests in jeopardy,
will rem ain free by invoking the principle o f international law laid down
in Article 51 o f the United N ations C harter to take the measures required
I &T
to safeguard those interests;”

As indicated by these statem ents, agenda setting was influenced by security
concerns not by the treaty’s text and existence. The treaty did however, force the
German governm ent to reflect on its view o f nuclear w eapons and develop a w ritten
policy.

Litigation
The centerpiece o f Germany's judicial system is the Federal Constitutional Court.
Also known as Bunesverfassungsgericht, it is the “special court for the review o f judicial
and adm inistrative decisions and legislation to determ ine w hether they are in accord with
the Basic Law (constitution) o f the country.” 184 The G erm an judiciary is considered
1o<;

"independent, both constitutionally and in practice." ' The system in G erm any "works"
and citizens could bring forth litigation to be heard by an impartial court system. They
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have a w ay to hold their national governm ent and its branches accountable. However, a
search o f the literature for the use o f litigation finds that no one has filed a suit disputing
the nation's com m itm ent to the N P T ; nor calling for com pliance with the treaty.
Presumably, this is because G erm any is already complying. If G erm any was not
com plying, citizens could use Article 25 o f the Basic Law to bring a law suit. Under
A rticle 25, international law, such as treaty obligations “take precedence” over the
dom estic law s.186

Conclusions fo r Germany
As recently as 1990, John M earsheim er predicted G erm any w ould pursue nuclear
weapons to reduce its vulnerability after the Cold W ar.187 So far, that has not come to
pass. G erm any has consistently dem onstrated its com m itm ent to the international
nonproliferation regime. For exam ple, G erm any signed and ratified the Com prehensive
Test Ban Treaty.

188

G erm any’s ratification is required for this treaty to enter into force.

G erm any also has an Additional Protocol, which means they are voluntarily granting the
IAEA broader access to locations and inform ation.189
Beyond the possible role o f m obilization, the dom estic politics theory has not
been effective in aiding understanding o f Germany's com pliance with the NPT. The

186 “ Basic Law for the Federal Republic o f G erm any,” prom ulgated by the Parliam entary
Council on 23 M ay 1949 and as am ended in June 2008.
187 M earsheim er, "W hy We W ill Soon M iss the Cold War."
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189 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Status o f A dditional Protocols,"
http://w w w .iaea.org/O urW ork/SV /Safeguards/protocol.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30,
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treaty did not impact agenda setting or litigation which in turn could have influenced
national com pliance with the NPT.
The mobilization m echanism was more relevant but is still not a strong
explanation of German com pliance. There was a m ovem ent to abolish nuclear weapons,
which is similar to Article VI o f the NPT. However, the goal was not about German
com m itm ent to the N PT but other nations' com m itm ents to the NPT. Furtherm ore, the
m ovem ent has not been successful. There was also a m ovem ent to end nuclear pow er in
Germany, which is not in line with the N PT pillars, but does serve as a stark w arning to
politicians that the dom estic population would likely m obilize against Germ an nuclear
weapons should it ever becom e an issue.

K azakhstan

W ith the fall o f the Soviet Union in 1991, K azakhstan was suddenly an
independent nation and “for a b rief period, K azakhstan was the fourth largest nuclear
pow er on Earth.” 190 This unforeseen nuclear w eapons state w as faced with a serious
decision: to keep the w eapons or do aw ay with o f them. The w hole w orld wanted to
know what K azakhstan w ould do (as well as what Ukraine and Belarus would do). The
Kazakhstan situation received much attention because o f the arsenal’s size and a reported
plan to sell nuclear material to Iran.191 In the end, K azakhstan made the “courageous
decision” to give up its nuclear weapons by returning them to Russia and set an exam ple

190 James E. Doyle, ed. Nuclear Safeguards, Security, a n d Nonproliferation (Burlington:
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for the w orld.11)2 This process was com pleted by the negotiation o f the STA RT I treaty
which was signed in 1992.193 The final w eapons were relocated to Russia in 1995.194
Kazakhstan continues to meet its obligations and is expected to do so in the future.

Overview

History with N onproliferation
There are several reasons K azakhstan m ay have considered keeping the nuclear
weapons it inherited. It is possible K azakhstan w anted them for security. As a recently
independent nation K azakhstan could have seen the benefits o f nuclear w eapons in
meeting their national security needs. N o one knew exactly what kind o f political
environm ent w ould follow the Cold W ar. Perhaps with the end o f the Soviet Union they
wanted to be self-reliant. O r they could have kept the stockpile because o f the perceived
prestige associated with nuclear weapons. Finally, it is expensive to develop nuclear
weapons and by acquiring them from the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan m ay have been
tempted to take on the low er m aintenance costs and put o ff m aking a decision for
decades.
K azakhstan’s inheritance from the Soviet Union “ included 1,040 strategic nuclear
warheads mounted on 104 Intercontinental Ballistic M issile (ICBM s), 370 nuclear-tipped
air-launched cruise m issiles, nuclear material m ining and processing facilities, and the

192

Ban Ki-moon, "Video M essage to the International Conference on a W orld Free o f
Nuclear W eapons" (paper presented at the International Forum for a N uclear W eaponFree W orld, Astana, Kazakhstan, 12 O ctober 2011).
193 Freedman, The Evolution o f N uclear Strategy, 423.
194 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Kazakhstan Profile: Overview,"
http://w w w .nti.org/country-profiles/kazakhstan/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).

73

largest weapons-testing com plex in the w orld.” 195 They had also had stockpiles
am ounting to over ten thousand kilogram s o f highly enriched uranium and three thousand
kilogram s o f plutonium , giving the nation the potential to further increase their arsenal
should they decide to do so .196 D espite this inherited arsenal, Kazakhstan w ould later
join the N PT as a non-nuclear w eapons state.
K azakhstan returned the w arheads and their missiles, dismantled the ICBM silos
and parts o f the test site.197 After ratifying the NPT, Kazakhstan negotiated a Safeguards
Agreement, as required under A rticle III, entering it into force in A ugust 1 9 9 5 .198
K azakhstan later entered the A dditional Protocol, w hich came into force in M ay 2007.
K azakhstan even took steps beyond its com m itm ents under the NPT. In
cooperation with the US government, Project Sapphire was carried out to rem ove over
500 kilogram s o f highly enriched uranium , some o f it being weapons grade m aterial.199
The material was taken to Oak Ridge N ational Laboratory in 1994.
In 1989, the local population around the test site played an im portant role in
K azakhstan creating and keeping other nonproliferation commitments. They started a
m ovem ent focused not necessarily for dism antling the weapons, but rather to stop the
testing o f nuclear w eapons.200 They w ere successful in stopping the tests and more
im portantly in gaining attention o f their national governm ent and the international
com munity. The m ovem ent called for a com prehensive test ban treaty that “w ould not

195 Doyle, ed. N uclear Safeguards, Security, a n d Nonproliferation, 179.
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only put a stop to the local health hazards o f testing but [would be] an essential step in
stopping the nuclear arms race .” 201 This com prehensive treaty did com e to realization.
K azakhstan’s other nonproliferation com m itm ents include the Com prehensive
Test Ban Treaty, w hich they ratified in M ay 2002 .202 They are m em bers o f the N uclear
Suppliers Group and the Zangger Com m ittee, which means they try to be responsible
with their nuclear technology related exports .203 As described in the G erm an section o f
this chapter, these two export control organizations contribute to N PT com pliance by
developing and m aintaining nuclear-related guidelines and lists for states to incorporate
into their dom estic legislation. K azakhstan also participates in the Proliferation Security
Initiative with the US governm ent and is party to the Central Asia N uclear W eapon Free
Zone . 204

Current N uclear Status
K azakhstan’s civilian nuclear fuel cycle is quite small but the industry is quite
large .205 There was one pow er plant in A ktau (the BN -350) but it closed in 1999. It was
for electricity and desalination purposes. Although, the US governm ent believes that the
B N -350’s main purpose was to be a plutonium production reactor for the Soviet nuclear
weapons program rather than produce electricity for the surrounding area. Russia and
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Kazakhstan are cooperating on future plans to build new pow er plants in Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan also has four research reactors . 206
Three o f the research reactors are located at the Sem ipalatinsk Test S ite . 207 The
test site was hom e to 456 above and below ground nuclear tests. The Sem ipalatink Test
Site and its “ facilities there com prised the largest underground nuclear test site in the
w orld .” 208 In response to protests, the last test was held in 1989, before the site was
closed by President N azarbayev in A ugust 1991. The test site includes some o f the
nation’s research facilities and waste storage.
Uranium m ining is the m ain sector o f the nuclear industry rem aining Kazakhstan.
Kazakhstan has 15% o f the w orld’s natural uranium resources and is the w orld’s largest
producer annually .209 All m ining and exploration is controlled by the governm ent owned
company, Kazatom prom . Kazatom prom has begun cooperation with com panies Cameco
and A REVA to increase its capabilities in m ining, conversion and fuel fabrication.
K azakhstan has a conversion and fabrication facility, the U lba M etallurgical
Plant, which has served a variety o f functions .210 The m ost relevant activities are
conversion o f the uranium ore to yellow cake and the fabrication o f fuel pellets.
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D omestic Politics Theory o f Compliance

Domestic M obilization
K azakhstan did not m obilize in the name o f the NPT. However, there was an
important m ovem ent, the N evada-Sem ipalatinsk m ovem ent which organized to stop
nuclear w eapons testing. The m ovem ent began w ith protests at the test site after two
accidents that vented radioactivity in 1989.

21 i

W hile the protestors in the N evada Test

Site garnered little attention in the US, they did inspire the citizens living near the
Sem ipalatinsk Test Site to mobilize.

9 J9

The leader o f the m ovem ent was poet and

politician O lzhas Suleimenov. The m ovem ent was originally com posed o f citizens living
near the test site and K azakh environmentalists.

213

The goals o f the N evada-Sem ipalatinsk m ovem ent as outlined in a petition were
“(1) the closure o f the Sem ipalatinsk facility and a cleanup o f the area; (2) the end o f
nuclear weapon production; (3) citizen control over nuclear waste; (4) the creation o f a
map showing the extent o f radiation dam age in the Soviet Union; and (5) the elucidation
o f the plight o f radiological victims in the Soviet U nion .” 214 There was also a lessdefined overarching goal to eliminate nuclear weapons. The petition outlining these
goals had over one m illion signatures in a matter o f days.
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From 1989 to 1991, the movem ent spread to other cities and protests against
testing were held in several cities across K azakhstan .213 The protests brought much
attention and people flew in from around the w orld to join the m ovem ent .216 It was
reported at the time that, “a powerful protest cam paign in Kazakhstan has made it
difficult, if not im possible to continue testing at the Soviet U nion’s prim ary test site
there .” 217
The m ovem ent did not use litigation to advance their cause but the participants
did use speeches, meetings, protests, petitions and other non-violent m eans to influence
the agenda against nuclear weapons testing .218 W hile the movem ent was focused on
halting nuclear w eapons testing, the concept o f a test ban treaty was seen “as a vital
prelude to stopping the nuclear arms race .” 219 There was an assumption that if the
m ovem ent was successful and testing ended in the Soviet Union, there w ould be
insurm ountable pressure on the US to end testing as w ell .220

Agenda Setting
K azakhstan gained its independence in D ecem ber 1991 with the fall o f the Soviet
Union. The governm ent is technically a republic “with little pow er outside the executive
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branch .” 221 Kazakhstan scores only a “- 6 ” on the Polity Project IV scale .222 This means
->->3

it is an autocracy.”" The current president, N ursultan Nazarbayev, began as a Soviet
executive adm inistrator in 1990 and has continuously won presidential elections in less
than dem ocratic reelections. The agenda setting for the nation is almost exclusively the
charge o f the elite leadership.
The leadership has a strong hold as the current President is expected to serve until
at least 2020, as the elections in betw een have been w aived . 224 He has now given
him self the title Leader o f the N ation, w hich m akes him the “de facto leader” even after
he is no longer president .225 He also receives im m unity from any possible persecution by
the Parliam ent now and in the future. There was also a 2010 law passed that allows him
to run for re-election indefinitely. Elections m onitors have found that the m inim um
standards o f dem ocratic elections have not been met in K azakhstan’s past elections. The
executive pow er has few limitations, as the legislative body “largely serves as a rubberstam p body (as does the judiciary ) . ” 226
K azakhstan’s leadership may not have been thinking o f the international
com m unity when they chose to return the w eapons to Russia. It is more likely they saw
the weapons as a bargaining chip in the game o f w orld politics. In exchange for the
weapons, Kazakhstan “received significant and broad assurances in D ecem ber 1994 from
221

Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Kazakhstan,"
https://w w w .cia.gov/library/publications/the-w orld-factbook/geos/kz.htm l (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
222 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Kazakhstan,"
http://w w w .system icpeace.org/polity/K azakhstan2010.pdf (accessed N ovem ber 30,
2 0 1 2 ).
223 Systemic Peace, "The Polity IV Project."
224 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Kazakhstan."
225 Ibid.
226

.

79

France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States . ” 227 These assurances w ere
focused on security and on respecting the sovereignty o f the new nation o f Kazakhstan.

Litigation
The Kazakhstan judicial system is com prised o f a Supreme C ourt and a
Constitutional Council (also know n as the Constitutional C ourt ) . 228 The executive
branch’s influence over the Constitutional Council by the fact when President
N azarbayev am ended the constitution to allow for unlim ited terms, he sent it to the
Constitutional Council for it to be approved and to give the appearance o f transparency.
A search for past or current lawsuits returns nothing. There is no litigation related
to forcing Kazakhstan to keep its nuclear nonproliferation com m itm ents. There was no
litigation related to stopping nuclear w eapons testing either. However, resolutions w ere
introduced and passed by the Supreme Soviet under the Soviet Union and in the new ly
formed K azakhstani Parliam ent after independence .229

Conclusions fo r Kazakhstan
As UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated, “ Semipalatinsk has becom e a
powerful symbol o f hope. Hope for a w orld free o f nuclear w eapons .” 230 K azakhstan
had a unique opportunity to be a nuclear weapon state autom atically at its infancy.
However, Kazakhstan did the noble thing for itself and for the world's international
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security. By giving up the w eapons K azakhstan had not ju st set an exam ple for other
countries but won international favor. W ho knows how w orld politics would look today
if Kazakhstan w ere a nuclear weapons state. W orse, Kazakhstan could have kept the
weapons and materials and sold them to other states.
Although, this has been an interesting case study, relatively little has been gained
by applying the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance. The agenda setting was
driven not by the treaty itself but by the international com m unity’s urge to secure the
arsenal. There was no litigation associated with the NPT. The public did m obilize
against testing nuclear weapons but not actually for nonproliferation and the treaty.
The N evada-Sem ipalatinsk M ovem ent was a great exam ple o f dom estic groups
m obilizing for a cause but it was not focused on the NPT; nor did it use the N PT to
advance its cause. The com m on opinion in K azakhstan was that “the only reason for
continued testing was the need to develop new and im proved nuclear w eapons .” 231
Therefore, it is possible there is a link w ith the NPT.

Conclusions

In this chapter we viewed the cases o f G erm any and K azakhstan’s
nonproliferation com pliance through the lens o f dom estic politics theory. In theory these
two cases should have been straight forward because w e know these states are in
com pliance with the NPT. Germany and Kazakhstan are not current or potential
proliferation concerns, and both are supporters o f the nonproliferation regim e. It seems

231
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that in these cases the agenda setting, litigation, and dom estic m obilization m echanism s
would be readily identifiable. In fact, Kazakhstan was chosen in part because the
domestic population had m obilized against nuclear testing within their borders.
However, this case proved more com plicated than anticipated because there was
mobilization, but it was not directly about nonproliferation.
Table 1 (on the following page) illustrates the presence o f dom estic politics theory
m echanism s evaluating the Germany and K azakhstan case studies for this chapter. The
national agenda setting w as not influenced by the treaty but rather by the international
com m unity and w orld politics at the time. N either state saw the use o f litigation to
enforce the obligations o f the national governm ent under the NPT. Finally, both
countries had dom estic populations m obilize for nonproliferation related issues. The foci
o f the movem ents, however, were on disarm am ent o f other nations, stopping testing, and
anti-nuclear power.
N either nation's citizens m obilized in the nam e o f the NPT nor to keep their
nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. G iven their history o f m obilizing on nuclear
issues, it m ay be that neither state's population is concerned about their governm ents'
com pliance w ith the N PT and have purposely chosen to mobilize on these peripheral
issues. W e could expect that m obilization w ould occur if the pursuit o f nuclear weapons
(i.e. NPT noncom pliance) were to becom e a concern in either state. Dom estic politics
theory o f treaty com pliance does not solely explain these cases but the theory does appear
to offer some insight to German and K azakhstani compliance.
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Domestic Politics Theory M echanism s Present?
State
Agenda Setting

Litigation

G ermany

No

No

K azakhstan

No

No

Table 1. Results o f Chapter 3 Case Studies

M obilization
Yes and No M obilized but did
not reference treaty
and was on
disarm am ent
(A rticle VI)
Yes and No M obilized against
testing and not
about the NPT
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CH A PTER IV
STATES THAT H AV E A LREA D Y FAILED TO COM PLY

Introduction

W hen the w orld thinks o f states pursuing nuclear weapons certain states com e to
m ind right away: Iran, N orth Korea, and Iraq. However, Libya and Syria are also fairly
recent cases o f states pursuing nuclear w eapons with less notoriety. In 2003, when the
international com m unity was focused on the US and Iraq (and its alleged w eapons o f
m ass destruction program s) the US and U K w ere also w orking in a m uch quieter
diplom atic fashion to dism antle the nuclear w eapons program in Libya.
In 2007, the w orld was w atching Iran, which had failed to stop enrichm ent
activities and was being punished w ith sanctions. W hile the international com m unity
was using diplom acy and the UN system to stop Iran, the Israelis bom bed a plutonium
production reactor to stop Syria from pursuing nuclear weapons. There was relatively
little outcry from Syria or the international com m unity, especially considering it was such
a violent and overt action.
The states in this chapter are ones that have already failed to com ply with their
nonproliferation com mitments. W e already know the outcome (noncom pliance) and can
focus on exploring what influenced the outcome. Failures are as im portant as successful
com pliance in international law. W hat can we learn about com pliance with the
nonproliferation treaties by exploring noncom pliance? Does viewing Syria and Libya
through the lens o f the domestic politics theory o f treaty com pliance indicate that these
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two nations should have been in com pliance? Did agenda setting, litigation, and
m obilization o f domestic groups play a role at all in not pursuing or pursuing nuclear
weapons despite being party to the NPT? W ere these aspects o f the Sim m ons’ theory
com pletely absent?
Exploring two case studies that are “failures to com ply” creates a w ell-rounded
investigation o f com pliance w ith the NPT. Com paring factors o f the successful
com pliance and failed com pliance may illustrate a clear role for the dom estic politics
theory o f treaty com pliance w hen it com es to the high level politics o f national security.
Or the com parison may show that no difference exists in the role o f dom estic politics. Or
com paring the case studies m ay aid in identifying other variables related to com pliance.
W hy use Syria and Libya, as opposed to other com pliance failure cases? Syria
and Libya both pursued nuclear w eapons but they no longer have program s. This means
we can consider them "closed" cases for now. This is in contrast to N orth K orea and Iran
w ho have been found in noncom pliance but m ay still have current program s. A nother
im portant point is that the Arab Spring has left Syria and Libya in flux, so this
dissertation will only consider the state o f things as o f June 2012.
Syria and Libya have another com m onality that separates them from the other
noncom pliance cases. They both m ay have been concerned w ith dom estic audiences
when deciding to pursue nuclear weapons. There was no fear o f outside regim e change at
the time that they began their programs. Unlike North Korea, Iraq and Iran whose
weapons program s seem to be for m aintaining regime security from outside intervention,
Syria and Libya seem to be focused on regim e security from dom estic forces. They have
both had disgruntled domestic groups and had reason to fear being overthrown. A
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successful nuclear w eapons program would rally the dom estic populations behind the
regime that had brought them to parity with Israel and defied the international
community.
Both states for this chapter are M iddle East North Africa (M ENA) states and Arab
states. These two instances o f noncom pliance were deliberately chosen because they
cam e after the Additional Protocol was available for ratification. The A dditional
Protocol is an international legal instrum ent that can signify renewed and/or strengthened
com m itm ent to N PT obligations by voluntarily giving the IAEA m ore inform ation and
access.
As Simmons found, the role o f governm ent is an im portant one. Both states had
cost benefits analyses that m ay have had their respective national governm ents leaning
toward acquiring nuclear weapons. A traditional realist view would say that the national
governm ents’ com mon perceived threats from Israel m ay have formed the preference to
cheat their N PT obligations. But was there more to the decision? D id dom estic factors
also play a role?
In addition to the sim ilarities m entioned above (i.e. both states are M EN A states,
Arab states, failures to com ply states, and neither has the Additional Protocol), both
Libya and Syria also received outside assistance with their clandestine activities violating
the NPT. Libya received assistance from A. Q. Khan and Syria received assistance from
North Korea. Both states were also hesitant to ratify the Additional Protocol. Libya did
so after the revelation o f its noncom pliance and Syria has been under continuous pressure
since its clandestine activities cam e under scrutiny.
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There are a few differences between these two case studies. Syria and Libya
differ slightly in the international com m unity's path to a noncom pliance finding. S yria’s
noncom pliance was announced to the world in the form o f the 2007 Israeli attack.
Libya’s clandestine program and its dism antlem ent w ere discussed behind closed doors
with the US and UK, and after an agreem ent was reached Libya announced its own
program publicly and its plans to term inate said program.
Syria and Libya also differed in their desired type o f nuclear weapon. There are
two basic types o f nuclear weapons: the gun-type assem bly and the im plosion m ethod .232
The gun-type assem bly requires uranium enriched to w eapons grade. This explains the
Libyan enrichm ent facility. The im plosion type typically requires plutonium , a hum anmade elem ent (although it is possible to use uranium ). All reactors produce plutonium as
a byproduct in fuel that has burned up in the reactor (know n as a spent fuel ) . 233 However,
reactors can be designed to produce higher am ounts o f plutonium and the features
necessary to generate and distribute pow er can be ignored. This explains Syria’s
clandestine building o f a plutonium production reactor absent any infrastructure to
distribute power.
The im portance o f this chapter is to explore w hether the dom estic politics theory
o f com pliance can give insight in to the Syrian and Libyan noncom pliance with the NPT.
Did dom estic politics theory help explain noncom pliance or does it indicate there should
have been com pliance? As discussed in chapter 2, a noncom pliance finding by the IAEA
Board o f Governors is an indisputable m easure o f noncom pliance for this test.

Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear W eapon Design."
The N uclear W eapon Archive, "Plutonium M anufacture and Fabrication,"
http://nuclearw eaponarchive.org/Library/Plutonium /index.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30,
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This chapter starts with the 2 0 1 1 noncom pliance finding o f Syria and is followed
by the twists and turns o f the Libyan case study and its 2004 noncom pliance finding. In
the Libya case study, there is a discussion on w hy Libya actually m oved into com pliance
after violating its N PT com m itm ents for years. For each state, there is an introduction to
the specific situation o f the noncom pliant state. An overview is given next, which
consists o f the state’s history with the NPT and the international nonproliferation regim e
more broadly, as well as the status o f nuclear pow er in the state. This aids in
understanding the context o f the noncom pliant actions.
Next, each state is analyzed using Sim m ons’ dom estic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance. This includes review ing the role o f agenda setting, litigation, and the
m obilization o f the domestic population for each state’s particular situation. Conclusions
are then draw n for each state on w hether these variables can explain the lack o f
compliance.

Syria

S yria’s noncom pliance activities most likely began in 2 0 0 1. 234 It was then that
the Syrians began building a clandestine nuclear reactor based on a N orth K orean design.
The design used is not for a reactor that produces pow er but rather a reactor specifically
designed with the purpose o f plutonium production. A ccording to renow ned proliferation

234 W orld N uclear Association, "Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies," http://w orldnuclear.org/info/default.aspx?id=340& term s=syria (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).

analyst D avid Albright, the reactor had the potential to produce a w eapon’s w orth o f
plutonium every one to two years.23'
The international com m unity became aware o f Syria’s clandestine activities in
2007 with Israel’s bom bing o f a secret facility at A l-K abir (referred to as D air A lzour by
the IAEA) and the subsequent cover-up by Syria.*

W hat is more surprising than the

fact that Israel m anaged to fly over Syria and destroy the facility? That there was no
chorus o f disapproval. N ot from Syria and not from the international com munity. It was
silent. The event was reported by the m edia but there w ere no com m ents from the
leadership in Syria or Israel. This is shocking given that Syria is quick to criticize Israel
normally. A nd while Israel's attack m ade it clear that they will not sit idly by while
others develop nuclear w eapons, at that time it did not want to take credit for its actions.
Few details were initially available, as Israel and Syria rem ained surprisingly
quiet concerning the incident (as did the US w hich later admitted prior know ledge ) . 237
N orth K orea cam e to Syria's aid in covering up the incident by rem oving debris and
bulldozing the area, in an attempt to rem ove all traces o f the facility and attack before
allow ing the IAEA access .238
It is im portant to note that like other poor developing nations, Syria w as not a
likely candidate to build a nuclear w eapon based on its capabilities. Syria was accused o f
developing other types o f weapons o f m ass destruction but nuclear w eapons had not been
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a concern .239 According to the N uclear Threat Initiative, Syria, “has a w eak industrial
infrastructure, poor scientific capabilities, and lacks trained engineers and other personnel
needed to run a m ajor civilian or w eapons-oriented program .” 240 As the international
com m unity keeps learning: w here there is a will there is a way. M ore exactly, where
supply meets dem and there is away. A state that has a strong desire (dem and) for nuclear
w eapons but lacks some technical resources can find a supplier to fill this gap for the
right price. A. Q. Khan allegedly approached the Syrians w ith an offer to assist in
building a clandestine nuclear w eapons program . 241 However, the N orth Koreans w ere a
natural choice o f supplier as they were already cooperating w ith Syria in the areas o f
m issile technology and related com ponents .242 Like Syria, N orth K orea was once
underestim ated because o f a lack o f resources. N ow North K orea has a suspected small
arsenal o f nuclear explosive devices and a profitable (albeit scary) business model.
N orth Korea is accused o f supplying the designs, know ledge, and experts to help
the Syrians develop and build their clandestine program .243 North K orea even used its
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own clandestine procurem ent networks and its front com pany, Nam chongang Trading
Company (NCG), to procure com ponents for Syria’s secret reactor .244

Overview

History with N onproliferation
The Syrian governm ent has attem pted to project an image o f greatness and
regional leadership. H owever, since the 1967 A rab-Israeli w ar, when Syria (and other
Arab states) suffered a significant defeat, the Arab governm ents have “struggled to find
explanations for Arab w eakness and strategies that w ould reverse some o f the perceived
injustices .” 245 D uring this tim e, Syria’s pow erful ally the Soviet Union did nothing to
support Syria. In fact, the Soviet Union w orked against Syria with the US to end the
1973 Yum K ippur W ar in a stalem ate .246 This m ay have played a role in Syria pursing
weapons o f mass destruction rather than relying on its allies.
Syria m ay also have hoped that if they could acquire nuclear w eapons it would
build support for the regim e domestically. In addition to being the first Arab state with
nuclear weapons, Syria would be on par with the Israelis. Syrians "have projected a selfimage o f enduring greatness and leadership o f the pan-A rab cause" and possessing
nuclear w eapons w ould help this image at home and abroad . 247 Syria m ay think that
nuclear weapons would help in the regional balance o f pow er and replace the loss o f their
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superpow er ally, the Soviet Union. Syria m ay have been pushed towards nuclear
weapons in the face o f an ever-strengthening Israel with its presumed nuclear weapons
and strong relationship with the US. Finally, in 1978 Syria felt it had lost another ally
with Egypt signing the Cam p David Accords.
Syria was am ong the first to sign and ratify the NPT; signing in 1968 and
ratifying in 1969.

248

H owever, it was not until M ay 1992 that their Safeguards

Agreement (INFCIRC 407) entered into force, as required in Article III o f the N P T .249
Technically, Syria had 18 months to bring this agreem ent into force but back in the 1970s
if a state m issed the deadline it was not seen as particularly significant. Failure to enter
into a Safeguards A greem ent w ithin 18 m onths o f NPT ratification has not been used by
the IAEA as the basis for noncom pliance findings, although technically it is failing to
com ply w ith the NPT. In the 1970s, it w as assum ed that a state had nothing to declare if
it did not enter its safeguards agreem ent in a tim ely fashion .250 This m ay have set a bad
precedent. Syria signed its Safeguards A greem ent w ith the IAEA in 1992 under
international pressure because the Chinese were building the aforem entioned research
reactor as part o f a Technical Cooperation project with the IAEA.
Syria was found in noncom pliance in June 2011. This means that Syria was
reported by the IAEA secretariat to the Board o f Governors, who in turn reported Syria to
the IAEA m em ber states, the UN General Assem bly, and m ost importantly, to the UN
Security Council.
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The path to an official IAEA noncom pliance decision began in 2007 with the
destruction, by Israel, o f the offending facility in Dair Alzour. Rather than inform the
UN nuclear w atchdog (the IAEA), Israel chose to take unilateral action . 251 The IAEA
Director General M oham m ed El Baradei during that time period has accused the US o f
also being aware o f the facility for years and choosing not to inform the IA EA .252
George W. Bush states in his m em oirs (D ecision Points) that Israel inform ed him o f the
clandestine reactor but he did not feel it was the U S ’ place to intercede . 253
The Israeli governm ent m oved forw ard with a unilateral strike against the AlK ibar facility in Septem ber 2007. W ithin days o f the strike, the Syrian governm ent had
rem oved site debris, used bulldozers to m ove part o f a nearby hill’s dirt onto the now
leveled site, and then began constructing a new structure on the exact same location .254
The N orth K oreans played a supporting role in this cover-up. The Syrian governm ent
claim ed the previous building (w hich they attem pted to erase all traces of) and the new
facility under construction were m ilitary buildings w ith no nuclear function .255 However,
they denied the IAEA im mediate access so the IAEA was unable to confirm the Syrian
claims.
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A year later, the IAEA finally was given access to verify the site’s purpose but
more anom alies were found .256 The inspectors determ ined that the facility layout was
consistent with a nuclear reactor (although the IAEA refuses at this point to com pletely
reject a non-nuclear possibility). The US has gone further by pointing out that not only
was the destroyed facility a reactor but it is not consistent w ith a pow er plant design and
m ust be a plutonium production design.
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IAEA inspectors have taken environm ental samples which revealed the presence
o f anthropogenic uranium (hum an-m odified uranium ) at the site o f the destroyed
building .258 The Syrian governm ent tried to blam e the Israeli missiles as the source o f the
uranium but the IAEA believes this unlikely. In 2008 and 2009, IAEA inspectors found
sim ilar particles in the hot cell at S S R -l(th e research reactor provided by the Chinese
under IAEA technical cooperation).

*)SO

The particles did not match any m aterial in the

Syrian declared inventory to the IAEA. The particles are believed to be from undeclared
uranium conversion activities in 2004.
Up until the bom bing, and resulting revelation to the IAEA, Syria had not been
accused o f noncom pliance w ith the N PT by the IAEA Board o f Governors. However, the
US governm ent had becom e concerned that Syria’s alleged weapons o f mass destruction
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programs were beginning to include nuclear w eapons .260 The US and others in the
international com m unity were significantly concerned to interfere with nuclear pow er and
technological sales to Syria. The US governm ent issued statements o f concern in its
national intelligence reports and State Departm ent com pliance reports. While issuing
these reports, the US was also putting pressure on other states not to deal in nuclear
related sales to Syria .261
A fter the A1 K ibar raid there w ere eleven reports by the IAEA D irector General
concerning the im plem entation o f safeguards in Syria, each describing the lack o f
cooperation and ongoing discrepancies .262 Eventually, on the 9th o f June 2011, the Board
o f Governors passed a resolution on the decision to report “Syria’s non-com pliance with
its Safeguards A greem ent to all M embers o f the A gency and to the Security Council and
General A ssem bly o f the United N ations.”

As o f April 2012, the issue rem ains open

with the IAEA asking Syria for clarifications and to ratify the Additional Protocol .264
The Syrian governm ent m ay have several reasons for the decision to not com ply
with their nonproliferation obligations. The first and obvious reason is a perceived threat
from Israel and outside intervention from other nations. This is a classic neorealist point
o f view. Simm ons, however, has taught us with the dom estic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance to look beyond balance o f pow er and security threats.
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Current N uclear Status
Syria currently has one nuclear reactor, Syrian Research R eactor-1 (SSR-1),
which is located near Damascus. This m iniature neutron source reactor was provided by
the Chinese in the early 1990s, under a Technical Cooperation agreement with the
IAEA . 265 It is under IAEA safeguards and is used for producing m edical isotopes,
research, and training .266 A ccording to IAEA standards, this reactor does not produce
enough plutonium to be o f a proliferation concern. The reactor does use highly enriched
uranium but the quantity required is quite low by proliferation standards . 267 The deal for
the research reactor began in 1991 and was m ade official by the Syrian parliam ent in
1 9 9 2 268

j i ^ reactor w ent crifical (started-up) in in 1996.

Syria had seriously considered buying a research reactor from India in 1991 but
India retracted the offer after pressure from the U S .269 It was not uncom m on for the US
to pressure states from cooperating with Syria on nuclear technology .270
Syria has no know n enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, which are also paths
to a nuclear weapon. Syria did research (and receive IAEA support) in uranium extraction
solvents and techniques. They also built a hot cell facility. This technique and facility
could be pure scientific research but both could be m isused for nuclear w eapons program.
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D om estic Politics Theory o f Compliance

M obilization o f Domestic Groups
The government may have pursued a nuclear w eapons program to im press the
dom estic population and gain support for a w eakening regime. Since the bom bing in
2007 and the Arab Spring, the situation in Syria has taken an unexpected turn and the
governm ent has becom e even weaker. Previously the lack “o f any real opposition groups
inside the country and a pervasive fear o f the security services were largely cited as the
culprit behind the seeming passivity o f the Syrian people.”271
Given the undem ocratic nature o f Syria it was unlikely that the dom estic groups
w ould m obilize for any cause. H owever, as we have seen w ith the Arab Spring in 2011,
there is a tipping point. The frustrated citizens o f Syria have organized protests and taken
to the streets. It is unknow n how this will finish but the most im portant point is despite
the risk o f death, the citizens are mobilizing.
They are not, however, m obilizing to stop Syria’s noncom pliance w ith the NPT.
N or have they done so in the past. This m ay be because the domestic population did not
know noncom pliance activities were happening. O r once the activities w ere revealed the
dom estic groups did not think they could m obilize and make a difference given the strict
government. Finally, they may have not cared as they clearly have bigger issues with the
governm ent than com pliance with a nonproliferation treaty.
W hat about the future? It is too soon to te ll.... But w hat if there is a change o f
governm ent in Syria? If the population now knows they can m obilize for change

271 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria,"
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successfully will they do it again? Can we expect to see an anti-nuclear weapons
m ovem ent in Syria in the future assum ing that the dom estic groups w ant to norm alize
relationships with the rest o f the w orld (which is necessary for the pariah state to begin
econom ic recovery and rejoin the international community).

A genda Setting
Syria is defined by the CIA as a “republic under an authoritarian regim e.”272 This
corresponds with the Polity IV Project scoring o f Syria as a "-7" on the polity scale.273
Bashar al-A ssad has been president since 2000, when he took over after the death o f his
father, H afez al-Assad. The governm ent is highly centralized and the nation has been
under martial law for decades.274 The President is ultim ately responsible for the Syrian
nuclear program .275
Given the strict (let alone often brutal) rule o f H afez Assad and his son B ashar
Assad, agenda setting is lim ited to the elite leadership. W hen the N PT was open for
signature, Syria’s quick ratification m ay be explained by S yria’s close relationship with
the Soviet U nion at the tim e.276 The Soviet Union was a negotiator and early proponent
o f the NPT. Syria m ay have secretly hoped the treaty would curb Israel’s pursuit as well,

272 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Syria,"
https://w w w .cia.gov/library/publications/the-w orld-factbook/geos/sy.htm l (accessed
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but this is unlikely. Ratification did give the leadership the ability to criticize Israel for
not signing.
There was a need for the elite to m odify their agenda to win support from the
domestic population. The noncom pliance activities could have been to dem onstrate to
the citizens (and possibly to the world) that Syria can achieve parity w ith Israel and even
surpass other Arab states by acquiring nuclear w eapons. There would certainly be the
possibility o f prestige for the Syrians should they achieve this distinction. Furtherm ore,
with the assum ption that security is a key com ponent o f the Syrian agenda, the
government could point to the nuclear weapons as a program to provide security to its
citizens and to gam er support for a “caring governm ent.”
Once again it is not necessarily the governm ent type that indicates potential
noncom pliance/com pliance. Just as an autocracy is less likely to com ply w ith hum an
rights treaties, a governm ent w ith specific perceived threats m ay prefer not to follow a
nonproliferation treaty. The agenda setting o f the governm ent does not to appear to be
influenced by ratification o f the NPT. This may have been because o f overriding
concerns bending the agenda towards noncom pliance.

Litigation
Unsurprisingly, Syria has a weak judicial system. The judicial system is
com prised o f the Suprem e Judicial Council, the Supreme Constitutional Court and the
Court o f Cassation.277 Under the rule o f Hafez Assad, the judicial system has not

277 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Syria."
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“provided a serious check to his authority.”278 Under his son, Bashar Assad, there have
been attempts at reform in various sectors but the “old guard” within the B a’ath Party
continues to undermine these efforts.
There has been no reported activity by dom estic groups utilizing litigation to
develop or im plem ent policy related to nuclear weapons.

Conclusions fo r Syria
It is difficult to understand why Syria thought they would successfully get aw ay
with building a clandestine facility in this day and age o f technology. The IAEA was
able to use satellite im ages and environm ental sam pling to determine the Syrian
governm ent’s true intentions. The IAEA did not begin these safeguards verification
activities until after the Israeli bombing. It seem s from this case study that perhaps
technology will influence com pliance decisions in the future by creating a fear not ju st o f
early detection but also o f post event analyses.
The Board o f Governors not only called for Syria to come into com pliance with
its NPT obligations but also required Syria to meet the new est international norm in
nonproliferation. Syria is to “sign and prom ptly bring into force and im plem ent in full
the Additional Protocol.”
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Furtherm ore, Syria should act in accordance with the

Additional Protocol until it is in force. On a related note, Syria continues to stay outside
the Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty, having refused to sign or ratify the treaty.280

279 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Implementation o f the N PT Safeguards
A greement in the Syrian Arab Republic: Resolution A dopted by the Board o f Governors
on 9 June 2011," 2.
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D espite know ing other states having had their attem pts to acquire nuclear
weapons exposed, Syria m oved forward with its clandestine program. Perhaps there was
still fear o f being caught because the Syria did go to extraordinary lengths to change the
facade o f the building.281 Given the assistance o f N orth Korea, it m ay be a fair
assum ption that the Syrians planned to build up their capacity and then leave the NPT, as
their advisors, the North Koreans, did. On the one year anniversary o f the IAEA
noncom pliance report, Syria remains uncooperative and issues relating to its program
remain unresolved. M arking the occasion, R obert W ood (A cting US Perm anent
Representative to the International O rganizations in Vienna) told the IAEA Board o f
Governors, "the responsibility rem ains w ith Syria to rem edy its noncom pliance, and to
dem onstrate a constructive approach in its relations to this Agency, the Syrian people,
and the international com m unity."282 O nly time will tell.
It is w orth noting that Israel had bom bed another nation’s reactor previously. In
1981, Israel destroyed Iraq’s Osirak reactor before its core was fueled.283 It is believed
that the attack resulted in a re-doubling o f efforts in Saddam H ussein’s efforts to acquire
a nuclear weapon and forced the Iraqi’s to try harder to “cheat the system .” Will this
happen with Syria?

284

Furtherm ore, was Syria N orth K orea’s only client or are there

more?
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Libya

W hile Syria worked with the North Koreans to develop their nuclear capacity via
a plutonium production reactor, the Libyans agreed to a deal with Khan and his network
to purchase a turnkey enrichm ent facility. The facility is referred to as a turnkey because
the Libyan's purchase was not individual pieces o f technology and m aterials to support an
indigenous program , but rather the purchase was an entire program. This was not the
first attem pt by Libya to acquire nuclear w eapons. Allegedly, Libya had approached
China, India and Pakistan in the past in its pursuit o f nuclear w eapons technology and
know how from 1969 until 2003.285 Libya actively pursued nuclear w eapons despite its
com m itm ents under the NPT.
In 2003, Qadhafi announced that Libya w ould give up its clandestine nuclear
weapons program. The US and U K w ere instrum ental in arranging the deal that led to
the announcem ent but the decision was solely Q adhafi’s. There are a variety o f reasons
that likely led to this decision, including Qadhafi not wanting to end up like Saddam
Hussein and his wishing for Libya to reintegrate with the w orld in order to help the
dom estic economy. Domestic reasons m ay have played a prominent role in pursuing
nuclear w eapons and for giving up the program in Libya.

‘ N uclear Threat Initiative, "Libya Profile: Nuclear," http://ww w .nti.org/countryprofiles/libya/nuclear/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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Overview

History with Nonproliferation
Libya had several reasons to desire nuclear weapons. Nuclear w eapons could
have provided regim e security by building support for Qadhafi dom estically and keeping
the international com m unity from enforcing a policy o f regim e change. Like Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Egypt, Libya may have sought a sense o f pride and prestige by becom ing the
first Arab state to acquire nuclear weapons. There may have been fear associated with
living in the M iddle East and a desire to build up national defenses.
Libya signed the N PT in 1968 under King Idris and later ratified the treaty in
1975 under Colonel Qadhafi.286 D espite this show o f com m itm ent, it is believed Qadhafi
began to seek nuclear w eapons alm ost im m ediately after taking pow er in 1969. O ver the
years, Qadhafi m ade m any contradictory statem ents.287 Sometimes the eccentric leader
stated that Libya had no intention o f acquiring nuclear w eapons and other times he stated
it was a necessity. This am biguity caused m istrust o f Libya within the international
community.
Libya has been accused o f trying to buy nuclear weapons from China and India in
the 1970s.288 Libya was also accused o f working with Pakistan in the 1970s to develop a
trade for uranium ore (from Niger) as a thank you to Pakistan for help in developing
Libya’s nuclear program. Libya has adm itted that during the 1980s, the nuclear program
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hired a German national to develop gas centrifuges for uranium enrichm ent.289 After
nearly a decade, that expert left Libya having been unsuccessful in producing a working
centrifuge let along enriching any uranium.
Libya tried several acquisition pathways to obtain uranium conversion and
enrichm ent capabilities. The US governm ent played active (and successful) role
pressuring suppliers to cancel sales. However, such pressure can only works on
legitimate com panies and states. Libya eventually found a supplier in the form o f A. Q.
Khan in the 1990s.
A ccording to the IAEA, in 1995 Libya made a “strategic decision” to once again
pursue nuclear w eapons and acquired its first centrifuges from the Khan netw ork in
1997

29° jQjan Yvouid iater confess he first m et with Libyan representatives in 1990.291

The Khan netw ork’s com prehensive offerings included technology, com ponents,
m anufacturing capabilities, training, instructions, lessons learned from previous
experience, and even w eapon blueprints (believed to be 1960s Chinese design and
fabrication docum ents).292 In 2004, the IAEA reported that analysis o f environm ental
sampling swipes o f relevant facilities and equipm ent in Libya revealed that some o f the
centrifuges had been used in the Pakistani program prior to being shipped to Libya.293
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This confirm ed the connection between the Libyan program and the Khan netw ork (and
debatably also the connection to the official state nuclear weapons program o f Pakistan).
By 2000, the UK and US intelligence com m unities had become suspicious that
Khan was w orking with Libyans and tracked the situation closely.294 There are a variety
o f reasons that m ust have influenced the decision to dism antle the nuclear w eapons
program and these are discussed in the following section. But the im portant part to note
now is that in M arch 2003, ju st days before the US (and coalition) invasion o f Iraq,
Qadhafi sent a secret personal envoy to approach the UK and US about Libya voluntarily
dism antling its weapons o f mass destruction program s.295 A fter quiet negotiations
Qadhafi agreed to share details o f his program s and give them up (including nuclear) as
well as take responsibility for the Pan Am 103 bom bing over Lockerbie. The final push
before full public disclosure and dism antlem ent by Libya, was the Proliferation Security
Initiative's interdiction o f a German ow ned ship, the BB C China, which was transporting
enrichm ent com ponents from M alaysia to Libya on behalf o f the Khan netw ork.296
Although there is debate w hether this interdiction should be attributed to the Proliferation
Security Initiative or w hether it was a separate intelligence m ission.297 In the end,
Qadhafi cam e clean and w elcom ed the US, UK, and IAEA in to its facilities to exam ine
and dism antle its nuclear weapons program. The program was a clear violation o f the
N PT and a noncom pliance finding was imminent.

294 Global Security, "A. Q. Khan & Libya."
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“A pplauding the voluntary decision” o f Libya for giving up its nuclear program ,
opening itself to verification by the IAEA, and ratifying the Additional Protocol, the
Board o f G overnors’ M arch 2004 noncom pliance resolution for Libya was very
com plim entary.298 In April 2004, there was no punishm ent handed down from the UN
Security Council in response to the noncom pliance report.299 The Security Council
sim ply “took note o f the IAEA resolution,” com m ended Libya for its decision to
dism antle its program, and encouraged it to do so for all o f its W M D program s, not ju st
nuclear.300

Current N uclear Status
Libya has no civilian nuclear pow er program but does have plans for a nuclear
reactor (for pow er and/or desalinization) in an estim ated 15 years.301 This is subject to
change. They have attempted to establish a nuclear pow er program in the past. This
included approaching the Soviet Union, France and a Belgian com pany for sales
negotiations during the 1907s and 80s.302 The US had actively discouraged other states
from cooperating with Libya on nuclear pow er because o f L ibya’s stated intentions o f
acquiring nuclear w eapons.303
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W hile Libya has not successfully established a pow er program, they do have a
strong research program. The Libyan Secretariat o f Atomic Energy oversees the nation’s
nuclear program and the National Board for Scientific Research m anages the research
and developm ent p ro g ram s.304 This includes research on the fuel cycle and peaceful
uses. This same organization established the Tajoura Research Center (TN RC) that is a
declared facility under IAEA safeguards. The 10 m egawatt research reactor, know n as
IRT-1, at TNRC was supplied in the late 1970s by the Soviet Union (and was started up
in 1981).

The IAEA did not detect any safeguards violations prior to the Libyan’s

revealing their clandestine program.
D uring the Libyan program ’s dism antlem ent phase, it was discovered that TNRC
was also heavily involved with Libya’s clandestine nuclear weapons program .306 Its
activities include the now infamous centrifuge program and plutonium separation
activities. During the process o f “com ing clean” w ith the international com m unity, the
world w ould leam there were ten m ore undeclared sites involved w ith the nuclear
program.

307

D om estic Politics Theory o f Compliance

Domestic M obilization
It is difficult for domestic groups to m obilize in an oppressive regim e, but as the
Arab Spring has shown us, it is not im possible. W ithin Libya, several groups posed a
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threat to Qadhafi, which m ay have influenced his decision to reverse and dism antle the
nuclear w eapons program. By doing this, he was able to redirect resources and attem pt to
appease dom estic groups.
One such group took the form o f the Islamic m ovem ent (sometimes referred to as
radicals).308 These groups offer social services that the Libyan governm ent was failing to
make available. As international studies scholars know, non-state actors can begin to
replace dom estic governm ent by providing social services.
The m ilitary was another dom estic group that m ay have posed a threat if the
nuclear program continued. The nuclear program was dem anding a large am ount o f
resources, “com peting w ith other m ilitary priorities.”309 The Libyan m ilitary had
previously revolted and were put dow n in a bloody oppression. A nother m ilitary coup
was a serious concern for Qadhafi as well.

Redirecting resources from the nuclear

program to m eet other needs and dem ands o f the m ilitary helped am eliorate this concern.
There are no indications that dom estic group are currently m obilizing over
Libya’s nuclear weapons nonproliferation com m itm ent (the NPT). N or have they
m obilized in the past over this issue. It m ay be that the domestic groups that would have
were sim ply unaware their governm ent was violating the NPT. It m ay also be that their
concerns for personal safety and security have taken priority.

308 Solingen, N uclear Logics: C ontrasting P aths in East Asia and the M iddle E ast, 223.
309 Ibid., 223.
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Agenda Setting
In 2010, Libya was a "-7" on the Polity IV Project scale o f polity, which puts it in
the autocracy category.310 Qadhafi began the Libyan nuclear program and as the leader
in an autocracy was the ultim ate decision m aker for the program.

311

Beginning in 1995,

M atoug M. M atoug was the Secretary o f the General P eople’s Com m ittee and Secretary
o f the National Board o f Scientific Research, m eaning he was in charge o f the operations
o f the program.

He also represented Libya in discussions with the IAEA during the

verification o f the disarm am ent.
Several factors m otivated the elite decision makers to create an agenda to pursue
nuclear weapons and then later reverse that decision. Originally, the agenda m ay have
included national security at the top o f the list. The Libyans live in an unstable region
and were under harsh econom ic sanctions, in addition to being viewed as suspicious (at
best) by the west. Israel’s suspected nuclear w eapons capabilities m ay have been viewed
as a direct threat and m ay also have been a source o f a feeling o f inadequacy on the
Libyan side.
Along that same line o f inadequacy, the 1967 Israeli victory m ay have played a
role in Q adhafi’s determ ination to obtain nuclear weapons. In 2003, Qadhafi stated that
Libya had pursued W M Ds (including nuclear w eapons) because the w orld was unsafe.
He said that Libya’s urging for W M D free zones in the M iddle East and Africa had

310 Systemic Peace, "Polity IV Country Report 2010: Libya,"
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“received no serious responses” and so Libya “ sought to develop its defence
capabilities.”312
The Libyans were interested in abandoning the programs, specifically the nuclear
program, for econom ic and national security reasons.313 By reversing its decisions, the
government could ease and/or end sanctions that after decades were negatively affecting
the economy. The nuclear program was com ing at a high cost and progressing so slowly
that the cost benefit analysis that may have at one tim e made sense no longer did. The
end o f the program s could also lead to norm alization o f relations with the W est and
perhaps future trade and econom ic benefits.
W hile discussions were already quietly underway, the 2003 US invasion o f Iraq
occurred and m ay have sped up the Libyan public confession and dism antlem ent.314 The
basic dynam ic being that Libya m ay have been putting itself at risk o f preem ptive war.
After the US attack on Iraq, partially over the alleged W M D program, Qadhafi may have
viewed his own program as a liability.315 Qadhafi m ay have seen the potential threat to
his regime and feared the same end for h im self as Saddam experienced. He was quoted
as saying, “today it becom es a problem to have a nuclear bom b.”316
Reportedly, Qadhafi w anted security assurances sim ilar to those received by the
former Soviet Republics U kraine, Belarus and K azakhstan after the Cold War. When
they gave up their w eapons in the early 1990s, they received security assurances from the
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P-4 .317 A ccording to some accounts, Qadhafi agreed to the dism antlem ent o f the Libyan
program once he received the security assurance that Bush would not push for “regime
change .” 318
The decision to reverse the decision to pursue nuclear weapons (ie. m odify the
previous agenda setting) may also have stem m ed from the realization that the program
would fail. Libya could not try to purchase uranium hexafluoride (U F 6 ) on the open
market because it would raise suspicions, and it did not have the netw ork to purchase
clandestinely .319 UF 6 is made from yellow cake and is necessary to feed into the
enrichm ent facility. Yellowcake is uranium oxide concentrate, U3O 8, which is natural
uranium that has been m illed .320 Libya eventually received hundreds o f tons o f
yellow cake from N iger but it did not have the capability to convert it to UF 6 feedstock .321
A ccording to a US State D epartm ent report, K han’s network supplied an initial
stock o f UF 6 to get the Libyan program started but it w ould not be able to supply the
valuable material on the necessary consistent b asis .322 Analysis at O ak Ridge N ational
Laboratory determ ined that the shipm ent o f 1% low enriched uranium supplied by the
network most likely originated in North K orea . 323 W ithout U F 6 , the enrichm ent
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technology is useless and no weapon can be built. Furthermore, the engineers w ere not
able to properly assem ble the enrichm ent technology Qadhafi had purchased.324
Finally, there w ere domestic issues that may have distracted Libya from its
original purpose o f acquiring nuclear weapons. L ibya’s domestic population was facing
a 30% unem ploym ent rate.325 Perhaps the m illions o f dollars spent on various m ethods
o f acquiring nuclear technology could have been spent on building the econom y. The
m ajor source o f national income, oil, was facing serious problems from production
dropping, outdated technology, and sanctions.
There are m any influences on agenda setting but there is no evidence that the N PT
played a role. There was no m ention o f the N PT, or L ibya’s com m itm ents under the
N PT, by the leadership until after the decision to dismantle. Even then, there are no
statem ents or indications that the treaty itself was an influencing factor.
W ith the governm ent overthrow and subsequent death o f Qadhafi on O ctober 20th,
2011, L ibya’s Transitional National Council has becom e the internationally recognized
government. It is striving to establish a dem ocracy, but it is too soon to know if the
council will successfully unite the various regions and tribes to steer Libya out o f w hat
appears to be an ever disintegrating state.
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This new regim e could significantly change

which issues are on the national agenda and how the agenda is set.
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Litigation
A ccording to the Polity IV Project, “ the judiciary has dem onstrated little
autonom y from the de fa c to executive and does not serve as an effective check on his
[Qadhafi] authority.”327 The “new ” post-Qadhafi judicial system is currently being
"reconstituted" as part o f the ongoing reform in Libya.328 It is now beginning to be tested
by crim inal trials associated with violations (m ostly o f hum an rights) during the Arab
Spring. There has been no reported activity by dom estic groups utilizing litigation to
develop or im plem ent policy related to nuclear weapons.

Conclusions f o r Libya
The US suspected Libya o f noncom pliance with the NPT's A rticle II and Article
III for m any years.329 Robert M ozley predicted in 1998, that given Libya's limited
scientific resources "it m ust buy turnkey facilities."330 He also noted that Libya lacked
uranium resources. In order to acquire nuclear weapons, Libya would have to use its oil
revenues to purchase the technology and nuclear m aterial.331
Despite being an early signatory o f the N PT and a m em ber o f the IAEA, Libya
activity pursued nuclear weapons until 2003. A fter several failed attem pts to acquire
nuclear w eapons from other sources, a business partner was found in K han and his
network. A ccording to US A m bassador Donald Mahley, the Khan netw ork was vital to
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the Libyan program ’s developm ent and the program would never have progressed
without assistance; the program w ould in fact have been “thw arted” w ithout the
netw ork’s effort.332
The Libyan governm ent did have limited success with its program under the
guidance o f Khan. W hile elite decision makers referenced the Libyan com m itm ent to
international nonproliferation and disarm am ent, it is unlikely that this was the cause o f
the decision to reverse and dism antle the nuclear weapons program. M ore likely it was a
com bination o f the resources used for the nuclear program needed to be redirected to
m eet other needs, Qadhafi fearing the same fate as Saddam Hussein, believing that
relinquishing the program w ould help with Libya’s reintegration with the rest o f the
world, helping the national econom y, etc.
Since that official reversal o f policy in D ecem ber 2003, Libya has reaffirm ed it
nonproliferation obligations. L ibya’s nonproliferation com m itm ent today is larger and
m ore involved than the NPT. A fter the noncom pliance resolution, Libya ratified the
Additional Protocol in August 2006.333 Libya is also a party to the C om prehensive Test
Ban Treaty, having ratified it in 2004.334
Since the Arab Spring m any issues in Libya have becom e unpredictable. The
overthrow and m urder o f Qadhafi has created a pow er vacuum. Com peting dom estic
groups have caused a civil unrest that verges on a civil war. The future o f nuclear pow er
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and nuclear w eapons is unknown at this time but it appears that both are non-issues at this
moment.
In O ctober 2011, NATO ended its seven m onth Operation Unified Protector to
protect the citizens o f Libya.335 NATO had been enforcing a no-fly zone and an arms
embargo. U ltim ately NATO played a key supporting role to the dom estic groups that
were m obilizing (and turning to violence) when they could not influence the agenda
setting or use the legal system to fight blatant violations o f hum an rights. W e did not see
this m obilization o f citizens calling for nonproliferation action.
L ibya’s discrete steps to disarm came before the IAEA Board o f G overnors’
noncom pliance resolution. Therefore, they w ere seen as cooperative and the
noncom pliance was not intended to be punitive or to result in sanctions. In fact, the final
draft o f the resolution stated that the noncom pliance be reported “w hile com m ending”
Libya.336

Conclusions

Syria and Libya were both found to be in noncom pliance with N PT in recent
history. They travelled different paths to noncom pliance: Syria relying on another state's
assistance for a plutonium based weapon and Libya using a non-state actor's assistance to
pursue a uranium based weapon. Syria was bom bed to stop (and perhaps reverse) its
proliferation program , while Libya reversed its path willingly. W hat can be learned by
335 North A tlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Libya: Operation Unified Protector,"
http://w w w .nato.int/cps/en/natolive/7l679.htm (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
336 International A tom ic Energy Agency, "Im plem entation o f the NPT Safeguards
A greement o f the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jam ahiriya Resolution A dopted by the
Board on 10 M arch 2004," 2.
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viewing these case studies o f noncom pliance from the perspective o f the dom estic
politics theory o f treaty compliance?
The dom estic politics theory involves agenda setting, litigation, and m obilizing
o f dom estic groups. For Syria these three elements were com pletely absent. The N PT
appears to play no role in persuading Syria’s elite to place nonproliferation on the
national agenda. Nor was the NPT utilized as the basis o f litigation in the court room s or
m obilization in the streets.
For Libya, litigation and dom estic m obilization were absent. The elite did have a
change in their agenda setting but there is no evidence this is from the influence o f the
N PT as much as non-treaty factors (include the urge to maintain the regim e). Security
assurances from aggression and regim e change play a vital role in the final negotiations
for Libya to dism antle its program .337
W hile the focus was on only two instances o f noncom pliance these negative
findings are still m eaningful. The lack o f support for the domestic politics theory o f
treaty com pliance indicates that, perhaps, the theory (and its three intertw ined variables)
is necessary for compliance. If so, this aligns w ith w hat Simmons has found in the
human rights realm.
The lack o f freedom o f the press is an issue in both these states. This means it
may be difficult for the citizens and researchers alike to get reliable inform ation about the
activities in these states. It also means it is difficult for the citizens to be heard and

337 Hirsh, "Bolton's British Problem."

mobilize. Syria is ranked 176th and Libya is ranked out 154th o f 179 states in the Press
Freedom Index.338
Table 2 illustrates the findings o f Syria and Libya for this chapter. The agenda
setting for nations was not influenced by the treaty but by the international com munity.
Neither state saw the use o f litigation to enforce the obligations o f the national
government under the NPT. Finally, neither country had dom estic population m obilize
for the NPT and to keep their nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.

Domestic Politics Theory M echanism s Present?
State
A genda Setting

Litigation

M obilization

Syria

No

No

No

Libya

No

No

No

Table 2. Results o f C hapter 4 Case Studies

338 Reporters W ithout Borders, "Press Freedom Index 2011/2012," Reporters W ithout
Borders, http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom -index-2011-2012,1043.htm l (accessed N ovem ber
30, 2012).
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C H A PTER V
STATES THAT ARE OF PO TEN TIA L PROLIFERATION CONCERN

Introduction

The states in this chapter are two for whom proliferation is less predictable at the
mom ent. They have not failed to com ply but they are considered to have the potential to
be failures. They are potential proliferation concerns. W hat can w e learn about treaty
com pliance in the issue area o f nonproliferation from viewing these states through the
lens o f the dom estic politics theory? These states w ere chosen because they have been
identified as w orth w atching closely by respected contem porary researchers.339
Iran m ay com e to m ind im m ediately as a proliferation threat. H owever, the IAEA
Board o f Governors, despite Iran not possessing nuclear weapons, has already found Iran
in noncom pliance. Rather the focus here is on those states that may not be considered
active threats to the nonproliferation regim e but may possess the resources and urge to
purse nuclear weapons in the future.
This builds on the concept that the definition o f potential proliferators has
broadened from traditional proliferation concerns (such as North K orea and Iran) to
include states that are not accused o f actively pursuing nuclear weapons but m ay be
hedging their bets technologically or otherw ise.340 These states have the technological

339 This includes scholars such as David A lbright, Jam es Wirtz, Peter Lavoy, Thom as
Reed, and Danny Stillman.
340 W ritz and Lavoy, eds., Over the H orizon Proliferation Threats, 222.

potential and the reasons to take the decision to pursue nuclear weapons, but to the best
o f our knowledge have not yet done so.
Scholars over the past decade have consistently placed Saudi A rabia and Egypt in
the category o f potential proliferation concern. As recently as 2012, W irtz and Lavoy,
wrote that these “anxiety-causing” states include Egypt and Saudi A rabia.341 David
A lbright included Egypt and Saudi A rabia (am ong others) in his “to w orry about” list in
2010.342 Thom as Reed and Danny Stillm an w arn o f Egypt and Saudi A rabia pursuing
nuclear w eapons in the future in their 2009 book entitled, The Nuclear E x p r e s s 343 In
2007, scholar Etel Solingen placed Egypt and Saudi Arabia in this category as well, based
on the likelihood that they would seek to m atch the Iranian pursuit o f nuclear w eapons.344
A nd as far back as 2004, Cam pbell, Einhom , and Riess identified Saudi Arabia and
Egypt as having the potential to tip tow ards nuclear w eapons.345
In term s o f nonproliferation, these two states have m ore in com m on than ju st
causing international concern. Both states are parties to the N PT .346 As required by the
NPT, both states are IAEA m em ber states with Com prehensive Safeguards Agreem ents
in place; although neither state has an A dditional Protocol.347 Egypt is an Arabic
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346 N uclear Threat Initiative, "NPT M embership,"
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speaking state w ith an alm ost com pletely M uslim po p u latio n .348 The same is true for
Saudi A rabia.349 W hile Egypt is technically North Africa it is often included in
discussions on the M iddle East. Both nations were under strict authoritarian rule, Egypt
technically a republic, but in fact tightly controlled by M ubarak and the military. Saudi
Arabia is under the will o f the royal m onarch family. Egypt and Saudi A rabia are both
insecure and threatened by Israel’s suspected nuclear capabilities.350 Egypt has strongly
supported the proposal for a M iddle East N uclear W eapon Free Z o n e .351 Saudi Arabia
politically supports this concept as well.
Finally, both have m ade statements that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable and they
m ay pursue nuclear w eapons in response. Egyptian A m bassador M aged Abdel A ziz said
in a 2010 reference to the Iranian program that, "we are not going to accept to be secondclass citizens in the region o f the M iddle East."353 However, as o f 2012, the new
Egyptian governm ent has sent m ixed signals and may be taking a m ore supportive stance

348 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Egypt,"
https://w w w .cia.gov/library/publications/the-w orld-factbook/geos/eg.htm l (accessed
Novem ber 30, 2012).
349 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Saudi Arabia,"
https://w w w .cia.gov/library/publications/the-w orld-factbook/geos/sa.htm l (accessed
November 30, 2012).
350 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The N uclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices.
351 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Profile: Nuclear,"
http://w w w .nti.org/e_research/profiles/Egypt/N uclear/index.htm l (accessed N ovem ber
30, 2012).
352 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi A rabia Profile: Nuclear,"
http://w w w .nti.org/country-profiles/saudi-arabia/nuclear/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
353 Elaine M. Grossman, "Egypt Plays Key Nonproliferation Role, but Keeps N uclear
Options Open," N uclear Threat Initiative, http://w w w .nti.org/gsn/article/egypt-plays-keynonproliferation-role-but-keeps-nuclear-options-open/ (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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with Iran in the future.354 Saudi King A bdullah has been reported as saying, "if they get
nuclear weapons, w e will get nuclear w eapons."355
A m ajor difference betw een the two states is that Saudi Arabia is an oil rich state
with these resources being the backbone o f their economy. 356 Egypt has limited natural
resources and a sm aller economy.

Egypt has seen much change since the A rab Spring,

w hile Saudi Arabia has seen m inim al change. For this dissertation, the analyses will
consider the history and events before June 2012, with a look towards the future from that
point in time.
The im portance o f this chapter is to explore treaty com pliance in nonproliferation
and discover w hether the dom estic politics theory o f com pliance can help understand
these hard cases and possibly predict the outcome. This chapter starts with the analysis
o f Egypt and is followed by a study o f Saudi Arabia.
For each state o f potential proliferation concern, there is an introduction to the
state’s specific situation. An overview is given next, which consists o f the state’s history
with the N PT and the international nonproliferation regim e more broadly, as well as the
status o f nuclear pow er in the state. This aids in understanding the context o f the
potential noncom pliant actions.
Next, each state is analyzed using Sim m ons’ domestic politics theory o f treaty
compliance. This includes reviewing the role o f agenda setting, litigation, and
mobilization o f the domestic population for each state’s particular situation in a search

354 Tom Parry, "Brothers in Arms: Egypt's Fresh Links to Iran Reignite Fears over
Nukes," The M irror, 26 June 2012.
355 Chemi Shalev, "Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain N uclear Bomb after Iran,"
H aaretz, 30 M ay 2012.
356 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Saudi Arabia."
357 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Egypt."

121

for evidence. Conclusions are then drawn for each state on w hether these variables can
explain (or predict) the potential for continued com pliance or a move towards
noncom pliance.

Egypt

Egypt has been reported on by the IAEA Secretariat to the Board o f G overnors,
but it has not been found in noncom pliance by the Board o f G overnors.358 This does not
mean its current standing o f com pliance will not change in the future. As discussed in
this chapter’s introduction, a variety o f scholars and analysts share the view that Egypt
could under certain conditions decide to pursue nuclear weapons. Egypt is currently a
supporter o f the N PT generally, but has not supported strengthening m easures such as the
Additional Protocol.
Egypt's history has included mom ents o f considering proliferation but never
com m itting fully to a nuclear weapons program. The option was left open in the 1950s
and 1960s under N asser and was later abandoned along with the idea o f nuclear pow er in
the 1980s.359 A lthough, Egypt did conduct secret activities from 1990 to 2003 including
creating uranium m etal, a key step in developing a nuclear w eapon.360 Egypt does not
have the m oney to purchase a com plete weapon but they have the basic industry and

358 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Im plem entation o f the N PT Safeguards
A greem ent in the Arab Republic o f Egypt: Report by the Director General," in
G OV/2005/9 (2005).
359 Solingen, N uclear L ogics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the M iddle E a st, 229.
360 International Atomic Energy Agency, "The Safeguards Statem ent for 2004,"
http://w w w .iaea.org/O urW ork/SV /Safeguards/docum ents/es2004.pdf (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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technology needed to support a nuclear w eapons program should they choose to do so.
Some believe a nuclear Iran and/or a potential souring o f the Egypt-US relationship may
cause Egypt to pursue nuclear w eapons.361 But does dom estic politics theory help aid in
understanding why they may choose to continue to meet their obligations under the NPT?

Overview

H istory w ith N onproliferation
Egypt has several reasons to pursue nuclear weapons. Perhaps they desire a
deterrent against Israel and/or Iran.

It m ay be as simple as seeking a balance o f pow er

in the region and possibly becom ing an undisputable hegem onic pow er.363 The w eapons
could also serve as a source o f pride for the dom estic population w anting to equal the
Israelis as w ell as becom e the first Arab nation w ith nuclear weapons. There has been a
strong desire for regional Arab leadership following Nasser.
On the other hand, the Egyptian leadership m ay want to win the support o f its
citizens that adm ire the Iranian program and the Iranian defiance o f the W est and
international com munity. Although, Egypt has said that Iranian w eapons are a threat to
Egypt and Egypt will need weapons to counter this threat. Egypt does not have a nuclear
security guarantee from one o f the existing nuclear weapons states, "except for a vague

361

Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
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Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 43-44.

123

Soviet com mitment" in the 1960s.364 The weapons would serve national defense
purposes if its relationship with the US deteriorated in the future.360 H owever, despite
these incentives, Egypt has kept its com m itm ent to not pursue nuclear w eapons as
required under the NPT.
Egypt is a party to the N PT and several other nonproliferation relevant treaties.
Egypt brought the NPT into force under Sadat in February 1981, years after first signing
it in 1968. Ratification for the People’s A ssem bly occurred because it becam e obligatory
by other states beginning to provide nuclear facilities, equipm ent and m aterials to
Egypt.366
Egypt joined the IAEA in 1957 and signed a Safeguards A greem ent in June 1982,
the delay was due to the fact that the N PT Article III stated tim e lim it o f 18 m onths was
in effect from the time o f ratification (which for Egypt was in 1981).367 Related to the
Safeguards A greem ent is the A dditional Protocol which Egypt has thus far refused to
sign. The Additional Protocol w ould allow the IAEA more inform ation and access, as
well as dem onstrate Egypt’s com m itm ent to the nonproliferation regim e.368 It is unlikely

364 Solingen, N uclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East A sia and the M iddle East, 232.
365 Cam pbell, Einhom , and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States
Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 72.
366 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear W eapons Program: Egypt,"
http://w w w .fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/index.htm l (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
367
tjie A greement between Egypt and the A gency for the A pplication o f
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the N on-Proliferation o f N uclear Weapons,"
ed. International Atomic Energy Agency (1982).
368 International Atomic Energy Agency, "Factsheets and FAQs: IAEA Safeguards
Overview," http://w w w .iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview .htm l
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that Egypt will take on any more obligations while Israel remains outside the N PT.369
This includes the Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Egypt signed the Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 but has yet to ratify
it.370 Egypt is an Annex II state, m eaning its ratification is required before the treaty can
enter into force.371 Once again, Egypt has tied the issue to Israel; this time it is refusing
to ratify the Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty because Israel has not. A lthough, it is
unclear w hether if Israel did sign and ratify the treaty Egypt w ould then ratify the
Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty. It m ight choose to w ait until Israel jo in ed the N PT .372
Egypt is a signatory to the African N uclear W eapon Free Zone (also know n as the
Pelindaba Treaty) but has failed to ratify that treaty as w ell.373 Egypt has tied its
ratification with the treaty to requiring Israel to jo in the N PT .374 The Pelindaba Treaty
entered into force in 2009 (the Egyptian ratification was not necessary for entry into
force).375
On a more positive note, Egypt does have a stated policy o f supporting a M iddle
East N uclear W eapon Free Zone and the later proposed M iddle East W eapons o f Mass
Destruction Free Zone.376 O f course, these are aim ed at restraining Israel. M ubarak
pursued the concept o f the M iddle East N uclear W eapon Free Zone vigorously after Iran

369 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt Profile: Nuclear."
370
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proposed the idea in 1979 as a UN General A ssem bly resolution.377 Egypt continues to
support the idea o f a M iddle East N uclear W eapon Free Zone today and speaks to its
merits at every possible forum .378 M inim al progress has been made but there are plenty
o f statements in support o f the concept. O f course, as we saw in the failed com pliance
case studies, statements are not always truth.
The M uslim Brotherhood (Egypt's new leading political party) has “ridiculed”
this idea in the past and called for Egypt to abandon its NPT com m itm ent in favor o f
acquiring nuclear weapons.

379

There was a 2004 m om ent o f doubt in the international

com m unity about Egypt's com mitment.
In 2004, the IAEA becam e aware o f some suspicious activities and undeclared
facilities via open source analysis.380 IAEA questioning o f Egyptian officials and
scientists revealed that there w ere in fact previously undeclared activities, materials and
laboratories. The undeclared activities included experim ents "involving the irradiation o f
small am ounts o f uranium and thorium and their subsequent dissolution."381 This is an
important concept/process to m aster in order to develop nuclear w eapons.382
The Egyptian governm ent cooperated with the IAEA investigation into the
alleged activities.383 However, the m atter was still reported by the Secretariat to the
Board o f G overnors.384 Egypt was not found in noncom pliance and was not reported to
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the UN Security C ouncil.38' A ccording to form er deputy director general o f the IAEA
Pierre G oldschm idt (head o f safeguards), "in the case o f Egypt, the IAEA did not find
any indication that the reported failures and breaches were part o f concealm ent efforts or
a deception strategy."386 H owever, G oldschm idt argues that the matter should still have
been defined as noncom pliance as the intent is not as im portant as the violation itself.
The M ubarak regim e was toppled in 201 1.387 The m ilitary transitional
governm ent took control until dem ocratically elected officials were chosen. In June
2012, the M uslim Brotherhood candidate M oham ed M orsy w on the presidential
election.388 There are concerns as the new governm ent takes shape and the international
com m unity waits to understand the role o f the m ilitary in this new government. This
change in governm ent and its possible influence on Egyptian com pliance w ith its current
nonproliferation obligations will be discussed further below.

Current N uclear Status
Compared to other M iddle Eastern states' nuclear infrastructure, Egypt is rather
advanced in its nuclear capabilities. However, the state has been unsuccessful in
establishing a nuclear pow er plant. Egypt currently has two research reactors, one
provided by the Soviets in 1961 and one provided by an Argentinean com pany in the
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1990s.

Egypt also has facilities for “mining, m illing, fuel fabrication, waste

managem ent, and (sm all-scale) reprocessing.’’390 The relationship to nuclear w eapons can
be seen in the early research that was used to understand how to reprocess the waste from
the nuclear reactor to extract the plutonium needed for a bomb (plutonium is a byproduct
o f burning up uranium based fuel in a reactor).391
E gypt’s nuclear program started under N asser with the purpose o f peaceful uses,
although reportedly the w eapons option was not to be entirely ignored.392 The pow er
program began w ith a decision by N asser in 1954, resulting in the creation o f the Atomic
Energy A uthority (AEA) in 1955. There was also an alleged clandestine nuclear
w eapons program , which ended in the 1970s with the death o f Nasser. Perhaps not
ironically, the program that was to m aintain E gypt’s “ superiority”393 over Israel involved
Germ an N azi scientists.394 It has been argued that, “ Egypt’s leadership never allocated
the financial resources and political capital necessary to the success o f a w eapons
program .” 395 If true, this suggests that there m ay have been curiosity about nuclear
weapons but no serious urgency in pursuing them.
M ubarak originally continued N asser’s nuclear pow er program but in the m id1980s, term inated the nuclear agenda. This was due to the Chernobyl accident, a
w eakening o f the Egyptian econom y, and pressure by the business sector to use the
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coastal property intended for pow er plants for tourism instead.396 This standstill o f the
nuclear program may have caused “E gypt’s nuclear scientific expertise to atrophy”
making it much more difficult to renew the nation’s pursuit o f nuclear pow er.397
Nevertheless, in 2006, M ubarak’s son announced that Egypt w ould again pursue
nuclear pow er to meet the nation’s grow ing electricity needs.398 He proposed that Egypt
w ould build three nuclear pow er plants by 2020. This was a reversal o f the tw enty-year
policy not to pursue nuclear pow er, established in 1986. In 2010, Egypt passed
com prehensive regulation related to nuclear and radiation issues, a necessary step to
responsible nuclear pow er developm ent.399 W ith the end o f the M ubarak regim e nuclear
pow er rem ains a viable option and plans are still in place to move ahead.400
As o f 2012, the Egyptian governm ent, in consultation with international experts
and the IAEA, has narrow ed dow n possible sites to build and there are plans to put out a
request for proposals in the near future.401 The plan has risen to 4 pow er plants.

Several

nations and com panies have stated they will place bids to build the Egyptian nuclear
pow er plants.
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D om estic Politics Theory o f Compliance

D omestic M obilization
There has not been nor is their currently m obilization o f domestic groups to
pressure the state to not acquire (or acquire) nuclear weapons. While our focus is on
dom estic groups and their relation to the treaty it is worth noting there are serious
concerns that dom estic groups could mobilize in the name o f noncom pliance. Etel
Solingen has pointed out that E gypt’s renew ed interest in nuclear pow er is m ost likely the
result o f “dom estic pressures from constituencies m obilized by Iran’s nuclearization.”402
There m ay be more dom estic groups in the future that m obilize in dem and o f Egyptian
nuclear weapons. The “pro-nuclear inward-looking secular and Islam ist forces” calling
for nuclear weapons in the 1980s could mobilize once again.403 M ore recently, in 2000, a
“pan-A rab opposition party” included the acquisition o f nuclear w eapons on its political
platform .404
Much as in Syria and Libya, the Arab Spring brought about a dramatic
m obilization o f the dom estic populations. Domestic groups m ay not be m obilizing in the
nam e o f nonproliferation but perhaps they have been concerned with m ore pressing
personal needs for change. It is im portant to note the Egyptians m obilized effectively
and successfully once and they could do so again. Domestic politics theory tells us to
watch for this to happen in the future as a clue to compliance.
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U nder the rule o f M ubarak, the M uslim Brotherhood called for Egypt to pursue
nuclear w eapons.405 G iven the current instability o f the nation’s governm ent and the fact
that the M uslim Brotherhood is running politicians for various offices in the em erging
dem ocracy... this is unsettling.

More importantly, the M uslim Brotherhood candidate,

M ohamed M orsy, won the presidential election in June 2012.406
Agenda Setting
The G lobal Report 2009: Conflict, Governance, a n d State Fragility, stated that
Egypt under M ubarak was “governed by an uninstitutionalized, or ‘w eak,’ autocratic
regim e.”407 Scholars and analysts were concerned w ith the possibility o f an Egyptian
nuclear w eapons program , but believed that it was less likely as long as M ubarak
m aintained control over the country.408 Under the strict rule o f M ubarak, civil society
was highly constrained and agenda setting was lim ited to him self and his close advisors.
Under the new dem ocracy we m ay see more entities influence the national agenda and by
default new opportunities to influence the agenda setting.
U nder N asser, the agenda was “ inw ard-looking self-reliance” w hich was in line
with the pursuit o f nuclear w eapons.409 U nder Sadat and Mubarak, the agenda was more
outward looking and was focused on building the econom y (within the constraints o f
maintaining regim e security and the pursuit o f self-enrichm ent). This agenda did not fall
in line with an expensive nuclear weapons program that would risk an international
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political backlash. Despite inflam m atory com m ents by Sadat and M ubarak w ith regards
to a possible pursuit o f nuclear weapons, both seemed to have not been serious when it
came to national policy.410
It was during Sadat's rule that the NPT came onto the national agenda.411 Albeit
not because it was open for ratification but because Egypt's desire for nuclear pow er
required the international com m unity to ask Egypt about its stance on nuclear w eapons.
So, an issue not previously discussed was brought up and a decision made. This aligns
with how Simm ons defines agenda setting.
Egypt is one o f the outspoken non-nuclear weapons states focused on the
“fundam entally discrim inatory nature o f the tw o-tiered system ” codified w ithin the
N p t 412 jh g n p x has categorized the w orld into nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear
w eapons states.413 N o new nuclear w eapons states can exist under the system and those
that exist rem ain outside the treaty w hile still receiving assistance from other states rather
than being outcasts o f the international com m unity (m ainly Israel, Pakistan, and India).
The new ly elected leadership o f Egypt will be shaping the new national agenda.
W hile one can assume the econom y and governm ent reform are on the agenda there may
be m ore controversial issues. President-elect M oham ed M orsy has stated that Egyptian
foreign policy will include restoring diplom atic relations with Iran and building a close
relationship.414 He has also said he m ay reverse the decades old peace deal with Israel.
He has yet to speak about nuclear w eapons for Egypt.

410 Ibid., 243.
411 Federation o f American Scientists, "Nuclear W eapons Program: Egypt."
412 Solingen, N uclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the M iddle E a st, 236.
413
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414 Parry, "Brothers in Arms: Egypt's Fresh Links to Iran Reignite Fears over N ukes."

Litigation
A new governm ent is being formed at this mom ent through a process o f
dem ocratic elections. The judicial system was reform ed quickly and is currently being
tested. Form er President M ubarak has already been tried and convicted and this may
indicate a positive sign for the future o f the judicial system ’s legitim acy.415 M ubarak was
sentenced to life in prison for accessory to m urder, relating to the death o f protestors
calling for the end o f his rule in February 2011. However, many Egyptian citizens do not
believe in the legal system and they are protesting that officials directly responsible for
killing dem onstrators have had their charges dism issed. The citizens are also displeased
that corruption charges against M ubarak and his sons w ere dropped.
It is too soon to know if litigation will play a role in nonproliferation for Egypt.
Researchers should follow w hat suits are filed in the court system. They can also watch
for any talk o f litigation, w hich is unlikely until dom estic groups organize in the nam e o f
nonproliferation.

Conclusions fo r Egypt
Egypt’s com m itm ent to the NPT m ay have w aivered occasionally but so far has
been mostly against acquiring nuclear weapons. W hen the discrepancies over Egypt’s
undeclared facilities, m aterials, and activities arose in 2004, the D irector General o f the
IAEA at that time (an Egyptian national) stated, “the repeated failures by Egypt to report
nuclear m aterials and facilities to the agency in a tim ely m anner are a m atter o f

413 David D. Kirkpatrick, "New Turmoil in Egypt Greets M ixed Verdict for M ubarak,"
N ew York Times, 02 June 2012.
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concern.”416 He went on to say it was not how ever a proliferation concern and used this
opportunity to remind the international com m unity to take their obligations seriously.
This is ironic because one has to w onder if the incident would have been much more
serious had a different country been involved. The m atter was never brought to the
attention o f the Board o f Governors, neither for a vote on com pliance or w hether to report
Egypt to the UN Security Council.
A realist perspective indicates that a nuclear Egypt could be imminent. The
weapons would assist in its balance o f pow er in the region both relative to Israel and in
the future possibly with Iran.417 The ebbs and flows o f the Egyptian program do not line
up with the Israeli tim eline.418 One would expect that Egyptian activity w ould coincide
w ith periods o f aggression or key m om ents in the Israeli nuclear w eapons program.
However, as Etel Solingen has reviewed in N uclear L ogics, this is not the case which
further supports the use o f dom estic factors.
In the fall o f 2001, Thom as Graham wrote an analysis on W M D threats for the
Brookings Review w here he ranked Egypt as a 1 out o f 5 (w here 1 is low) on a scale o f
magnitude o f W M D threats and made no m ention o f nuclear w eapons.419
Domestic politics theory m ay give us more insight in to the future N PT
com pliance o f Egypt. For example, Egypt's practice o f nonproliferation com pliance
could change if the agenda setting is influenced by global events. This could include a
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negative turn in relations with the US 420 Some experts also predict Egypt may pursue
nuclear w eapons if Iran successfully acquires nuclear w eapons.421 A lthough, under the
Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt and Iran could revive their relationship, changing a
perceived threat into an ally.422
W ith the M uslim Brotherhood com ing to pow er in the 2012 presidential election,
there is a chance they could return to their earlier rhetoric and pursue nuclear w eapons.423
If this comes to pass, Egyptian citizens m ight m obilize in favor o f nonproliferation. The
last few years have seen the Egyptian econom y hit hard by slow growth, particularly in
construction and tourism .424 Perhaps the citizens w ould mobilize in the nam e o f the NPT
to dem and their new governm ent not pursue nuclear weapons in favor o f spending
resources on im proving the economy. Sadly, it m ay be as likely that citizens w ould
mobilize in order to dem and their governm ent pursue nuclear weapons.
If Egyptian citizens do mobilize for nonproliferation and if the new governm ent is
as open and transparent as the citizens have been dem anding, then they could take their
issue to the (hopefully) now legitimate judicial system to dem and that Egypt meet its
nonproliferation com mitments. These factors could inform the setting o f the elite agenda,
which would be the final “tipping point” for com pliance in this case. D om estic politics
theory o f treaty com pliance tells us this is all possible and we should w atch for these
possible events.
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Saudi Arabia

Like Egypt, Saudi Arabia has not been found in noncom pliance by the IAEA
Board o f Governors. Unlike Egypt, Saudi A rabia has very limited scientific resources,
such as nuclear facilities and experts, w hich it could utilize to pursue a nuclear weapons
program .425 Unlike Egypt, Saudi A rabia has the financial resources to purchase a
com plete nuclear w eapon therefore overriding the need to have an extensive nuclear
weapons program. In fact, Saudi A rabia already owns missiles capable o f carrying
nuclear w arheads.426
There are several allegations o f direct and indirect support between Saudi Arabia
and Pakistan’s nuclear program. These allegations rem ain unsubstantiated by the
Pakistani and Saudi governments, and in some cases are vehem ently denied. Suspicion is
that Saudi A rabia supported Pakistan's nuclear w eapon program in exchange for future
access to nuclear weapons for Saudi A rabia.427
W hile Saudi Arabia has not been found in noncom pliance it rem ains a concern
because o f several disturbing events and discrepancies. An exam ple o f an issue that
causes international nonproliferation concern was when Prime M inister B hutto’s press
adviser Khalid Hasan asserted that m uch o f the funding for Pakistan’s nuclear program

425 N uclear Threat Initiative, "Saudi A rabia Profile: Nuclear."
426 Gordon Corera, Shopping fo r Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and
the Rise a n d Fall o f the A. Q. Khan N etw ork (New York: Oxford U niversity Press, 2006),
97.
427 A m ir Mir, "W here Terror and the Bomb Could Meet," A sia Times, 07 July 2005.
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under came from Saudi Arabia.

428

This was confirm ed by Dr. A. Q. Khan who was a key

figure in developing Pakistan’s nuclear program .429
A nother exam ple are the claims made by First Secretary, and a nuclear expert,
M ohamm ed A bdalla A1 Khilewi o f the Saudi Arabian mission to the United Nations in
New York.430 He defected to the US where he was granted political asylum in August
1994. In various outlets, he asserted that he had made copies o f thousands o f official
Saudi docum ents that passed through his office. He has not made this archive public, but
he asserts that the docum ents show that from 1975 until 1990, the Saudi Arabian
governm ent provided som e $5 billion to help fund Saddam Hussein's nuclear efforts; and
that it tried to acquire nuclear weapons from Pakistan and the Soviet Union.
In one interview, Khilewi estim ated conservatively that the Saudi governm ent
spent at least $7 billion on nuclear armaments since 1975, including m illions o f dollars to
buy nuclear reactors for what it calls "scientific" and "peaceful" uses, and for nuclear
research and data collection. But m ost o f the m oney w ent to support nuclear program s in
other countries— Iraq and Pakistan, with m ost going to Iraq. In his view, Pakistan
transferred nuclear technology out o f econom ic interest.431
Khilewi also claims that the Saudi government, recognizing its technical
shortcom ings in nuclear expertise, attempted “to buy into” the Iraqi and Pakistani nuclear

428
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programs in exchange for weapons.432 Supposedly, a secret agreement was created
arranging Saudi Arabian finances for the nuclear weapons program if Pakistan would
defend Saudi A rabia with nuclear w eapons in the occurrence that the oil-rich state was
attacked with nuclear weapons 433
Khilewi has made repeated statements that Saudi Arabia has tried to silence him
with bribes, threats and attem pted assassinations.434 Saudi Arabia continues to m aintain
the allegations are baseless and the docum ents are fabricated.435 Perhaps, Thom as
Lippm an explained it best when he wrote: “this allegation has never been proved but
neither has it been effectively refuted.”436
W hy w ould Saudi Arabia support the Pakistani program ? Is this a sign o f the
clandestine sale in the future some suspect?437 D irect and Indirect issues include public
statem ents, financial contributions, and national defense purchases.
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Overview

History with Nonproliferation
Saudi Arabia has several reasons to pursue nuclear weapons that are sim ilar to
Egypt's. The Saudis m ay feel threatened by a nuclear Iran and seek a balance o f regional
power. Or the Saudis may one day decide to be the undisputed hegem onic pow er in the
region.

438

In doing so, the Saudis could take pride in being the first Arab nation with

nuclear weapons. This could result in stronger support from the citizens for the
monarchy. The Saudis live in a volatile region and m ay seek to increase their national
defenses with nuclear w eapons, especially if their relationship deteriorates w ith the US.
They are not explicitly under the US nuclear umbrella, which is also a concern. Despite
the reasons Saudi A rabia has to pursue nuclear weapons, they have, so far, com m itted
them selves not to do so.
Saudi Arabia joined the N PT in 1988, nearly 20 years after the treaty entered into
force.439 Saudi ratification o f the N PT was actually forced by the US and the
international com m unity due to a suspicious Saudi m ilitary purchase o f Chinese missiles.
In 1988, Riyadh purchased long-range CSS-2 ballistic missiles from China.440
This particular m issile is quite inaccurate and therefore only useful when m ounted with
som ething that does not need precision targeting, such as a nuclear weapon. The CSS-2
ballistic missile is meant to carry nuclear warheads and does so in all other known
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deployments. Pakistan served as the m iddlem an and initiated the deal betw een China and
Saudi Arabia. In return, Pakistan received cash from China and Saudi A rabia.441
Furtherm ore, Riyadh purchased the m issiles with the understanding that once the
Pakistani nuclear program was successful, several nuclear bombs would be sold to the
House o f Saud for m ounting on the missiles. It is believed that this arrangem ent died the
same year as Pakistani President Zia, w ho had been the one to originally make the
secretive deal. It was an interesting deal and a bit surprising as the Saudis already had
m ilitary capabilities w ithin their air force to strike with greater precision then the CSS-2s
and at a low er cost.442 This is especially true given the $3 billion price tag on the CSS2 8 443

In 1988, the US was shocked by the discovery o f the Chinese m issiles deploym ent
to a rem ote desert area o f Saudi Arabia, w here they w ere being m anned by the
Chinese 444 To am eliorate US and international concern, the Saudis struck a deal w ith the
US. The missiles could stay but Saudi A rabia needed to sign and ratify the NPT,
dem onstrating their com m itm ent to not pursue nuclear w eapons.445 This helped put the
US and Saudi A rabia’s neighbors at ease. It also allowed the US and Saudi Arabia to
continue their strategic relationship, including arms sales. To this day, the m issiles are in
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the Saudi desert being m aintained by a Chinese crew and have never been inspected by
the US. The m issiles were “ grandfathered” and therefore excluded from the missile
proliferation com m itm ent the Chinese made, in 2000, that included not to aid states in
acquiring missiles that can be used for W M D .446
As m entioned in the previous section, the CSS-2s are not the only eyebrow raising
incident in Saudi A rabia’s nonproliferation history. There w ere also the statem ents by
Prim e M inister B hutto’s press advisor and Dr. A. Q. Khan. There are also the various
controversial statements by K hilewi described above.
W hile the Saudis did ratify the NPT, they were slow to enter into a Safeguards
A greem ent as required w ithin 180 days by Article III o f the NPT. As m entioned in
previous case studies, there is no precedence o f this issue being used as grounds for a
noncom pliance finding. Saudi Arabia signed a Small Quantities Protocol in 2005.447
This agreem ent is for states with m inim al am ounts o f nuclear material and no m aterial in
a fuel cycle facility.448 This agreem ent and a Com prehensive Safeguards A greem ent
entered into force in 2009.449 Saudi Arabia has no Additional Protocol in place.
Outside o f the NPT, Saudi Arabia also supports the concept o f a M iddle East
N uclear W eapon Free Zone, which has seen slow progress in com ing to fruition.450 Saudi
A rabia has not signed, let alone ratified, the Com prehensive Test Ban Treaty.451 Their
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ratification is not required for the treaty to enter into force, but it show s a lack o f
com m itm ent to the international nonproliferation regime.

Current N uclear Status
Saudi Arabia does not currently have nuclear fuel cycle facilities or research
reactors.452 W ithin the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is a prim ary “producer and consum er” o f
electricity from oil and gas.453 W ith an expected annual 8% growth in dem and, Saudi
Arabia has taken the decision to pursue nuclear power. In 2011, it was announced that 16
pow er plants will be built over the next 20 years. The first 2 reactors are expected to
come online by 2021. Deals are also in the works for sm aller Argentine plants for
desalination purposes.

D om estic Politics Theory o f Compliance

Domestic M obilization
Saudi A rabia’s “strict im plem entation o f the Shari’a laws prohibits or restricts
freedom o f speech, the press, assem bly, and association.”454 Therefore, it will be very
difficult for the domestic population to m obilize in the nam e o f nonproliferation.
Furthermore, the m onarchy has “both the capacity and the willingness to suppress
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opposition activities and even view s.”4' 5 But as history has shown repeatedly, it is still
not impossible for oppressed populations to mobilize.
In 2010 and 2011, pre-dom inantly Shia dom estic groups inspired by the Arab
Spring mobilized and were met with strong opposition from the governm ent 456 These
"modest incidents” occurred across Saudi Arabia but were put down with minimal
bloodshed.457 The King did, however, enact new dom estic policies to appease citizens
“including funds to build affordable housing, salary increases for governm ent workers,
and unem ploym ent benefits.”458
In 2004, a hum an rights organization form ed for the first time in Saudi Arabia.
This organization, called the N ational H um an Rights Association, collects inform ation on
violations from the population and seeks to ensure Saudi A rabia’s com pliance with its
international hum an rights agreements. This is a huge first step and dom estic politics
theory leads us to believe there m ay be change in hum an rights com pliance in the future.
Given this exam ple, perhaps it will be possible for groups to m obilize in the nam e o f
nonproliferation. It is too soon to tell but we should watch for this type o f event in the
future.
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Agenda Setting
The Polity Project IV scores the governm ent on the far end o f the autocracy
4*>9

spectrum. ‘

W ithin the autocracy, the natio n ’s citizens are quite repressed and do not

influence the governm ent.460
This obviously means that the K ing is the ultim ate authority and has no
restrictions enforced upon him by a constitution or legislation.461 C urrently the ruler is
King and Prime M inister A bdullah bin A bd al-Aziz A1 Saud 462 Therefore, the agenda is
set almost exclusively by the royal family. D ecisions are often taken by the K ing’s
cabinet.463 The cabinet, called the Council o f M inisters, is com prised o f 18 people
appointed by the King. The C ouncil’s m em bership is family members and close fam ily
friends. This has begun to change; there has been some reform with the goal o f pleasing
the dom estic constituency and perhaps W estern critics. This includes a m ove to hold
elections for certain positions.
W hile there is little that appears to influence the Saudi agenda, a 2008 Senate
Com m ittee on Foreign Relations report stated that the United States’ relationship with
Saudi Arabia may be the only factor that keeps the Saudis from going nuclear.464
Cam pbell et al. also believe that US policy weighs heavily on the agenda setting o f Saudi
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A rabia.46:1 A change in the relationship for the worse may end with Saudi Arabia
believing it needs to be more self-reliant and acquire nuclear weapons.
Simmons also defines agenda setting within dom estic politics theory as a treaty
bringing an issue up that otherw ise w ould not be discussed. In Saudi Arabia, the treaty
became an issue when the Chinese m issile purchase was revealed to the international
community. At that point the US and others wanted a solid answ er on Saudi Arabia's
view o f nuclear weapons. W here nonproliferation was not a previous issue, the treaty
cam e on to the national agenda not when it was open for ratification but when the world
asked for a com mitment.

Litigation
Since 2007, there has been a reform to make the judicial system more transparent
and consistent.466 Previously, judges could enforce Shira’i law as they (the individual)
interpreted it with no regard for the codification o f law or the use o f precedents. The
reform included the elim ination o f the Suprem e Judicial Council and replacing it with the
new ly created Supreme Court and a corresponding Appeals Court. The King and his
family still influence the judicial system despite its relative independence.
Finally, there is no legislature to develop laws that could be used for litigation.467
The King and his close advisors develop new laws as they see fit and the public has little
input. The Council o f M inisters, m entioned in the Agenda Setting section above, does
play an advising role in developm ent o f laws.
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Given the lim ited independence o f the courts and the complete lack o f legislature,
the domestic population has no m anner o f using these governm ent elem ents to call for
and im plem ent change.

Conclusions fo r Saudi Arabia
Above all, the Saudis w ould clearly be more interested in obtaining nuclear
weapons, if Iran goes nuclear.468 Riyadh has seen Iran as a threat, especially since the
Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah was overthrow n by Ayatollah Khomeini.
This was when the m ajority Shiite state o f Iran “had begun denouncing the corrupt oil
sheikdom s.”469 Today, “Iran ’s nuclear program m e has provided a potent symbol o f the
growing Shia threat.”470 Should it obtain nuclear weapons, Iran could becom e the
regional hegem onic pow er, if it is not already, given the dem ise o f Saddam Hussein.
Beyond the threat o f a nuclear Iran, Saudi A rabia is located in a volatile region
where it m ay feel “always insecure and fearful o f encirclem ent.”471 Israel’s
unannounced nuclear capability is seen as a threat by Riyadh and the Saudis repeatedly
call for Israel’s disarm am ent. And while Israel has nuclear arms, it m ost likely will not
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allow an Islamic nuclear weapons program to advance too far down the path o f
proliferation.472
G iven the lack o f nuclear infrastructure and expertise the Saudis are unlikely to
pursue nuclear w eapons on their own. Furtherm ore, to begin a program now would leave
Saudi Arabia quite far behind the perceived threats that are the Israeli and Iranian nuclear
weapons programs. In fact, “ if the Saudis do pursue nuclear weapons, they will alm ost
surely draw in part on the already established Saudi-Pakistani nexus.”473 Some people
believe that a deal has already been struck; that Pakistan will provide a nuclear w eapon to
Saudi A rabia in exchange for assistance received during the years o f pursuit.
The agenda setting o f Saudi A rabia is not clear cut. Should it decide nuclear
w eapons are im portant to the state’s survival and obtain a nuclear capability, it may well
get caught on the horns o f a security dilemm a; w hat it believes to be defense m ay w ell be
perceived as offensive by other states.474 As Thom as Lippman stated, “the acquisition or
developm ent o f nuclear weapons w ould be provocative, destabilizing, controversial and
extrem ely difficult for Saudi Arabia, and ultim ately would likely weaken the kingdom
rather than strengthen it.”475
Sim m ons found that treaties and the dom estic politics theory had the most
"impact" in transitional dem ocracy.476 At this point, Saudi Arabia is m ost definitely not a
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transitional dem ocracy.477 It would be difficult to know the true opinions o f the domestic
population given the lack o f freedoms. Saudi Arabia is ranked 158th out o f 179 states in
the Press Freedom Index.478 As it appears currently, dom estic politics theory does not
help us understand Saudi Arabia's com pliance with the NPT.

Conclusions

Egypt and Saudi A rabia offer interesting cases o f states that m ay be considered
potential proliferation concerns. This makes them hard cases o f the dissertation. They
are currently com plying but should aspects o f their situations change in the future they
could becom e proliferators. W hat can be learned by viewing these case studies o f
potential proliferation concern through the lens o f the domestic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance?
Experts have believed “that as long as President M ubarak or a like-m inded
successor remains in charge, there is little prospect- short o f such traum atic events as a
m ilitary attack on Egyptian territory or the use o f nuclear weapons som ew here in the
M iddle East - that C airo’s response would be to em bark on a nuclear weapons
program .”479 W ith M ubarak sitting in jail and his successor a m em ber o f the M uslim
Brotherhood, what can w e expect for the future o f nonproliferation in Egypt?
As m entioned above, Saudi Arabia does not have the scientific resources to
launch a nuclear weapons program and has no im mediate reasons to do so. However,
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Reconsider Their N uclear Choices, 44.
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Saudi Arabia could m ore than afford to finance a nuclear weapons program (or purchase)
with its GDP o f $676.7 billion, with oil accounting for “80% o f budget revenues, 45% o f
GDP, and 90% o f export earnings.”480 In the context o f strained relations with the US,
and a possibly nuclear Iran, Saudi Arabia may hedge its bets. In fact, there is evidence
that it has already begun to by supporting the Pakistani's in its pursuit o f the nuclear
bomb. W hat can we expect for the future?
One can look back at history and quickly rem em ber that things w ere not so
different in the 1960s. Instead o f an Iranian pursuit o f nuclear weapons causing
headlines, it was an Israeli pursuit o f nuclear weapons. In response to Israel's nuclear
program, in 1960, N asser threatened to arm Egypt w ith nuclear w eapons.481 More
recently it was M ubarak's am bassador saying that “if others will acquire nuclear weapons
— and if others are going to use these nuclear w eapons to acquire status in the region o f
the M iddle East — let me tell you, w e are not going to accept to be second-class citizens
in the region o f the M iddle East.”482 M ore recently it was Saudi King A bdullah allegedly
saying about a nuclear Iran, "if they get nuclear w eapons, we will get nuclear
weapons."
If Iran obtains nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia or Egypt m ight well be pushed to
develop their own nuclear capability as a deterrent to Iran and also perhaps as a m atter o f
regional prestige as the first Arab state to m atch the Persians. It is im portant to note, and
the Saudis understand this well, that even a small nuclear weapon could destroy m ajor oil

480 Central Intelligence Agency, "The W orld Factbook: Saudi Arabia."
481 "Nasser Threatens Israel on A-Bomb."
482 Grossman, "Egypt Plays Key Nonproliferation Role, but Keeps N uclear Options
Open."
483 Shalev, "Dennis Ross: Saudi King Vowed to Obtain N uclear Bomb after Iran."

149

facilities and cities, and threats o f radiological, chem ical and biological w eapons attacks
cannot be discounted. In addition, even if Iran or other states in the region never use
weapons o f mass destruction, they could enable brinkm anship or coercion because others
would be aware o f their existence.
Dom estic politics theory has not helped us understand treaty com pliance in these
countries. N onproliferation did becom e an agenda item for both nations, but not because
o f dom estic pressures. W ith the treaty open for ratification they were under pressure
from the international com m unity and also w ished to use the nonproliferation issue to
condem n Israel. There has been no litigation or m obilization on nuclear issues to date.
D om estic politics theory gives variables that one can watch for in the future to
understand w hether Egypt and Saudi Arabia w ill com ply w ith their international
nonproliferation obligations. There may be elem ents o f agenda setting, litigation, or
domestic m obilization in the nam e o f nonproliferation in the future. Egypt is the m ore
likely case because it is the transitional dem ocracy that, according to Sim m ons, the
theory m ay w ork best for explaining.484 For these m ethodologies o f change to be used
both governm ents will have to becom e more open and transparent; which is already
beginning to happen but only time will tell if there will be real change.
Table 3 illustrates the findings o f Egypt and Saudi Arab for this chapter. The
agenda setting for nations was not influenced by the treaty but by the international
community. N either state saw the use o f litigation to enforce the obligations o f the
national governm ent under the NPT. Finally, neither country had dom estic population
mobilize for the N PT and to keep their nations from acquiring nuclear weapons.

484 Simmons, M obilizing fo r Human Rights: International L aw in D om estic P olitics, 155.
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Domestic Politics Theory M echanism s Present?
State
Agenda Setting

Litigation

M obilization

Egypt

No

No

No

Saudi Arabia

No

No

No

Table 3. Results o f Chapter 5 Case Studies

W hile domestic politics theory does not seem to have helped us understand the
m echanism s for com pliance with the N PT in these cases, there are legitim ate concerns
that these m echanism s could actually be used in support o f proliferation. As exem plified
by the M uslim Brotherhood, citizens could m obilize in favor o f nuclear weapons.
Perhaps they want the perceived prestige for their nation or to emulate Iran. O r perhaps
they fear Iran and desire their governm ent try to protect them.
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CH APTER VI
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

There are scholars and practitioners, that credit the N PT for being "more
successful in preventing new states from acquiring nuclear weapons than it has been in
either slowing dow n or disarm ing states that already possess nuclear w eapons."485
H owever you interpret the evidence, there are fewer nuclear w eapons today than
anticipated at the tim e o f the creation o f the NPT. Is this because treaties do have an
im pact on state behavior, as put forth by Simmons in the form o f the dom estic politics
theory?
Given the theory’s ability to explain treaty com pliance in hum an rights issue area
it was expected that this m ight apply to other issue areas. N onproliferation does have
some commonalities with hum an rights (both are about security, both have m onitoring
systems, both have high levels o f ratification, both gained m om entum around the same
point in history, etc.) but the details concerning the type o f security and the resulting
im plications are on opposite ends o f the spectrum.
While there is a clear link between the theory’s three m echanism s (m obilization,
agenda setting, and litigation) and state com pliance in hum an rights treaties, the last three
case study chapters have shown that the dom estic politics theory is not very useful when
studying com pliance with the NPT. In this research on the N PT and the dom estic politics

485

W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in W illiams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction, 362.
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theory, m obilization was partially present in the com pliant states, but the other two
mechanisms are com pletely absent.
This chapter begins by exploring what can be inferred about the theory from
studying its application to the NPT. W hat can be learned about the theory’s relative
ineffectualness in explaining NPT com pliance? The theory has already proven its value
in the low politics issues area o f hum an rights but it struggles to explain com pliance in
the high politics issue area. Therefore it is not that theory is not useful but it needs to be
revised. O r perhaps it is not the theory but that nonproliferation has characteristics that
make the dom estic politics theory.
The second section expands on the characteristics o f nonproliferation, and w hat
the research results m ay m ean for the issue area. N oncom pliance w ith the N PT equates
to new nuclear w eapons states. This has high costs for the state that chooses to develop
nuclear w eapons and the international com m unity w hose relationship m ust change with
the noncom pliant state.
Thirdly, given the relative im portance o f m obilization, is it the key to
understanding com pliance and nonproliferation? M obilizing may have m ore w eight than
the other m echanism s o f the dom estic politics theory. A fter all, Simmons even uses this
mechanism in the title o f her book introducing the theory. It is the only m echanism
present in this nonproliferation research, and even then it is not a direct relationship.
Finally, conclusions are drawn for the analyses as a whole. This sums up what
was learned from viewing the NPT com pliance (and noncom pliance) cases through the
lens o f the dom estic politics theory, what this all m eans for the NPT, and if m obilization
is the m ost im portant concept gained from the dom estic politics theory.
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W hat Can Be Inferred About the Theory?

There were three chapters o f case studies, each with a different type o f
com pliance situation with the NPT. There w ere states o f no proliferation concern
(com pliant), already failed to comply, and potential com pliance concerns. Each o f these
com pliance situations contributes to the analysis o f the dom estic politics theory’s
explanatory capability.

Com pliant States
G erm any and Kazakhstan both had lim ited m obilization but neither had the
m echanism s o f litigation and agenda setting. Perhaps, mobilization is m ore im portant
than the other two mechanisms. O r given the obvious strong stance against (m ost things)
nuclear and the current unquestionable com pliance, the theory does not gain much
traction because there is no concern that these governments would ever consider building
nuclear weapons. The other m echanism s are m issing because there is no need for them.
Given the past m obilization against testing o f nuclear weapons, nuclear power,
and the British nuclear arsenal, there is an im plicit constraint upon the national
governm ents in G erm any and K azakhstan that the dom estic populations w ould m obilize
again. The governm ents would not broach the subject o f violating their international
nonproliferation com mitments. Therefore, it is not that the theory does not w ork so much
as the com pliance (the threat o f m obilization) is so unquestionable that theory cannot be
applied in a meaningful manner.
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N oncom pliant States
Libya and Syria developed nuclear weapons program s despite their international
obligations, with no outcry from their citizens. There are several reasons for this, which
may explain the domestic politics theory’s w eak application in these two cases. First,
both nations’ citizens are facing direct threats to their individual security. It is likely that
these threats are much m ore pressing than the national level security concerns. M aslow ’s
H ierarchy o f N eeds explains that physiological needs (such as health and survival) are a
hum an’s m ost basic need.

Therefore, if a citizen had to prioritize his/her concerns, the

proliferation o f nuclear weapons is likely further down the list than safety for his/her
fam ily or establishing a stable fair dem ocracy. Second, neither Syria nor L ibya’s
dom estic populations likely knew o f the clandestine program s nor their governm ent’s
noncom pliant actions before the international com m unity knew. Their governm ents did
not promote their progress with the same propaganda that, for example, the North
Koreans com m only use.
The more pressing concerns o f Libyan citizens really came to light during the
2011 Arab Spring. The Arab Spring was a m ovem ent by domestic groups to overthrow
their governm ents in "a com m on call for personal dignity and responsive governm ent."487
In Libya, the killing o f peaceful protestors by Q adhafi's regim e prom pted an international
outcry.

486 A. H. M aslow, "A Theory o f Human M otivation," Psychological Review 50, no. 4
(July 1943).
487
Anderson, "Dem ystifying the Arab Spring."
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A noticeable difference o f the Libyan Arab Spring (from other Arab Spring
nations) was the supporting role o f the N orth Atlantic Treaty O rganization (N A TO ).488
In response to the February 2011 UN call for security o f the Libyan people from their
government, NATO allies and partner countries form ed a coalition for O peration Unified
Protector (OUP). OUP enforced the no-fly zone, enforced the arms em bargo, and
protected civilians.
The ability o f the Libyan citizens to m obilize was the first m ajor step. N ATO and
the international com m unity than gave legal standing and text the citizens could use to
vindicate their position against their governm ent and continue their dem and for change.
The agenda setting quickly becam e about independence from a ruthless dictator.
One has to w onder if the international com m unity had supported the citizens in
mobilizing against nuclear w eapons if it w ould have made a difference. Instead, secret
negotiations were held to arrange the reverse in Libya’s program. Change cam e from the
outside rather than from within. O f course, the citizens could have chosen to side with
their government had they known about the program. This concept o f m obilizing for
noncom pliance is discussed later in this chapter.

Potential Proliferation Concerns
Egypt and Saudi A rabia are sim ilar to the already failed to com ply states, in that
there are other more pressing concerns that could distract from proliferation. Both states
were im pacted by the Arab Spring, Egypt much more so than Saudi Arabia. The
domestic politics theory did not prove an effective lens for viewing and understanding

488 North A tlantic Treaty Organization, "NATO and Libya,"
http://w w w .nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_71652.htm (accessed N ovem ber 30, 2012).
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future com pliance. Perhaps, trying to understand potential com pliance w ith the N PT in
these cases was too much to demand o f the theory. The theory cannot indicate future
com pliance (or noncom pliance) if the m echanism s are absent. Or is the absence o f the
m echanism a sign o f future noncom pliance?
As seen in our com pliance and noncom pliance cases, the absence o f the
m echanism s is not a true indicator o f anything. In these countries there is no reason to
m obilize against nuclear weapons as there are m ore personal concerns for w hich to
mobilize.

Overall Trends
All three case study categories have com m onalties. Despite varying com pliance
all are m issing litigation and agenda setting m echanism s o f the domestic politics theory.
Furtherm ore, w ith the slight exception o f K azakhstan and G erm any’s m obilization on
related nuclear issues, there is an absence o f m obilization for nonproliferation. Table 4
illustrates the findings o f all six states evaluated in this dissertation. For each o f the
dom estic politics theory m echanism s (agenda setting, litigation, and m obilization) no
state dem onstrated an im pact on treaty com pliance with the NPT.
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Domestic Politics Theory M echanism s Present?
State

A genda Setting

G ermany

No

Litigation

No

M obilization
Yes and N o M obilized but did
not reference treaty
and was on
disarm am ent
(Article VI)
Yes and NoM obilized against
testing and not
about the N PT

K azakhstan

No

No

Syria

No

No

No

Libya

No

No

No

Egypt

No

No

No

Saudi Arabia

No

No

No

Table 4. Results o f All Case Studies

The weak perform ance o f the dom estic politics theory shows that the theory needs
to be modified. Its usefulness in hum an rights does not extend to all issue areas. Based
on this research there should be an added stipulation that in the area o f national security
related treaties (high politics) the theory appears to be less useful. It is too brazen to say
it is com pletely useless as nonproliferation may be a special case. N onetheless, there
may still be some ways in which testing the dom estic politics theory has aided in
understanding proliferation.
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W hat Do the Results Tell Us A bout Nonproliferation?

Given that dom estic politics theory did not provide much leverage for
understanding state com pliance with the NPT: what does this tell us about
nonproliferation? Is nonproliferation unique?
Simmons discussed extensively those states that w ere insincere in their
ratification o f treaties. These are the states that ratified treaties with no intention o f
meeting their obligations. However, she argues that they m ay eventually com ply as a
result o f the com bined m echanism s o f the dom estic politics theory. It seem s that the N PT
has fewer insincere ratification states than hum an rights treaties because there is a higher
cost to ratification. W ith human rights treaty ratification there is little cost for
noncom pliance. W ith the NPT ratification, noncom pliance means pursuing nuclear
weapons, which other states see as a direct threat to their survival. Therefore, they are
m ore likely to respond to noncom pliance and by default the costs are higher for the
noncom pliant state (than for noncom pliance with a hum an rights treaty).
The cost o f noncom pliance with a treaty w hose issue area has such far reaching
international im plications (such as the NPT) can be dire. The noncom pliant actions o f
states party to the N PT have led to diplomatic and m ilitary pressures, and even wars.
And yet, one w ould be hard pressed to think o f an intervention based solely on the
violation o f a human rights treaty. There would be no m ore suffering, let alone genocide,
if the international com m unity took as harsh an approach to noncom pliance with human
rights treaties as they do with weapons related treaties.

The m onitoring systems o f the NPT build further on the cost o f noncom pliance.
The IAEA D epartm ent o f Safeguards is specifically designed to verify N PT treaty
compliance. This is done in a variety o f ways, including: on-site inspections, open source
inform ation analyses, satellite imagery analyses, trade analyses, etc. There are also the
intelligence com m unities o f individual states and independent NGOs that are interested in
verifying com pliance for their own reasons. N onproliferation has a variety o f actors that
collectively form a relatively strong m onitoring system.
The international security nature o f the treaty and the perceived threats associated
w ith violations com bined with a strong m onitoring system may in fact increase
com pliance, w ithout depending on the influence o f dom estic politics.

Is M obilization the Key?

The only part o f the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance that seems to
have an im pact is the m obilization m echanism. M obilization must com e before there can
be agenda setting or litigation. O r perhaps it is sim ply more im portant than the other two
m echanism s in high politics issue areas.
The Kazakhstan and German case studies dem onstrated that treaty m obilization
can be subsum ed within related causes. In these two cases, nuclear testing and nuclear
pow er subsum ed the anti-nuclear weapons (anti-proliferation) position. Given transitive
preferences, one can safely assume the citizens w ould agree with the lesser dem ands o f
the anti-proliferation agenda. Neither nation’s governm ents would choose to pursue
nuclear weapons know ing the strength o f the opposition on related nuclear issues. There
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is no need for citizens to m obilize in the name o f treaty com pliance because the
consensus is so strong on related issues that proliferation is a non-issue in their countries.
Related to this lack o f m obilization for the N PT is the situation in states where
there is treaty noncom pliance and yet the citizens do not mobilize. As discussed in the
case o f Syria and Libya, this may have been for several reasons. The leading reason
behind the lack o f m obilization for nonproliferation is that the populations have more
im m ediate concerns in their lives (specifically safety and econom ics) that dem and their
m obilization efforts more than nonproliferation.
In recent history, both Syria and Libya have proven that their populations can
m obilize despite oppressive government. This contributes to the idea that m obilization is
the most im portant m echanism o f the dom estic politics theory. M obilization in an
oppressive regim e is difficult but does draw the attention o f the national leadership and o f
the international com munity. This m ay be one o f the only w ays for the citizens to
influence the national agenda setting in a non-dem ocratic governm ent w hich offers no
m echanism for citizen input. Furtherm ore, litigation in a repressive and corrupt
governm ent is pointless. It can be ignored and is likely to be a fruitless effort, especially
on an issue for which the national leadership has much to lose. Therefore, m obilization
m ust come before the agenda setting and litigation.
This concept o f m obilization com ing first can also be seen in G erm any and
Kazakhstan. By m obilizing against nuclear w eapons testing and nuclear pow er, both
nations’ citizens were also m obilizing against nuclear w eapons more generally. It is safe
to say the transitive preferences for these citizens move from anti-nuclear weapons
testing to anti-nuclear weapons. The same goes for nuclear power. Those against nuclear
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power will undoubtedly be against the non-civilian use o f nuclear technology for
weapons. In this case, the national governments have taken the point and there is no need
for litigation. Furtherm ore, these m obilizations successfully influenced the agenda. The
nuclear weapons test site is closed in Kazakhstan and G erm any is closing its nuclear
pow er plants.
On the other hand, there is the possibility o f m obilization in support o f
noncompliance. Perhaps the dom estic population really believes that their nation’s intent
is peaceful uses only, or they m ay aspire to the national prestige presum ed to accrue for
nuclear weapons states. Either way, in this proposed instance, a state found in noncom pliance with a treaty has citizens actually m obilizing in support o f their nations’
defiance.
Finally, it is im portant to note that m obilization as a mechanism m ay be directly
influenced by a country’s history and tradition o f mobilization. To generalize:
m obilization may be a com m on w ay o f draw ing attention to an issue in the Arab world,
or even a way o f trying to accom plish things in France, it m ay not be as likely to occur in
other places. It is hard to imagine an issue that w ould unite and m obilize apathetic
citizens across America. Likewise, in Germ any, stereotypically citizens are more likely
to use the established governm ental process than take to the streets.

Research Conclusions

The nonproliferation regime, the NPT and the IAEA safeguards (a requirem ent
under Article III) am eliorate the international com m unity’s peace o f mind against the
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spread o f nuclear weapons. Com pliance is critical for the treaty and regim e to remain
relevant.
This dissertation has explored case studies through the lens o f the domestic
politics theory o f treaty com pliance to understand why states com ply (or do not comply)
with the NPT. C hapter 2 set out a definition o f com pliance and noncom pliance in the
context o f the NPT for the purposes o f this dissertation. The concept o f the domestic
politics theory o f treaty com pliance was discussed w ith time spent on its three main
points (agenda setting, litigation, and m obilization o f dom estic groups) and how they m ay
apply in the high politics issue area o f nonproliferation. An explanation is made in
defense o f using a case study m ethodology for this research followed by an identification
o f the case studies to be used.
In the effort to answ er the question o f w hether the domestic politics theory is
useful for understanding com pliance in the high politics issue area o f national security,
and nonproliferation specifically, this dissertation looked at a total o f six states divided
into three categories o f case studies: no proliferation concern, failure to com ply, and
potential proliferation concern. Chapter 3 covers the states o f no proliferation concern
(G erm any and K azakhstan) and chapter 4 covers the states that have already failed to
com ply (Syria and Libya). Chapter 5 covers the states are o f potential proliferation
concern (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). In each o f these chapters, after an overview o f each
state’s situation, the basic background inform ation was covered including the state’s
history with the NPT and with the nonproliferation regim e more broadly, as well as the
current nuclear pow er status. Then, most importantly, each state was analyzed for the
domestic politics theory variables o f agenda setting, litigation, and domestic
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mobilization. All o f the case studies were based on the facts up until June 2012. Things
may change in the future; especially in those nations most affected by the A rab Spring.

The N ew Stipulation fo r the D om estic Politics Theory
Sim m ons never claimed that the dom estic politics theory was the panacea for
treaty com pliance issues. This dissertation has shown this to be appropriate because the
theory appears to w ork very poorly outside o f the human rights issue area. The dom estic
politics theory does not appear to apply to high politics issues and its limits need to be
recognized. Dom estic politics theory will be m ore or less useful depending on the issue
area. However, if there is one thing that appears to transcend issue areas it is
mobilization.
W hen looking at other issue areas, m obilization appears to be the m ost im portant
m echanism o f the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance. It appears to be the most
effective tool and is utilized first by citizens. I f successful, it influences the national
agenda and rem oves the need for litigation. If it is not successful it may lead to litigation
and attem pts to influence the national agenda by relying on the treaty (that is in-line with
the need for m obilization).

Current Nonproliferation Challenges
There are several current proliferation challenges in the world. Tw o o f the most
important are the ongoing issues with Iran and N orth Korea. The dom estic politics
theory does not look likely to help the international com m unity work with North K orea or
Iran. The citizens o f N orth Korea will not be m obilizing anytime soon for the leadership
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to stop building nuclear w eapons. In fact they could one day mobilize (albeit in a
suspiciously w ell-choreographed manner) to support their nation’s nuclear weapons
developm ent. Likewise, Iran appears to have vacillating domestic support for its nuclear
policies.489 In neither country can we expect new litigation or influence on the national
agenda by nonproliferation supporters.
W ith those states have rem ained outside the treaty (Israel, India and Pakistan) the
N PT has minimal impact. However, it seems unlikely that the domestic politics theory
can be applied to those states that never com m itted them selves to the treaty in the first
place.
Finally, there are the five nuclear weapons states that have com m itted themselves
to good faith negotiations on disarm am ent.490 This can be explored further in future
research but it seems view ing this issue through the domestic politics theory o f treaty
com pliance w ould be difficult given how difficult com pliance is to define for Article VI.

H ope fo r the Future
The nonproliferation regim e has “helped to create predictability, stability, and
security in m any regions o f the w orld.”491 Elements o f the regime are coordinated around
the NPT. The NPT m ay not be a perfect treaty but it is the best we have and it serves a

489 Shahram Chubin, "The Politics o f Iran's N uclear Program," United States Institute o f
Peace, http://iranprim er.usip.org/resource/politics-irans-nuclear-program (accessed
N ovem ber 30, 2012).
490 US Departm ent o f State, "Treaty on the Nonproliferation o f N uclear W eapons," ed.
Treaties and O ther International Acts Series (1970).
491 A m y Sands, "Nonproliferation Regimes at Risk," in Occasional P aper N um ber 3, ed.
M ichael Barletta and A m y Sands (M onterey, N ovem ber 1999).
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real purpose and international com m unity need. The German ratification o f the NPT
included the follow ing declaration statement, which says Germany:
regards the Treaty not as end but rather a starting point for the
negotiations, provided for the Treaty itself as its natural supplem ent and to
ensure its effective im plem entation, concerning disarm am ent, the peaceful
uses o f nuclear energy, and the benefits arising for the peaceful
applications o f nuclear energy;492

The treaty is a starting p o in t and the international com m unity must continue to
strive for this noble cause. There are those that do not believe that the treaty is w orking
to stop the spread o f nuclear weapons and is doom ed to be a failure and meaningless.
There is a real danger in this w ay o f thinking as "this prophecy is not only at risk o f being
self-fulfilling, but w ould remove the legal norm s (and perceived consequential im proved
security context) that may be constraining som e states from nuclear w eapons
acquisition."493
As this dissertation has shown, the dom estic politics theory o f treaty com pliance
is not a very useful prism for understanding nonproliferation treaty com pliance. In fact,
the m echanism m ay even w ork against com pliance in high politics. M ost likely the result
o f “dom estic pressures from constituencies mobilized by Iran’s nuclearization,” caused
Egypt’s renew ed interest in nuclear pow er.494 The same domestic pressure could
mobilize for m atching Iranian weapons in the future.

492 United Nations, "NPT (Germany)."
493 Owen C. W. Price and Jennifer M ackby, eds., D ebating 21st Century N uclear Issues
(W ashington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 281.
494 Solingen, N uclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the M iddle E a st, 236.
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As David Albright states, “our security should rest on the first lines o f defense,
such as institutionalized approaches like the N uclear Non-Proliferation T reaty.”495 Sadly,
this is not a perfect system and som etim e a first line o f defense is not enough. The world
has had to rely on last line o f defense m easures several times. The classic exam ple being
the 2003 Iraq war, for which nonproliferation was a partial justification. This preventive
war, W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu o f the Geneva Centre for Security Policy in Switzerland
calls "the first (and last) non-proliferation w ar."496
Hopefully, this research on nonproliferation and the domestic politics theory o f
treaty com pliance aids in understanding nonproliferation compliance. And by default a
better understanding o f com pliance m ay lead to more com pliance and m ake the w orld a
safer place.

495 Albright, Peddling Peril: H ow the Secret Nuclear Trade Arm s A m erica ’s Enem ies,
245.
496 W aheguru Pal Singh Sidhu in W illiams, ed. Security Studies: An Introduction, 373.
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